2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 MISTER COLEMAN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00311-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 JAMES DZURENDA, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Mister Coleman brings this civil-rights action under

to 13 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Ely State 14 Prison. (ECF No. 17.) On February 21, 2025, this Court ordered Mister Coleman to file 15 an amended complaint by March 21, 2025. (ECF No. 16.) The Court warned Coleman 16 that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that 17 deadline. (Id. at 10.) That deadline expired and Coleman did not file an amended 18 complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 20 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 21 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

, 831 22 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 23 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 24 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 25 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th 26 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 27 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 28 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 2 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 3 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 4 Malone,

). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 6 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Mister 7 Coleman’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor 8 of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable 9 delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. 10 Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring 11 disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring 12 dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 14 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 15 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 16 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 17 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 18 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 19 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 20 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 21 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 22 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 23 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 25 unless Coleman files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second 26 order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often 27 only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances 28 here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Coleman 1 || needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. 2 || Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So, 3 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 5 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 6 || prejudice based on Mister Coleman’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance 7 || with this Court’s February 21, 2025, order and for failure to state a claim. The Clerk of 8 || Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 9 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Mister Coleman wishes to pursue his claims, he 10 || must file a complaint in a new case. 11 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) 12 || is granted. This status does not relieve Plaintiff of his obligation to pay the full $350 filing 13 || fee under the statute; it just means that he can do it in installments. And the full $350 filing 14 || fee remains due and owing even though this case is being dismissed. 15 To ensure that Plaintiff pays the full filing fee, it is further ordered that the Nevada 16 || Department of Corrections must pay to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 17 || District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month’s deposits to the account of Mister 18 || Coleman, # 1234612 (in months that the account exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing 19 || fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this 20 || order (1) to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office and (2) to the attention of Chief of 21 || Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of Corrections at 22 || formapauperis @doc.nv.gov. 23 DATED THIS 4" Day of April 2025.

25 — MIRANDA M. DU 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28