2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 EDMUND HO, Case No. 3:24-CV-372-ART-CLB

4 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER v. 5 JAMES DZURENDA, 6 Defendants. 7 8 Plaintiff Edmund Ho brings this civil-rights action under

9 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 10 at Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF No. 9.) On July 1, 2025, this Court ordered 11 Edmund Ho to file a first amended complaint by July 31, 2025. (ECF No. 8.) The 12 Court warned Edmund Ho that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a 13 first amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 10.) That deadline expired and 14 Edmund Ho did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or 15 otherwise respond. 16 DISCUSSION 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 18 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 19 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 20 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 21 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 22 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 23 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 24 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 25 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 26 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 27 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 28 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 2 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 3 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 4 Cir. 1987)). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 6 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 7 dismissal of Edmund Ho’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to 8 defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury 9 arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by 10 the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

, 524 11 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases 12 on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 14 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 15 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 16 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 17 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 19 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 20 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 21 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 23 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 24 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 25 Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 26 cannot realistically proceed until and unless Edmund HO files an amended 27 complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 28 But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 2 not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Edmund Ho 3 needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening 4 order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 5 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 6 CONCLUSION 7 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 8 they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 9 dismissed without prejudice based on Edmund Ho’s failure to file an amended 10 complaint in compliance with this Court’s July 1, 2025, order and for failure to 11 state a claim. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and 12 close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If 13 Edmund Ho wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 14 It is further ordered that the application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF 15 No. 1] is granted. This status doesn’t relieve plaintiff of his obligation to pay the 16 full $350 filing fee under the statute; it just means that he can do it in 17 installments. And the full $350 filing fee remains due and owing even though 18 this case is being dismissed. 19 To ensure that the plaintiff pays the full filing fee, it is further ordered that 20 the Nevada Department of Corrections must pay to the Clerk of the United States 21 District Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month’s deposits to the 22 account of 23 Edmund Ho, #89285, (in months that the account exceeds $10.00) until 24 the full $350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk is directed to 25 SEND a copy of this order (1) to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office and (2) 26 to the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of 27 Corrections at [email protected]. 28 1 DATED THIS 13th day of August 2025. 2 3 4 An posed dn 5 ANNE R. TRAUM 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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