1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Selva Kumar, Case No. 2:24-cv-02256-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiff Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration 6 v.

7 Tata Consultancy Services Limited, [ECF No. 18]

8 Defendant

9 10 Plaintiff Selva Kumar brings this suit against defendant Tata Consultancy Services 11 Limited alleging claims of (1) violation of the WARN Act; (2) discrimination on the basis of his 12 age; and (3) violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). See First am. 13 compl., ECF No. 13. Tata Consultancy filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the case 14 pending the completion of arbitration. See Mot., ECF No. 18. The motion is fully briefed. See 15 Resp., ECF No. 21; Reply, ECF No. 24. For the following reasons, I grant the motion to compel 16 arbitration. 17 I. Legal standard 18 “There is a strong presumption in favor of arbitrating a dispute where a valid and 19 enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties.” SR Constr., Inc. v. Peek Bros. Constr., 20 Inc.,

, 798 (Nev. 2022) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.,

, 21 650 (1986); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 1285 v. City of Las Vegas,

(Nev. 1996)). 22 “Nevada courts resolve all doubts concerning the arbitrability of the subject matter of a dispute 23 in favor of arbitration.” Local No. 1285,

. “Nevada has a ‘fundamental policy favoring 24 the enforceability of arbitration agreements,’ and [courts] ‘liberally construe arbitration clauses 25 in favor of granting arbitration.’” Uber Techs., Inc. v. Royz,

(Nev. 2022) (quoting 26 Tallman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,

, 118–19 (Nev. 2015)). 1 “By its terms, the [Federal Arbitration] Act ‘leaves no place for the exercise of discretion 2 by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to 3 arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.’” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho. 4 Diagnostic Sys., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470

, 218 (1985)). “The court’s role under the Act is therefore limited to determining (1) 6 whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement 7 encompasses the dispute at issue.”

(citing

; Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.,

, 8 719–20 (9th Cir. 1999); Rep. of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co.,

, 477–78 (9th Cir. 1991)); 9 see also Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt. Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2015) (stating that the party 10 seeking to compel arbitration has the burden to show both elements) (citing Cox v. Ocean View 11 Hotel Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2008)). If the answer to both inquiries is yes, then the 12 court must enforce the arbitration agreement’s terms.

Courts are guided by a “presumption of 13 arbitrability in the sense that ‘[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be 14 denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 15 susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’” AT&T Techs.,

16 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,

, 582–83 (1960)). 17 II. Discussion 18 The arbitration agreement at issue here is three pages and is titled “mutual agreement to 19 arbitrate claims.” Arb. agreement, Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 18-2. In relevant part, the agreement 20 includes the following: 21 [t]he only claims that are arbitrable are those disputes that may be resolved under applicable federal, state or local law. Arbitrable claims include, but are not limited 22 to: claims for wages or other compensation due; claims for breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied); tort claims; claims for discrimination (including, 23 but not limited to, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, age, marital status, physical or mental disability or handicap, or medical condition); 24 claims for benefits (except claims under an employee benefit or pension plan that 25 either (1) specifies that its claims procedure shall culminate in an arbitration procedure different from this one, or (2) is underwritten by a commercial insurer 26 which decides claims); and claims for violation of any federal, state, or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except claims excluded in the section of this Agreement entitled ‘Claims Not Covered By The Agreement.’ 1 ECF No. 18-2 at 2. As explained above, when the FAA governs an agreement, the court’s role is 2 limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if so, (2) whether 3 the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Chiron Corp.,

