Nunn v. High Desert State Prison

District Court, D. Nevada

Nunn v. High Desert State Prison

Trial Court Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 IN RE Case No.: 2:24-cv-02342-APG-DJA TYRONE NOEL NUNN, 4 Order

5

6 Plaintiff Tyrone Noel Nunn brings this civil-rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

. ECF 7 No. 1-1. On January 10, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Nunn to file a fully complete 8 application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before March 11, 9 2025. ECF No. 3. The magistrate judge warned Nunn that the action could be dismissed if he 10 failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents 11 or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline.

Id. at 2

. That deadline has 12 expired, and Nunn did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the 13 full $405 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 14 I. Discussion 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 16 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 17 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

782 F.2d 829, 831

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 18 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 19 Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 20 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 21 Postal Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 22 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 23 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 1 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 2 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 3 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 4

833 F.2d at 130

).

5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 6 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third 7 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 8 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 9 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 1976). The 10 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 11 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 13 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 14 v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic

15 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 16 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 17 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 18 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

779 F.2d 1421

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 19 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Nunn either files a fully complete 20 application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only 21 alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an 22 ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. 23 The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that 1}| Nunn needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors 3}| dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. II. Conclusion 6 I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Nunn’s 7|| failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 8]| filing fee in compliance with the magistrate judge’s January 10, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed this now-closed case. If Nunn wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 12 13 Dated: June 10, 2025 14 ( Bo Andrew P. Gordon 15 Chief United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Reference

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