1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Lon Allen Clark, Case No.: 2:23-cv-02163-RFB-EJY

4 Petitioner Order

5 v.

6 Gabriela Najera,

7 Respondents

8 This habeas matter is before the Court on Petitioner Lon Allen Clark’s failure to comply 9 with the Court’s Order. 10 Background 11 Clark initiated this case by filing an application for leave to file a second or successive 12 petition under

. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Clark’s application 13 as unnecessary and transferred the application to this Court to be processed as a § 2254 petition. 14 The Court ordered Clark to either pay the $5 filing fee or submit a complete IFP application with 15 all required attachments within 45 days. ECF No. 10. Clark timely complied. ECF No. 12. In 16 addition, the Court instructed Clark to file a petition on the Court’s approved form or in 17 substantial compliance with the form within 45 days. ECF No. 13. Clark was warned that a 18 failure to comply would result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice and without 19 further advance notice. Id. The 45-day deadline expired last month. 20 To date, Clark has not filed an amended petition, requested an extension of time, or taken 21 any other action to prosecute this case. In addition, the Court’s minute order denying Clark’s 22 motion for appointment of counsel was returned as undeliverable with a note that Clark has been 23 discharged. ECF No. 15. 1 Discussion 2 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 3 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 4 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court 5 may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules.

6 See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 7 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. 8 U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 9 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must 10 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 11 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 12 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 13 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 14 U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)).

15 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 16 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor, risk of 17 prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises 18 from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 19 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 20 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 21 the factors favoring dismissal. 22 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be 23 used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See 1 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less 2 drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); 3 accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the 4 persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic 5 alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the

6 “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to 7 comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of 8 dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 9 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because litigation 10 cannot progress without Clark’s compliance with court orders, the only alternative is to enter a 11 second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it 12 often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances 13 here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting another deadline is not a 14 meaningful alternative given these circumstances. Thus, the fifth factor favors dismissal.

15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner Lon Allen Clark’s Petition for Writ of 16 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED without prejudice based his on failure to comply 17 with the Court’s Order (ECF No. 13) or the Local Rules of Practice. 18 It is further ordered that Petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability, as jurists of 19 reason would not find dismissal of the petition for the reasons stated herein to be debatable or 20 wrong. 21 The Clerk of Court is directed to add Nevada Attorney General Aaron D. Ford as counsel 22 for Respondents. No response is required from Respondents other than to respond to any orders 23 of a reviewing court. 1 Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Clerk of Court is directed to file the Petition (ECF No. 1-1) and informally serve the Nevada Attorney General with the petition and this order by sending a notice of electronic filing to the Nevada Attorney General’s office. 5 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment accordingly and close this case. 6 7 8 DATED this 13 day of June, 2025. : AS 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23