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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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7 APRIL PARKS, Case No. 2:25-cv-00040-RFB-MDC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 9 HOLLY SKULSTED, et al., 10 Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff April Parks initiated this case with a motion to compel the Defendants to provide 14 her a copy of her “credit history by sentence report.” (ECF No. 1-1). On January 10, 2025, this 15 Court explained to Parks that to commence a civil action she must file a complaint with the Court, 16 and she must either pay the $405 filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis. 17 (ECF No. 3). The Court directed Parks to file a complaint and either pay the filing fee or file an 18 application to proceed in forma pauperis by March 11, 2025. (Id. at 2). The Court warned Parks 19 that the action could be dismissed if she failed to file a complaint and file an application to proceed 20 in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id.). Parks 21 subsequently refiled the same motion to compel that she had filed to initiate this action. (ECF No. 22 4). However, Parks did not file a complaint, file an application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay 23 the full $405 filing fee, request an extension, or otherwise respond to the Court’s order. 24 I. DISCUSSION 25 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 26 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 27 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 1 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 2 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 3 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 4 Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 5 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) 6 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 7 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 8 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 9 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 10 U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 11 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 12 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Parks’ claims. The third 13 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 14 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 15 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 16 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 17 the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 19 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 20 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 21 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 22 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 23 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 24 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 25 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 26 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 27 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 1 ||

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 2 || unless Parks files a complaint and either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma 3 || pauperis or pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order 4 || setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 5 || the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate 6 || that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Parks needs additional time or evidence 7 || that she did not receive the Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative 8 || given these circumstances. So, the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9 || IL. CONCLUSION 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 11 || favor of dismissal. 12 Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice based on 13 || Parks’ failure to file a complaint and file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 14 || or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s January 10, 2025 Order. The Clerk 15 || of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may 16 || be filed in this now-closed case. If Parks wishes to pursue her claims, she must file a complaint in 17 || anew case. 18 19 DATED: May 5, 2025. 20 21 < | RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27