UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 MATTHEW TRAVIS HOUSTON, Case No. 3:25-cv-00053-ART-CSD 3 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 4 v.

5 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

6 Defendants.

7 8 Plaintiff Matthew Travis Houston brings this civil-rights action under 42

. (ECF No. 5). On March 13, 2025, the Court denied Houston’s 10 application to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered him to pay the $405 filing 11 fee in full by April 12, 2025, because he had three strikes under

1915(g). (ECF No. 15). The Court warned Houston that the action would be 13 dismissed if he failed to pay the $405 filing fee by that deadline. (Id. at 4). At 14 Houston’s request, the Court extended the deadlines to May 13, 2025, and then 15 June 30, 2025. (ECF Nos. 25, 30). Those deadlines expired and Houston did not 16 pay the filing fee, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 17 DISCUSSION 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 19 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 20 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 21 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 22 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 23 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 24 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 25 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 26 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 27 1 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the 2 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 3 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 4 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 5 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 6 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 8 litigation and the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 9 dismissal of Houston’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 10 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 11 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 12 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 13 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 14 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 16 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 17 court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 18 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 19 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 21 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 22 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the Court’s order as 23 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 24 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 25 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 26 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 27 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1 || 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless 2 || Houston pays the $405 filing fee, the only alternative is to enter a fourth order 3 || setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it 4 || often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The 5 || circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is 6 || no hint that Houston needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive 7 || the original order and extension orders. Setting another deadline is not a 8 || meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors 9 || dismissal. 10 || Il. CONCLUSION 11 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 12 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. The Court orders that this action is dismissed 13 || without prejudice based on Houston’s failure to pay the $405 filing fee in 14 || compliance with the March 13, 2025, April 17, 2025, and May 21, 2025, 15 || orders. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close 16 || this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Houston 17 || wishes to pursue his claims, he must comply with the vexatious litigant pre- 18 || filing order issued by Judge Dorsey in Houston v. Encore Event Technologies, et 19 || al., 2:22-cv-01740-JAD-EJY, ECF No. 30. 20 It is further ordered that the motion for clarification (ECF No. 16), which 21 || appear to be copies of inmate request forms, is denied as moot. 22 23 DATED: July 10, 2025. 24 25 j ), ‘ Vd 26 of TRAUM 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28