Thomas Oates v. Jeremy Bean, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada

Thomas Oates v. Jeremy Bean, et al.

Trial Court Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 THOMAS OATES, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01330-APG-NJK

4 Plaintiff Dismissal Order

5 v.

6 JEREMY BEAN, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiff Thomas Oates brings this civil-rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF No. 1-1. On July 24, 11 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Oates to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 12 pauperis (IFP) or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action on or before September 22, 2025. 13 ECF No. 4. The magistrate judge warned Oates that the action could be dismissed if he failed to 14 timely comply.

Id. at 2

. That deadline expired and Oates has not filed a complete IFP, paid the 15 full $405 filing fee, or otherwise responded. 16 I. Discussion 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

782 F.2d 829, 831

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 20 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 21 Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 22 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 23 Postal Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: 1 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 2 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

5

833 F.2d at 130

). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Oates’s claims. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 9 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 10 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 1976). The 11 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 12 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish

15 v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 18 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 19 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

779 F.2d 1421

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 20 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Oates either files a complete IFP or pays 21 the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 22 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable 23 and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 2|| circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3) TI. Conclusion 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 5|| dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 6|| Oates’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full 7|| $405 filing fee in compliance with the magistrate judge’s July 24, 2025, order. The Clerk of 8|| Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be 9}| filed in this now-closed case. If Oates wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a 10|| new case and either pay the required filing fee or file a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis. 12 13 14 Dated: October 6, 2025 15 Z- □□ Andrew P. Gordon 16 Chief United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Reference

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