1

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4

5 HAILEY ALEXIA PEREZ, Case No. 2:24-cv-01650-RFB-NJK 6 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 7 v. [Docket No. 32] 8 RAMANJIT SINGH, et al., 9 Defendant(s). 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. Docket No. 32. 11 Defendants filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 33. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 34.1 12 The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed 13 below, the motion for leave to amend is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 This case involves an alleged personal injury arising out of a vehicle collision. See Docket 16 No. 21 (first amended complaint). On September 5, 2024, Defendants removed the case to federal 17 court on diversity grounds. See Docket No. 1. On November 15, 2024, the Court issued a 18 scheduling order establishing a deadline to amend the pleadings of December 19, 2024. Docket 19 No. 13. Although other case management deadlines have been extended, the deadline to amend 20 the pleadings expired on December 19, 2024. See Docket No. 25. On February 12, 2025, Plaintiff 21 filed a motion for leave to amend, Docket No. 28, which was denied without prejudice for failing 22 to address the governing standards, Docket No. 30. On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff renewed that 23 motion, Docket No. 32, which is the matter currently pending before the Court. 24 II. STANDARDS 25 When a party moves to amend the pleadings after the expiration of the deadline established 26 in the scheduling order, courts review the motion through a multi-step process. As a threshold 27

28 1 The Court cites herein to the CMECF pagination, not the native pagination in the filings. 1 matter, courts treat the motion as seeking to amend the scheduling order. Such a request implicates 2 the “good cause” standard outlined in Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Johnson 3 v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ 4 standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.”

. In 5 particular, courts look to whether the deadline set in the scheduling order “cannot reasonably be 6 met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”

The diligence inquiry also 7 addresses other pertinent circumstances, including whether the movant was prompt in seeking 8 relief from the Court once it became apparent that relief from the scheduling order was needed. 9 See Jackson v. Laureate, Inc.,

(E.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Eckert Cold Storage, 10 Inc. v. Behl,

(E.D. Cal. 1996)). Although prejudice to the opposing party 11 may also be considered, the focus of the inquiry is on the movant’s reasons for seeking 12 modification. Johnson,

. “If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” 13

The party seeking amendment bears the burden of establishing diligence. See Singer v. Las 14 Vegas Athletic Clubs,

(D. Nev. 2019); see also Morgal v. Maricopa 15 Cnty. Bd. Of Supervisors,

(D. Ariz. 2012). 16 A motion for leave to amend filed after the expiration of the corresponding deadline also 17 requires a showing of excusable neglect. See Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. DMSI, LLC,

(9th Cir. 2017); see also Local Rule 26-3. The excusable neglect analysis is guided 19 by factors that include (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay 20 and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the 21 movant acted in good faith. Branch Banking,

. The party seeking amendment 22 bears the burden of establishing excusable neglect. See

(affirming finding of no excusable 23 neglect based upon the movant’s failure to provide a sufficient showing). 24 When the movant establishes a sufficient basis for obtaining relief from the governing case 25 management deadline, courts then examine whether amendment is proper under the standards 26 outlined in Rule 15(a). Rule 15(a) provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] 27 when justice so requires,” and there is a strong public policy in favor of permitting amendment. 28 Bowles v. Reade,

(9th Cir. 1999). Rule 15(a) is to be applied with “extreme 1 liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2003) (per 2 curiam). Under Rule 15(a), courts consider various factors, including: (1) bad faith; (2) undue 3 delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of the amendment; and (5) whether the 4 plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. See

. Not all of these factors carry 5 equal weight and prejudice is the “touchstone.”

Absent a showing of prejudice or a strong 6 showing of any of the remaining factors, there is a presumption that leave to amend should be 7 granted.

The party opposing the amendment bears the burden of showing why leave should 8 not be permitted under Rule 15(a). Underwood v. O’Reilly Auto Enters., LLC,

