1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *

4 WILLIE JACKSON, Case No. 3:25-cv-00066-ART-CLB

5 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 6 v. OF COUNSEL AND MOTION TO ACCEPT EXHIBIT 7 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., [ECF Nos. 12,15, 56, 57] 8 Defendants.

9 10 This case involves a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Willie Jackson (“Jackson”) 11 against various defendants for events that took place while Jackson was incarcerated at 12 Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF No. 21.) Currently pending before the Court are several 13 motions filed by Plaintiff. These motions are as follows: (1) emergency motion local Rule 14 II 7-4, (ECF No. 12); (2) emergency motion for order to show cause, (ECF No. 15); (3) 15 motion for appointment of counsel, (ECF No. 56); and (4) motion to accept exhibit. (ECF 16 No. 57.) The Court will address each motion in turn. 17 I. EMERGENCY MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 12, 15) 18 Jackson filed two “emergency motions,” when read together, appear to request 19 that the Court enter injunctive relief to address what Jackson claims is “life threatening 20 circumstances by the Nevada Department of Corrections staff at Ely State Prison.” (See 21 ECF Nos. 12, 15.) In these motions, Jackson asserts that the Court should intervene and 22 enter an order to prevent staff at ESP from engaging in various types of alleged “illegal 23 acts of intimidation, threat” and “attempted assaults.” (ECF No. 12 at 2.) He specifically 24 requests that the Court “order” ESP staff to provide him with meal trays of unopened food 25 to prevent him from receiving contaminated food trays, a prison transfer, and other 26 injunctive relief, including immediate blood tests. (Id. at 10-11.) 27 The Court construes Jackson’s emergency motions, (ECF Nos. 12, 15), as motions 1 Court enjoin the conduct and actions of the staff at ESP. After the filing of these motions, 2 Jackson was transferred from ESP to High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). (See ECF No. 3 51, Jackson’s Notice of Change of Address from ESP to HDSP). Based on his transfer to 4 HDSP, Defendants argue Jackson’s motions are now moot and should be denied. (ECF 5 Nos. 52, 53.) Jackson did not reply to these arguments. 6 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that “[w]hen an inmate challenges prison 7 conditions at a particular correctional facility, but has been transferred from the facility 8 and has no reasonable expectation of returning, his claim [for injunctive relief] is moot.” 9 Pride v. Correa,

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Johnson v. Moore,

(9th Cir. 1991)); see also Nelson v. Heiss,

, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) 11 (“[W]hen a prisoner is moved from a prison, his action will usually become moot as to 12 conditions at that particular facility.”); Dilley v. Gunn,

(9th Cir. 1995) 13 (claims for injunctive relief were rendered moot because inmate was transferred to 14 different prison and failed to demonstrate a “reasonable expectation” that he would be 15 transferred back and subjected to the challenged policy). 16 Based on the above, the Court agrees with Defendants that Jackson’s motions are 17 now moot. There is no dispute that Jackson was transferred from ESP to HSDP after he 18 filed his motions. (ECF No. 51.) Moreover, Jackson failed to file a reply brief in support of 19 his motions or otherwise demonstrate that there is a “reasonable expectation” that he 20 would be transferred back to ESP and thus be subject to the same conduct in the future. 21 As such, the Court cannot grant any relief to Jackson at this time and his motions, (ECF 22 Nos. 12, 15), must be DENIED as MOOT. 23 II. MOTION APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (ECF No. 56) 24 The Court now turns to Jackson’s motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 25 56.) There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action. E.g., Rand 26 v. Rowland,

(9th Cir. 1997), opinion reinstated in pertinent part, 154

, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The provision in

(e)(1) gives 1 counsel.”

(e)(1); see, e.g., Wilborn v. Escalderon,

, 1331 2 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). While the decision to request counsel lies within the discretion 3 of the district court, the court may exercise this discretion to request counsel only under 4 “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer,

(9th Cir. 1991). 5 A finding of “exceptional circumstances” requires the court to evaluate: (1) the 6 plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the Plaintiff’s ability to articulate his 7 claims pro se considering the complexity of the legal issues involved. 8

(quoting Wilborn,

) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither factor 9 is dispositive, and both factors must be considered before a court decides.

