1

2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 MATTHEW DOUGLAS, Case No. 2:25-cv-00567-MMD-MDC

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 JEREMY BEAN, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 Matthew Douglas, an individual incarcerated at High Desert State Prison, has 12 submitted a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under

(ECF No. 1- 13 1 (“Petition”)), and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 1). The 14 Court will deny Douglas’s IFP application because it does not include the required 15 financial certificate signed by an authorized prison officer. See LSR 1-2. And the Court 16 will summarily dismiss this action without prejudice because it is plain that all of Douglas’s 17 claims are unexhausted in state court. 18 The court conducts an initial review of a habeas petition and orders a response 19 unless it plainly appears from the petition and attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 20 entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery,

(9th Cir. 2019); Rule 4 of 21 the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”) (“If it plainly appears from the 22 petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district 23 court, the judge must dismiss the petition . . . .”). A procedurally defective petition may be 24 dismissed summarily. See Boyd v. Thompson,

(9th Cir. 1998); see 25 also McFarland v. Scott,

(1994) (“Federal courts are authorized to 26 dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.”). 27 Douglas’s Petition includes three grounds for relief, in all three of which he claims 28 that his federal constitutional rights have been violated by the manner in which his prison 1 sentence has been calculated and/or in state court proceedings in which he has sought 2 relief. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3-8.) All three grounds are unexhausted in state court. 3 A federal court generally may not grant habeas corpus relief on a claim not 4 exhausted in state court. See

(b). The exhaustion doctrine is based on 5 the policy of federal-state comity, and is intended to allow state courts the initial 6 opportunity to correct constitutional deprivations. See Picard v. Conner,

, 7 275 (1971). To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must fairly present the claim to the highest 8 available state court and must give that court the opportunity to address and resolve it. 9 See Duncan v. Henry,

(1995) (per curiam); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 10

(1992). 11 In his first ground for relief, Douglas claims his constitutional right to due process 12 of law has been violated by Respondents’ treatment of four leap years in calculating his 13 sentence. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) Douglas alleges that he asserted this claim in two state 14 habeas petitions, one filed March 4, 2024, and the other filed October 29, 2024, and in a 15 motion to modify or correct illegal sentence, and that he has appealed the denial of relief, 16 but there is no indication that the appeal has concluded. (Id. at 4; see also

, 10-28 17 (attaching documents from state district court proceedings, but not from any state 18 appellate proceedings, despite the instruction in the form petition to attach copies of “all 19 state court written decisions regarding this conviction.”).) 20 In his second ground for relief, Douglas claims his constitutional right of access to 21 the courts has been violated because one of his state habeas petitions was denied without 22 oral argument. (Id. at 5.) Putting aside that this is likely not a claim cognizable in a federal 23 habeas action, it is plain that Douglas has not asserted this claim in state court. (Id. at 6.) 24 And in his third ground for relief, Douglas claims that his constitutional right to be 25 free of double jeopardy has been violated because his sentence, as calculated by 26 Respondents, violates Nevada’s “40% rule.” (Id. at 7.) Douglas alleges that he asserted 27 this claim in his March 4, 2024, state habeas petition but that he did not raise the claim 28 2 1 || on appeal from the denial of relief in that case, and he acknowledges that he did not 2 || assert this claim in his October 29, 2024, state habeas petition. (/d. at 8.) 3 Given that all of Douglas’s claims are unexhausted in state court, the Petition fails 4 || to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. This action will be 5 || dismissed without prejudice. If Douglas wishes to initiate a new petition for writ of habeas 6 || corpus in this Court, after exhausting his claims in state court, he must submit a petition 7 || on the correct form, and he must either pay the filing fee or file a fully completed 8 || application to proceed in forma pauperis, also on the correct form, including the required 9 || financial certificate. If he does so, Douglas should not put the case number of this case 10 || on the documents he submits to initiate the new action. 11 It is therefore ordered that Petitioner's Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 12 || (ECF No. 1) is denied. 13 It is further ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice. 14 It is further ordered that Petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability because 15 || no reasonable jurist would find this ruling to be debatable or wrong. 16 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 17 The Clerk of Court is further directed to serve a copy of this order on the Attorney 18 || General of the State of Nevada. The Attorney General need take no action with respect 19 || to this case. 20 DATED THIS 7" Day of April 2025. 21 22 MIRANDA M. DU 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28