1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:23-cv-00764-JAD-DJA Duston Miller, 4 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for 5 v. Summary Judgment based on Lack of Exhaustion 6 Charles Daniels, et al., [ECF No. 26] 7 Defendants

8 Duston Miller sues Charles Daniels, Calvin Johnson, Chief Medical Officer James Scally, 9 Corrections Officer Jeffrey Henderson, Sergeant Thurston Moore, Senior Corrections Officer 10 Javier Garcia, the (unnamed) Chief Medical Officer at High Desert State Prison, two unnamed 11 nurses employed by High Desert State Prison, and a “health care provider” for the Nevada 12 Department of Corrections (NDOC) under

This court screened Miller’s 13 complaint and allowed him to proceed on his Eighth Amendment claim for unsafe prison 14 conditions against Daniels, Johnson, Scally, Moore, Henderson, Doe chief medical officer, Doe 15 health-care providers, and Doe nurses; his Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference 16 to serious medical needs against Johnson, Moore, Scally, Jane Doe #1, Doe chief medical 17 officer, and Doe health-care provider; his First Amendment retaliation claim against Moore; 18 Fourteenth Amendment due-process property-deprivation claim against Garcia; and First 19 Amendment retaliation against Garcia. 20 Daniels, Johnson, Scally, Moore, Henderson, and Garcia now move for summary 21 judgment on Miller’s entire suit, arguing that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under 22

23 1 The Nevada Department of Corrections and the State of Nevada were dismissed as defendants by this court’s screening order. ECF No. 8 at 13. 1 the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and that they are entitled to qualified immunity on all 2 of his claims.2 Because Miller did not properly exhaust NDOC’s available grievance 3 procedures, I grant the defendants summary judgment under the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion 4 requirement and close this case.

5 Background 6 This case concerns grievances filed by Duston Miller, who is incarcerated at High Desert 7 State Prison (HDSP).3 In 2021, Miller filed an informal grievance alleging that Corrections 8 Officer Javier Garcia searched and illegally seized his property as retaliation after Miller had unit 9 officers and his spouse call the property room and filed an emergency grievance seeking the 10 return of his property.4 Miller’s first-level grievance explained that he had recently been 11 transferred to HDSP and did not receive his property the morning after his arrival as he had been 12 promised.5 According to Miller, Garcia “stated that since [Miller] had written a grievance and 13 had people calling him, [Miller] would have to climb a cactus to receive [his] property.”6 Miller 14 later requested second-level review of that grievance, which was rejected because Miller

15 requested more than $500 in compensation and had failed to attach his first-level response.7 16 NDOC’s rejection memo directed Miller to resubmit his grievance, correcting the noted 17 deficiencies, but Miller did not do so.8 18 19 2 ECF No. 26. 20 3 See ECF No. 26-3 at 3 (“You arrived from WSCC to HDSP on 11/02/2021.”) 21 4 ECF No. 26-4 at 4, 9. 5

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1 About a year later, Miller initiated a new grievance process.9 In an informal grievance, 2 he alleged that medical staff and a corrections officer refused to rehouse him after his cellmate 3 tested positive for COVID-19 and he tested negative.10 Miller recounted that after he eventually 4 tested positive and suffered severe symptoms, “the Sgt.” accused him of “seeking to go over his

5 head” and threatened to write Miller “a rule infraction for manipulating staff.”11 He demanded 6 more than $100,000 as compensation for the physical and mental distress he suffered.12 NDOC 7 rejected this informal grievance, reasoning that Miller hadn’t shown a loss or harm, hadn’t 8 articulated a remedy that would satisfy his claim, and requested more than $500 in 9 compensation.13 Miller did not resubmit his grievance and did not complete the grievance 10 process for his COVID-related complaints. 11 Discussion 12 A. The PLRA requires complete exhaustion of available administrative remedies. 13 The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before 14 filing a civil-rights action to redress alleged constitutional violations by prison staff.14 The

15 Supreme Court has interpreted the PLRA as “requir[ing] proper exhaustion,” which “demands 16 compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”15 Of course, “[a]n 17 inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are ‘available,’” which requires that 18 19 9 See ECF No. 26-5. 20 10

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. 23 14 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 15 Woodford v. Ngo,

(2006). 1 the procedures “are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’”16 In 2 Ross v. Blake, the United States Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of “circumstances 3 in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to 4 obtain relief.”17 An administrative remedy may be considered unavailable when “it operates as a

5 simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to 6 aggrieved inmates”; if the administrative scheme is “so opaque that it becomes, practically 7 speaking, incapable of use”; or if “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of 8 the grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”18 9 To succeed on a PLRA-exhaustion defense at summary judgment, the defendant must 10 “prove that there was an available administrative remedy” that the prisoner did not exhaust; the 11 burden then shifts to the plaintiff to provide evidence that the remedy was unavailable to him.19 12 But “the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant.”20 The trial court should grant 13 summary judgment based on a lack of exhaustion only “[i]f undisputed evidence viewed in the 14 light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust.”21

15 B. Miller failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, so his lawsuit cannot proceed. 16 NDOC Administrative Regulation 740.05(4) states that “compensation for loss of 17 personal property, property damage, personal injury, or any other claim arising out of a tort shall 18 19

16 Ross v. Blake,

(2016). 20 17

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at 643–44. 22 19 Albino v. Baca,

