1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 DAKOTA J. ROMERO, Case No. 3:24-cv-00527-ART-CSD

4 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER v. 5 DOE MEDICAL PROVIDER, 6 Defendant. 7 8 Plaintiff Dakota Romero (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil-rights action under 42

to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered 10 while incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) In 11 this action, Plaintiff sued a single doe defendant for stopping his access to 12 physical therapy. (Id. at 4.) While the Court found Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 13 deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim against the doe defendant 14 colorable, it warned Plaintiff that if he could not identify the true name of the 15 doe defendant, this case could not proceed and would be dismissed without 16 prejudice. (ECF No. 9 at 5–7.) The Court then told Plaintiff that he could file a 17 Rule 45 subpoena duces tecum to request the name of the doe defendant from 18 interested party, the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”). (Id.) 19 This began an extensive back-and-forth between Plaintiff and the NDOC 20 to uncover the identity of the doe defendant. Over the past three months, Plaintiff 21 filed several motions to issue subpoenas (ECF Nos. 10, 12, 21) and motions for 22 enlargement of time when the subpoenas were unsuccessful (ECF Nos. 16, 20, 23 23, 29). 24 In response to the subpoena, the Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) mailed 25 Plaintiff’s medical file to the warden with information relevant to Plaintiff’s 26 request for “the name of the male nurse—Doe Medical Provider—who cancelled 27 1 Plaintiff’s access to physical therapy and the prison parallel bars.” (ECF No. 17). 2 The DAG also sent Plaintiff a letter instructing him to send a kite to the warden 3 to review the document provided in compliance with his subpoena duces tecum. 4 (Id.) 5 When Plaintiff asserted that he needed to file another subpoena because 6 his first subpoena incorrectly targeted a male nurse who was not the doe 7 defendant he was seeking, the Court permitted him to do so. (ECF Nos. 26, 28). 8 In response to the subsequent subpoena, the DAG was unable to identify the 9 name of the doe defendant and stated that “[a] thorough review of the 23 pages 10 of [Plaintiff’s] practitioner orders did not yield any orders to stop [Plaintiff’s] 11 physical therapy, so the Office of the Attorney General is unable to identify the 12 doe defendant.” (ECF No. 34 at 1.) Even when the Court ordered the NDOC to 13 file a page from Plaintiff’s medical record (ECF No. 35), Plaintiff was unable to 14 find the name of the doe defendant who allegedly cancelled his access to physical 15 therapy. (ECF No. 41.) 16 After this extensive pre-service effort to identify the doe defendant, 17 Plaintiff, in his latest motion, concedes that he is unable to identify the name of 18 the doe defendant. (Id. at 2.) But he still requests the Court to compel the NDOC 19 to provide him the name of the doe defendant. (Id.) In its last order, the Court 20 warned Plaintiff that if he did not file the name of the doe defendant by 21 September 24, 2025, the Court would not grant him another extension of time 22 and dismiss the case without prejudice. (ECF No. 40 at 1.) 23 Because that deadline expired and Plaintiff cannot identify the name of the 24 doe defendant, the Court denies Plaintiff’s latest motion (ECF No. 41) without 25 prejudice and dismisses this action without prejudice because this Court cannot 26 order service of a complaint on an unknown person. 27 1 DISCUSSION 2 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 3 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 4 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 5 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 6 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 7 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 8 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 9 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 10 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 11 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 12 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 13 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 14 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 15 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 16 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 17 Cir. 1987)). 18 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 19 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 20 dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 21 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 22 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 23 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 24 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 25 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 26 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 27 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 1 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 2 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 3 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 4 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 5 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 6 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 7 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 8 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 9 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 10 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 11 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 12 Because this action cannot proceed until Plaintiff identifies the name of the doe 13 defendant, the only alternative is to enter yet another order setting another 14 deadline for Plaintiff to attempt to uncover the name of the doe defendant. But 15 the reality of repeating the motions for subpoenas that have already failed to 16 provide the name of the doe defendant only delays the inevitable and squanders 17 the Court’s finite resources. Specifically, in this case, the Court has issued 11 18 orders over the last three and a half months on subpoena issues. The 19 circumstances here do not indicate that another subpoena will be an exception: 20 there is no hint that Plaintiff will discover the name of the doe defendant through 21 this process. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 22 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 23 CONCLUSION 24 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 25 they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 26 dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to provide the name of 27 the doe defendant. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 1 || and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If 2 || Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 3 The Court denies Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 41) without prejudice. 4 The Court denies Plaintiffs applications to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 5 || Nos. 1, 5) as moot. 6 DATED: October 6, 2025. 7 8 9 Aras jloset Ten 10 ANNER.TRAUM il UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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