. As to the 4 arbitration procedures, this agreement provides that it “will be conducted under the 5 Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA 6 Rules’) then in effect.” ECF No. 18-2 at 3. Kumar does not dispute the scope of the arbitration 7 agreement or whether it encompasses his claims, therefore the question before the court is 8 whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement. 9 A. The arbitration agreement between the parties is valid. 10 Tata Consultancy argues, as evidenced by the signed arbitration agreement, that Kumar 11 entered into a binding arbitration agreement with them and that agreement covers the entirety 12 of his allegations. ECF No. 18 at 2. In opposition, Kumar argues that Tata Consultancy has 13 attached a “rogue” document because Kumar did not sign the agreement, and that there is no 14 handwritten signature, so the typewritten signature provided by the defendant “casts [a] dark 15 shadow on authenticity and veracity.” ECF No. 21 at 2. Kumar also argues that even if the court 16 considers the arbitration clause to be valid, it should be declared unenforceable because it is 17 procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Id. at 3. I address each argument. 18 19 20 When analyzing a motion to compel arbitration, I employ a similar standard to the 21 summary judgment standard applied under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Gonzalez v. 22 Comenity Bank,

, at * 4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2019). Therefore, the 23 moving party must show there is no genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to an order 24 compelling arbitration as a matter of law. If I find a genuine issue of material fact exists, I must 25 summarily proceed to a bench trial on the issue.

; see also Mayorga v. Ronaldo,

Supp. 3d 840, 855 (D. Nev. 2020). 1 To support its motion to compel, Tata Consultancy provides a copy of Kumar’s signed 2 arbitration agreement. Arb. Agreement, Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 18-2.1 Tata Consultancy also 3 provides a declaration from Jeevak Sharma, Head of Human Resources Compliance and 4 Employee Relations, describing their onboarding process, and a statement declaring that on 5 April 16, 2018, the plaintiff electronically signed the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes. See 6 Sharma decl., Def.’s Ex. 2, ECF No. 18-3. 7 In response, Kumar argues that he did not sign the arbitration agreement and that there 8 was never any discussion of the agreement to arbitrate. Resp., ECF No. 21. In support of his 9 argument, Kumar asserts that Tata Consultancy previously filed a similar motion (Mot. to 10 Compel Arb., ECF No. 11) that contained an agreement Kumar never signed and “was dated long 11 before Kumar ever joined the company as an employee.” Id. at 3. Kumar claims the inclusion of an 12 erroneous agreement with the prior motion proves Tata Consultancy is trying to “hoodwink the 13 court with a rogue document.” Id. Kumar further argues that he is meticulous, pointing to the 14 three pages of the job offer he signed. Pl.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 21-1. Kumar essentially asserts that he 15 did not sign the arbitration agreement. ECF No. 21. at 2–3. 16 In reply, Tata Consultancy asserts that “[t]here is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff 17 executed his Agreement to Arbitrate.” ECF No. 24. As explained in Sharma’s declaration, Tata 18 Consultancy uses “a secure, internal onboarding website called ‘iBegin’ for new hires to 19 electronically receive, review, and complete paperwork as required as a condition of their 20 employment with Defendant.” Id. at 4. “[O]nce a candidate submits their acceptance of an offer 21 of employment,” Tata Consultancy then “sends the candidate a system-generated email with a 22 link and randomly generated password that the candidate is directed to use for logging into 23 iBegin.” Id. Once candidates create their own confidential passwords and review the read-only 24 documents, iBegin directs candidates to click through documents, and the employees are 25 required to review and electronically sign the documents before commencing employment with 26 1 I may examine evidence outside the pleadings on a motion to compel arbitration. Whipple v. Whipple,

, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2025) (citing Manuwal v. BMW of N.Am. LLC,

, 864 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2020)). 1 Tata Consultancy. ECF No. 24 at 4. Among these documents is the agreement to arbitrate.

at 2 4; ECF No. 18-3 at 15–21. 3 Kumar has not met his burden in demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact 4 exists as to whether he did in fact sign the arbitration agreement. Although Kumar asserts that 5 he never signed the agreement, this assertion is solely supported by his own declaration. ECF 6 No. 21 at 2. “[A] conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting 7 evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Valenzuela v. GK Nev. LLC, 2024

, at * 14–15 (D. Nev. June 26, 2024) (quoting FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House, 9 Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1997); see also Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,