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Block,

(2007) (cleaned up). 23 20

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1 not exceed $500.00.”22 All of Miller’s relevant grievances in this case were rejected, at least in 2 part, because he demanded more than $500 in damages in those grievances.23 Miller was told 3 that he could resubmit those grievances if he corrected the deficiencies identified. Miller 4 concedes that he did not resubmit the grievances or completely exhaust the grievance process for

5 his claims. 6 1. NDOC provides an administrative claim process for tortious injuries. 7 NRS 209.243 permits a prisoner to file an administrative claim with NDOC “to recover 8 compensation for the loss of his or her personal property, property damage, personal injuries, or 9 any other claims arising out of a tort” caused by prison officials. The statute states that NDOC 10 must evaluate each claim and, if the amount due is $500 or less, NDOC may “approve the claim 11 for payment and submit it to be paid.”24 But, if the amount due is more than $500, NDOC must 12 submit that claim, “with any recommendations it deems appropriate, to the State Board of 13 Examiners.”25 The statute directs NDOC to “adopt regulations necessary to carry out the 14 provisions of this section.”26

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16 17 18 19 22 ECF No. 26-6 at 9. 20 23 See ECF No. 26-4 at 19 (rejecting grievance 2006-31-32665, related to Miller’s property- deprivation and retaliation claims against Garcia, under AR 740.05(4)); ECF No. 26-5 at 10 21 (rejecting grievance 2006-31-35212, related to Miller’s medical-indifference claims, because Miller hadn’t shown a loss or harm and his requested remedy exceeded $500). 22 24

(2). 23 25

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(3). 1 2. The PLRA required Miller to exhaust that process even though his desired 2 remedies were not available through it.

3 The defendants contend that, had Miller refiled his grievance seeking an amount within 4 the limits of the administrative process, he could have exhausted his remedies and then sought 5 higher damages once his case was properly before this court.27 Miller responds that the prison’s 6 procedure of rejecting claims on the basis that they seek more than the process allows has 7 effectively rendered the administrative process unavailable to him, so he was not required to 8 exhaust it. 9 Settled law forecloses Miller’s theory. In Booth v. Churner, the United States Supreme 10 Court confronted a grievance process that didn’t permit an award of monetary damages at all.28 11 The prisoner argued that “when a prisoner demands money damages as the sole means to 12 compensate his injuries, a grievance system without that relief offers no ‘available’ ‘remedy,’” 13 so exhaustion of such a system is not required.29 The High Court unanimously disagreed. It 14 held that a prisoner who seeks only monetary damages in a grievance system that can’t award 15 them must nonetheless exhaust that process, reasoning that “Congress meant to require 16 procedural exhaustion regardless of the fit between a prisoner’s prayer for relief and the 17 administrative remedies possible.”30 18 This Booth rule was reiterated in Woodford v. Ngo, in which the Court recognized that 19 prisoners must “exhaust administrative remedies even [when] the relief sought—monetary 20 21 27 ECF No. 39 at 2. 22 28 Booth v. Churner,

(2001). 23 29

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. 1 damages—cannot be granted by the administrative process.”31 And when addressing exhaustion 2 in Nevada’s prison system in O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, the Ninth Circuit stated 3 even more clearly that “[a] prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies even when the 4 prisoner’s suit seeks monetary damages that are unavailable through the prison’s grievance

5 process.”32 In short, under the PLRA, the administrative process, whatever it is, must be pursued 6 to completion in order for the inmate to be able to seek his ultimate desired remedy through the 7 court system. 8 I find that Booth’s general rule applies here. AR 740.05(4) caps inmate-compensation 9 demands at $500. When Miller’s grievances were rejected for noncompliance, he could and 10 should have cured their deficiencies by resubmitting them with a damages amount within the 11 cap. This would have exhausted the process and permitted him to then come to court to seek 12 compensatory damages exceeding the cap. Because Miller didn’t do that for any of the 13 grievances he filed, Booth and its progeny bar his suit. 14 Miller’s contention that NRS 209.243 requires a different result is not persuasive. How

15 NDOC reviews internal administrative claims is not relevant to the separate question of how a 16 prisoner must exhaust his federal claims under the PLRA. This court is not tasked with deciding 17 whether NDOC’s administrative regulations comply with statutory directives for internal claims- 18 handling processes. It must simply determine whether Miller exhausted his available remedies. 19 I acknowledge that the mismatch between NRS 209.243’s process for internal claims and the 20 PLRA exhaustion requirements may be confusing, but nothing prevented Miller from complying 21 with AR 740’s restriction on claims exceeding $500 in order to exhaust that administrative 22

23 31 Woodford,

. 32 O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr.,

(9th Cir. 2007). process before seeking a larger remedy in federal court. I conclude that the defendants have shown that the administrative process was available to Miller, and because he failed to exhaust that process, his claims are barred by the PLRA. So I grant summary judgment in favor of the Al| defendants on this basis.** 5 Conclusion 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 7|| [ECF No. 26] is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT 8||in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff based on lack of exhaustion and CLOSE 9) THIS CASE. 10 il 7S INK ————— An — _———_———— US. Distrigt Judge J énnifer A Dorsey 12 September 19, 2025 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 In addition to the named defendants, all of whom moved for summary judgment, Miller also 9 sued several Doe defendants, including “Chief Medical Officer,” “John Doe #1,” “Jane Doe #1,” and “Health Care Provider.” ECF No. 9 at 3-5. I informed Miller that he could substitute 3 named defendants in for those placeholder Doe defendants if he ascertained their identities during discovery. ECF No. 8 at 7.27. Miller did not substitute any named defendants for those Doe identities, so I consider the claims against those non-entities abandoned.