2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 JOSEPH WASHINGTON, Case No. 2:24-cv-01000-GMN-DJA

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 TIMEKEEPER NDOC, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Joseph Washington brings this civil-rights action under

13 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Ely 14 State Prison and High Desert State Prison. (ECF No. 18.) On May 23, 2025, this Court 15 ordered Washington to file a second amended within 30 days. (ECF No. 19.) The Court 16 warned Washington that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a second 17 amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 6.) That deadline expired, and Washington 18 did not file a second amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 19 I. DISCUSSION 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 21 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 22 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

, 831 23 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 24 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 25 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 26 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th 27 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 28 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 2 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 7 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of 8 Washington’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in 9 favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of 10 unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See 11 Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public 12 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors 13 favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 15 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 16 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 17 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 18 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 19 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 20 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 21 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 23 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 24 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until 26 and unless Washington files a second amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter 27 a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is 28 that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 1 || circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint 2 || that Washington needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s 3 || screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 4 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 5 || Ul. CONCLUSION 6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 7 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore Ordered that this action is dismissed without 8 || prejudice based on Washington’s failure to file a second amended complaint in 9 || compliance with this Court’s May 23, 2025, Order. The Clerk of Court is kindly requested 10 || to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in 11 || this now-closed case. If Washington wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint 12 || in anew case. 13 It is further Ordered that Washington’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 14 || (ECF No. 3) is denied as moot. 15 16 DATED THIS 22 day of July 2025. Yj, /jfp, : 19 Sniegpatates District Court

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28