The 10 difficulties every litigant faces when proceeding pro se does not qualify as an exceptional 11 circumstance. Wood v. Housewright,

(9th Cir. 1990). While 12 almost any pro se litigant would benefit from the assistance of competent counsel, such 13 a benefit does not rise to the level of “exceptional circumstances.” Rand,

1525. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is unable to articulate his claims due 15 to their complexity.

16 In this instance, Jackson’s motion for appointment of counsel is a two-page form 17 titled “ex parte motion for appointment of counsel” that is intended for use in cases 18 involving Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus – not civil rights cases proceeding under 19

. (See ECF No. 56 at 1-2.) The motion is simply pre-typed language 20 that states, without any support, that “Petitioner alleges this case are complex and that 21 the petitioner is unable to adequately present his claims without the assistance of 22 counsel.” (Id.) As this pre-printed form is for use in habeas proceedings, it fails to address 23 the standards required for appointment of counsel in an inmate civil rights case. 24 Therefore, Jackson has failed to establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his 25 claim or that he is unable to articulate his claims due to their complexity. To the contrary, 26 to date, Jackson has been able to articulate his claims in this case and he does not 27 appear to have any difficulties litigating this case that are any more significant than other 1 demonstrated exceptional circumstances exist in this case, Jackson’s motion for 2 appointment of counsel, (ECF No. 56), must also be DENIED. 3 III. MOTION TO ACCEPT EXHIBIT 4 Finally, Jackson filed a “motion to accept exhibit of legal mail Ely refused to send.” 5 (ECF No. 57.) In the motion, Jackson claims that he is submitting the motion for an 6 “emergency habeas corpus as an exhibit due to Ely refusing to send it to the D.O.J., 7 Nevada Attorney General, ACLU, Clerk of Court, for the judicial court.” (Id. at 1.) The 8 “exhibit” is a 77-page document that appears to be a “Petition for a Writ of Habeas 9 Corpus” seeking post-conviction relief. (Id. at 2-77.) 10 It is unclear why Jackson is attempting to file this document in this case or what, if 11 any filing, this “exhibit” relates to. However, to the extent he is attempting to initiate a new 12 habeas corpus action, the document must be filed in a new case in the appropriate court 13 – not simply as an “exhibit” in this case. In addition, the District of Nevada’s General Order 14 2021-05 expressly states that “exhibits that are not filed in support of a motion, a response 15 to a motion, or a reply to a motion may not be filed.” GO 2021-05 at 5. 16 Moreover, the filing of this document violates the stay imposed in this case. On 17 May 8, 2025, the Court entered a screening order in this case permitting this case to 18 proceed certain claims against various defendants. (ECF No. 21.) In that order, the Court 19 expressly stayed this case for 90 days. (Id. at 23.) The Court ordered that during the 90- 20 day stay, “no other pleadings or papers may be filed in this case.” (Id.) Plaintiff 21 impermissibly filed this motion after the stay was entered, in violation of the Court’s order. 22 (ECF No. 57.) For all these reasons, Jackson’s motion to accept exhibit, (ECF No. 57), is 23 DENIED. 24 While the Court understands Jackson is proceeding pro se and may be unfamiliar 25 with the processes of litigating a case, Jackson has filed a multitude of improper motions, 26 declarations, exhibits, and notices in this case. The Court has been patient with Jackson, 27 however, he is cautioned and reminded that all litigants, whether appearing pro se or 41 | the Local Rules of this District, and the Court’s orders. See, e.g., Briones v. Rivera Hote! 2| & Casino,

(9th Cir. 1997) ("pro se litigants are not excused from 3 | following court rules”); King Atiyeh,

(9th Cir. 1987) (“[p]ro se litigants 4} must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”), overruled on other 5 | grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

(9th Cir. 2012). Jackson is reminded 6 | to read and review the Court's orders closely before filing any additional motions in the 7 | future. Moreover, Jackson is reminded that he is not permitted to file exhibits, declarations 8 | ornotices that are not permitted under General Order 2021-05. Thus, Jackson is advised that the Court may strike without notice any additional motions or documents he files in 10 | violation of the stay in this case or the Court's rules or orders. IV. CONCLUSION 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jackson’s emergency motions, (ECF Nos. 12, 13 15), are DENIED as moot. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jackson’s motion for appointment of counsel, (ECF No. 56), is DENIED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jackson’s motion to accept exhibit, (ECF No. 57), 17 is DENIED. 18 DATED: September 4, 2025 , . 19 20 UNITED STATES\MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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