1

2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5

6 TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No. 2:24-cv-01797-RFB-EJY

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 ELY STATE PRISON, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Tyrone Noel Nunn brings this civil-rights action under

to redress 13 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered at Ely State Prison. ECF No. 1-1. On October 14 18, 2024, this Court ordered Nunn to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 15 or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before November 22, 2024. ECF No. 3. The Court warned 16 Nunn that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed 17 in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that 18 deadline. 19 That same day, Nunn filed a document with fourteen case numbers and the words in forma 20 pauperis on it. ECF No. 4. In light of this filing, the Court extended the deadline for Nunn to file 21 a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the filing fee to March 7, 2025. ECF 22 No. 5. That extended deadline expired, and Nunn did not file a fully complete application to 23 proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 24 I. DISCUSSION 25 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 26 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 27 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 1 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 2 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 3 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 4 Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 5 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) 6 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 7 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 8 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 9 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 10 U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 11 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 12 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third 13 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 14 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 15 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 16 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 17 the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 19 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 20 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 21 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 22 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 23 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 24 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 25 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 26 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 27 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 1 ||

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 2 || unless Nunn either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $405 3 || filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 4 || But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders 5 || the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an 6 || exception: there is no hint that Nunn needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the 7 || Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. 8 || So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9 I. CONCLUSION 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 11 || favor of dismissal. 12 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without 13 || prejudice based on Nunn’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 14 || or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 18, 2024, and February 4, 15 || 2025, Orders. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Nunn may move to reopen this case and vacate the 17 || judgment by filing a motion for reconsideration of this Order. In this motion, Nunn is required to 18 || explain what circumstances delayed him from paying the filing fee or filing the application to 19 || proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint in compliance with LSR 2-1. If the Court finds there 20 || to be good cause or a reasonable explanation therein, the Court will reopen the case and vacate the 21 |} judgment. 22 DATED: April 7, 2025. 23 24 □ | S RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28