, 9 343 (D. Nev. 2022). 10 III. ANALYSIS 11 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend centers on two sets of proposed amendments: (1) 12 amendments to modify the allegations as to the parties’ respective lanes of travel and (2) 13 amendments to add a request for punitive damages related to the alleged failure to comply with 14 procedures in a safety manual. Because the proposed amendments relate to different 15 circumstances and implicate different issues, the Court will address them separately below. 16 A. LANES OF TRAVEL 17 Plaintiff seeks to amend the allegations regarding the drivers’ lanes of travel to “match the 18 evidence that has been uncovered.” Docket No. 32 at 12. Plaintiff points to various discovery 19 information provided in late January or thereafter regarding the drivers’ lanes of travel at the time 20 of the underlying incident. See id. at 12-13. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s 21 efforts to amend the complaint is untimely as to these allegations. See, e.g., Docket No. 33 at 7. 22 Plaintiff was herself one of the drivers involved in the accident, so she has been privy to the parties’ 23 respective lane positions since May 18, 2023. See Docket No. 21 at ¶ 7 (first amended complaint, 24 alleging date of incident). Plaintiff has also long had access to the police report, which also 25 explicitly identifies the parties’ respective lane positions. See Docket No. 33-2 at 7. Indeed, that 26 police report was identified in Plaintiff’s own initial disclosures. Docket No. 33-3 at 7. The 27 contention that Plaintiff only recently learned of the parties’ lanes of travel is disingenuous and 28 belied by the record. Plaintiff knew or should have known this information from day one, but 1 Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit and allowed the amendment deadline to lapse (by several months) 2 before seeking to amend these allegations. In these circumstances, the Court cannot find that 3 Plaintiff was diligent as required by Rule 16(b), so this aspect of the motion for leave to amend 4 will be denied on that basis.2 5 B. SAFETY MANUAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 6 Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add allegations regarding noncompliance with 7 Defendants’ safety manual, along with a corresponding request to recover punitive damages. 8 1. Good Cause 9 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was diligent such that good cause exists to modify the 10 scheduling order. See, e.g., Docket No. 32 at 6; Docket No. 33 at 6. While the Court agrees with 11 Defendants in general that there were some gaps in the discovery activity, the overall picture 12 suffices to establish diligence required for good cause. Plaintiff served requests for production 13 within a few weeks of the issuance of the scheduling order. Docket No. 33-8 (requests for 14 production served on November 26, 2024). Upon receiving the subject safety manual after a meet- 15 and-confer and obtaining pertinent deposition testimony, see Docket No. 32-2 (deposition from 16 January 16, 2025), Plaintiff sought leave to amend with respect to this information only a few 17 weeks thereafter, see Docket No. 28 (initial motion filed on February 12, 2025). Good cause exists 18 to modify the scheduling order with respect to this set of proposed amendments. 19 2. Excusable Neglect 20 The governing factors for excusable neglect also tilt in Plaintiff’s favor. There was not 21 significant delay and there was sufficient reason for that delay, as stated above. Moreover, the 22 case remains in the discovery period, so there is not a significant potential impact on the 23 proceedings and there is minimal danger of prejudice to the defense. With respect to the movant’s 24 good faith, Defendants argue that the pending motion is bad-faith gamesmanship designed to 25 improperly thwart Defendants’ early motion for partial summary judgment. Docket No. 33 at 9- 26 11. The Court does not find sufficient grounds to deem the motion filed in bad faith. Although 27 2 The lack of diligence is alone fatal, so the Court need not opine on excusable neglect or 28 the Rule 15 considerations for amendment. See, e.g., Morgal,

. 1 seeking leave to amend when facing a motion for summary judgment “might reflect bad faith” in 2 certain circumstances, Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 3 1999) (emphasis added) (finding that bad faith might be found in seeking leave to amend after 4 summary judgment had been sought to add new causes of action on which discovery had not been 5 obtained), the circumstances here are more readily viewed as a natural progression of the case to 6 amend upon receiving discovery from the opposing party with new information. Stated differently, 7 the fact that leave to amend was sought in this case after the motion for partial summary judgment 8 was filed appears to stem largely from the fact that Defendants filed that motion during the 9 discovery period and a full six months before the pertinent deadline. See Docket No. 25 at 2 10 (setting dispositive motion deadline for July 17, 2025). In short, the Court does not find that 11 Plaintiff’s motion was filed in bad faith. Excusable neglect exists to modify the scheduling order 12 with respect to this set of proposed amendments. 13 3. Rule 15 Analysis 14 Having found that the filing of the instant request after the governing deadline is not an 15 impediment to amendment, the Court turns to the Rule 15 analysis to determine whether 16 amendment is warranted. Defendants argue that the proposed amendment would be futile. Docket 17 No. 33 at 13-19. Although futility can be a ground to deny leave to amend, Novak v. United States, 18

(9th Cir. 2015), courts do not generally deny leave to amend on that ground, 19 Underwood, 342 F.R.D. at 346-47. “Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of challenges to 20 the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended 21 pleading is filed.” Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp.,

(N.D. Cal. 2003). 22 Deferring ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations is preferred in light of the more liberal 23 standards applicable to motions to amend and the fact that the parties’ arguments are better 24 developed through a motion to dismiss or other dispositive motion practice. See, e.g., in re 25 Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.,

(N.D.

). Defendants provide no reason to chart a different course in this case. 27 28 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the motion for leave to amend is GRANTED in part and 3] DENIED in part. Plaintiff must file a second amended complaint in conformity with the findings made herein by May 29, 2025. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: May 21, 2025 7 ‘ Nancy a 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28