1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 TIMOTHY CLEVELAND, Case No. 2:25-cv-00579-EJY

5 Plaintiff,

6 v. ORDER

7 MARIA CHAVES, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 11 (ECF No. 2) and his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4), both of which arrived in the District of 12 Nevada by way of a transfer from the Eastern District of California. ECF No. 6. The Court reviewed 13 the documents and finds as follows. 14 I. Screening Standard 15 Complaints by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis are screened under the standard 16 specified by

(e)(2). Under this standard, the reviewing Court must identify any 17 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon 18 which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 19 relief.

(e)(2). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent 20 standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe,

(1980). However, even 21 a plaintiff proceeding pro se must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. While the standard 22 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, 23 a plaintiff’s pleadings must include more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 24 action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). 25 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 26 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 27 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 1 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams,

, 327–28 (1989); 2 McKeever v. Block,

(9th Cir. 1991). 3 II. Discussion 4 Though this case arrived before the Court via transfer from the Eastern District of California, 5 the Court takes notice of the fact that Plaintiff previously filed a substantially identical complaint in 6 this District that was dismissed for failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See ECF No. 29 7 in Case No. 2:24-cv-00511-CDS-DJA (“Cleveland I”). In dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint in 8 Cleveland I, the Court noted that “[a]lthough Cleveland cites to various state and federal statutes, he 9 does not articulate how they give rise to viable claims against the defendants, much less how this 10 court has jurisdiction over any alleged claim under the statutes.” Id. at 2. 11 Comparing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in the case at bar to his complaint in 12 Cleveland I, which was dismissed, the Court finds that the First Amended Complaint provides even 13 less information than was stated in the Cleveland I. Both operative complaints mention “badges and 14 incidents of slavery,” as well as referencing various constitutional provisions and an international 15 treaty. Compare ECF No. 4 with ECF No. 13 in Cleveland I. However, while the complaint in 16 Cleveland I cited multiple provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act as well as the Fair Housing Act, 17 Civil Rights Act, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the First Amended Complaint here removes 18 all citations to federal statutes save for a single mention of the Corporate Transparency Act. Id. 19 Plaintiff names one additional Defendant in the instant case, Maria Chaves, but he fails to direct any 20 allegations towards her. See generally, ECF No. 4. Finally, though Plaintiff alleges a specific injury 21 in the form of “the seizure and sale on July 03, 2018 of Plaintiff’s motor vehicle,” he fails to connect 22 this allegation to any named Defendant or a cognizable cause of action. Id. at 4. 23 “A trial court may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss 24 it for failure to state a claim....” Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co.,

, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) 25 (internal citation omitted). Further, “a pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed 26 and demand relief.” Sherrell v. Bank of Am., N.A., Case No. CV F 11-1785-LJO (JLT),

6749765, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011). In sum, “[w]hile the Court must construe pro se pleading 1 || provide Defendants with fair notice of the specific [sic] of Plaintiff's claims such that they c: 2 || fairly mount a defense” Gifford v. Hornbrook Fire Protection District, Case No. 2:16-cv-059 3 || DJC-DMC,

, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2025). 4 Based on the foregoing and the fact that Plaintiff has been given multiple attempts to addre 5 || these infirmities, the Court finds it proper to exercise its authority and dismiss this matter in 1 6 || entirety with prejudice. 7 \| Ul. Order 8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in forn 9 || pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) 11 |} DISMISSED with prejudice. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is to enter judgement in favor | 13 || Defendants and close this case. No further filings are to be accepted. 14 Dated this 25th day April, 2025.

Vea NN POLAK cWwo □ 16 ELAYNM J. YOUCHAH ~ UNITE STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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