1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 QUASHAWN SHERIDAN, Case No.: 2:25-cv-00882-APG-DJA

4 Plaintiff Dismissal Order

5 v.

6 RUSSLE, et al.,

7 Defendants 8 9 Plaintiff Quashawn Sheridan brings this civil-rights action under

to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert 11 State Prison. ECF No. 1-1. On June 9, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Sheridan to file a fully 12 complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before 13 August 8, 2025. ECF No. 3. The magistrate judge warned Sheridan that the action could be 14 dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all 15 three documents or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline.

. That 16 deadline expired and Sheridan did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 17 pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 20 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 21 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 22 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 23 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 1 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 2 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 3 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 4 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its

5 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 6 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 7 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 8

). 9 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 10 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Sheridan’s claims. The 11 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 12 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 13 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th 14 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is

15 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 16 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 17 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 18 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 19 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 21 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 22 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 23 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Sheridan either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only 2|| alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an 3} }ignored order 1s that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. 4|| The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that 5}| Sheridan needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the court’s order. Setting 6] another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in 8|| favor of dismissal. II. CONCLUSION 10 I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 11||Sheridan’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with the magistrate judge’s June 9, 2025, order. The Clerk of 13]| Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be 14|| filed in this now-closed case. If Sheridan wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in new case. 16 17 Dated: September 9, 2025 C7 Chief United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23