, 1061 10 (9th Cir. 2002) (“this court has refused to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence 11 presented is ‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony.”). Although Kumar provides one 12 exhibit containing a hand-signed copy of his employment offer with Tata Consultancy (ECF No. 13 21-1), this does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Tata Consultancy provides a copy of 14 the acceptance of offer that was signed electronically, which is consistent with the procedures 15 explained by Sharma. See ECF No. 24-2. Moreover, the electronic acceptance of offer and the 16 employment offer physically signed by Kumar contain the same date as the electronically signed 17 arbitration agreement. Compare ECF No. 24-2 at 5 with ECF No. 21-1 at 3 and ECF No. 18-2 at 4. 18 Further, both of the employment offers provided by Kumar and Tata Consultancy contain the 19 same “EP Refence ID: EP2018RA719382.” ECF No. 24-2 at 4, 5; ECF No. 21-1 at 3. The evidence 20 before the court shows there is no genuine issue of material fact that Kumar electronically 21 signed the arbitration agreement. Simply proclaiming that he did not sign the agreement is not 22 enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. See FTC,

(citations omitted); see 23 Valenzuela,

, at *15 (collecting cases). Additionally, Sharma’s 24 declaration that all prospective employees hired by Tata Consultancy use iBegin to 25 electronically review and sign onboarding documents, which includes the arbitration agreement, 26 as evidenced in the form of screenshots of Tata’s iBegin onboarding documents, belie Kumar’s 1 claims. See Def.’s Ex. 2A, ECF No. 18-3 at 11–18. Even Kumar’s exhibit seems to demonstrate he 2 needed to do more after accepting the offer. See ECF No. 21-1 at 3 (the offer of employment 3 contains a link and a QR code “to validate the offer letter”). 4 Also, Kumar’s referral to the defendant’s filing of a prior copy of a different prospective 5 employee’s agreement to arbitrate, arguing Tata Consultancy is trying “to hoodwink the court 6 with a rogue document, either deliberately or in error, of course, the answer is in the affirmative 7 because it is the nature of man to repeat a sin than repent of it” is unconvincing. ECF No. 21 at 3. 8 Kumar provides no evidence to corroborate this assertion and Tata’s explanation of their error is 9 reasonable. See ECF No. 18 at 2; ECF No. 18-3 at ¶ 27. Consequently, Kumar has failed to meet his 10 burden to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he signed the 11 arbitration agreement. 12 13 Kumar argues that even if the court were to find the arbitration clause is valid, the court 14 should declare it unenforceable because it is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. An 15 arbitration agreement is unconscionable only if it is both procedurally and substantively 16 unconscionable. De Niro v. Arise Virtual Sols. Inc.,

, at * 11 (D. Nev. 17 Nov. 20, 2024) (citing Tough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott,

, 885 (Nev. 2023)). An 18 arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable if “a party lacks a meaningful opportunity 19 to agree to the . . . terms either because unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contraction, 20 or because . . . its effects are not readily ascertainable upon review of the contract.” Tough Turtle 21 Turf, 537 P.3d at 885. Further, an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable if its 22 “terms are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party, such as terms that impair the 23 integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy.” 24 Id. “Unconscionability is evaluated on a ‘sliding scale,’ such that if one type of unconscionability 25 is greater, the other may be lesser.” De Niro,

, at * 12 (citing Tough 26 Turtle Turf, 537 P.3d at 885). Although the party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement 1 bears the burden of proving the validity of the agreement, the party opposing arbitration must 2 establish a defense to enforcement—in this case that it is unconscionable. Id. 3 As a threshold matter, Tata Consultancy asserts that the plaintiff bears the burden of 4 demonstrating a defense to the arbitration agreement. Specifically, it argues that Kumar’s 5 position only addresses procedural unconscionability, and that this agreement did not mislead 6 or conceal any of its terms from Kumar. See ECF No. 24 at 7–8. I agree. The arbitration agreement 7 reveals that its terms were clear and does not appear to be any attempt to conceal the terms of 8 arbitration. ECF No. 18-2. The arbitration agreement provides that it will be conducted under 9 the Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures of the American Arbitration Association 10 (“AAA”). AAA Rules, Def.’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 18-4. Pursuant to the AAA rules, “[t]he arbitrator 11 shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction” including objections regarding the 12 validity of the arbitration agreement. See id. at 18.2 In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the 13 Supreme Court held that parties may agree to arbitrate gateway questions of arbitrability to 14 include whether the agreement is valid.

, 68–69 (2010). Here, when reviewing the 15 arbitration agreement that was signed, arbitrability is not included in the “claims not covered by 16 the agreement” section, and the agreement clearly indicates that the AAA rules govern. When an 17 arbitration agreement’s delegation clause provides for an arbitrator to have authority to 18 determine whether an arbitration agreement is valid, a court is barred from adjudicating a 19 party’s claim of unconscionability. See Madrigal v. AT&T Wireless Servs.,

134347, at * 6–7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (citing Jackson, 561 U.S. at 72). 21 Here, it is unclear what exactly Kumar claims is unconscionable. Instead, Kumar simply 22 asserts he “did not sign the arbitration agreement, even if he did, it is obvious that he was not 23 aware of doing so as that was not an explicit or affirmative act, rather it was implied.” ECF No. 24 21 at 4. There is no explanation regarding any disagreements with the arbitrability delegation 25 2 I take judicial notice of the rules of the AAA as they can be readily determined from a source whose 26 accuracy cannot reasonably be disputed. See Torres v. Secure Commun. Sys.,

, at * 3 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2020). They can be found here: https://www.adr.org/media/0vrpbnm0/2025_employment_arbitration_rules.pdf 1 clause nor any particular terms of the arbitration agreement. Relying on D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 2 Kumar also attempts to argue that the agreement was unconscionable because he lacked a 3 meaningful opportunity to agree to the terms due to unequal bargaining power.

, 4 1162 (Nev. 2004). In the entirety of Kumar’s response, D.R. Horton is the only case that is cited, 5 and I find that Kumar has failed to provide any meaningful analysis explaining the relevance of 6 that case nor how it applies here. D.R. Horton provides that a contract clause “is procedurally 7 unconscionable when a party lacks a meaningful opportunity to agree to the clause terms either 8 because of unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contract, or because the clause and its 9 effects are not readily ascertainable upon a review of the contract.” D.R. Horton,

, 10 overruled on other grounds by U.S. Home Corp. v. Michael Ballesteros Tr.,

(Nev. 2018) 11 (emphasis added). As explained above, the terms of the arbitration agreement were readily 12 ascertainable. Kumar fails to explain how he was in an unequal bargaining position than the 13 defendant and how it renders his agreement to arbitrate procedurally unconscionable. He fails 14 to provide argument as to how the agreement is substantively unconscionable. Without any 15 evidence to support Kumar’s contentions, the court finds there is none. 16 Consequently, because there is nothing currently before the court that would allow me 17 to find that the arbitration agreement is procedurally or substantively unconscionable, my 18 inquiry into the validity of this agreement ends. Any other arguments relating to the validity of 19 the arbitration agreement must be resolved by the arbitrator. Defendant’s motion to compel 20 arbitration is granted. 21 III. Conclusion 22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay 23 this case [ECF No. 18] is GRANTED. The parties must promptly submit this matter to 24 arbitration in accordance with Tata Consultancy Services’ Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate 25 Claims (ECF No. 18-2). 26 1 This matter is now stayed pending the outcome of arbitration, therefore the parties must 2]| file a joint status report on July 23, 2026, or within fourteen days of the arbitrator's decision, whichever is sooner. “) 4 Dated: September 25, 2025 J, /

6 Cristizia D. Silva vs States District Judge / 8 9 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26