1

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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 T1 Payments, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01816-ART-NJK 7 Plaintiff(s), Order 8 v. [Docket No. 370] 9 New U Life Corporation, 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is a stipulation to extend the initial expert disclosure deadline, 12 and subsequent case management deadlines, by 30 days. Docket No. 370. 13 I. BACKGROUND 14 This is a very old case that was stayed at times.1 On February 12, 2024, the stay was lifted. 15 Docket No. 327. The parties did not at that time file a proposed scheduling order. On September 16 29, 2024, motions to dismiss were resolved. Docket No. 363. The parties did not at that time file 17 a proposed scheduling order. On October 15, 2024, an answer was filed to the second amended 18 counterclaim. Docket No. 365. The parties did not file a proposed scheduling order at that time. 19 On March 26, 2025, the parties filed a joint discovery plan and proposed scheduling order. 20 Docket No. 366. That discovery plan indicated that counsel had conducted a Rule 26(f) conference 21 five months earlier on October 24, 2024, and that they continued to confer thereafter. Id. at 1. No 22 explanation is provided as to why the joint discovery plan was not filed during the interim months. 23 The discovery plan indicated that “prior discovery had occurred as jurisdictional discovery in this 24 action” such that “substantive discovery regarding the full claims and defenses asserted in this 25 action remained to be completed.” Id. at 2. The discovery plan sought an extended discovery 26

27 1 The undersigned was assigned to this case after years of litigation, on June 13, 2025. Docket No. 369. The docket is extensive. The Court discusses herein only the background most 28 pertinent to the instant request. 1 period, including a deadline to serve initial expert disclosures on October 9, 2025. See id. at 2. 2 The discovery plan recognized that “[a]ll motions or stipulations to extend discovery must be 3 received by the Court at least 21 days before the expiration of the subject deadline.” Docket 4 No. 366 at 5 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 4 (“Any stipulation or motion to extend any date 5 set by this plan and order must be made not later than twenty-one (21) days before the expiration 6 of the subject deadline”). On March 27, 2025, the magistrate judge previously assigned to the case 7 approved the discovery plan and entered a corresponding scheduling order. Docket No. 367. 8 On October 9, 2025, the parties filed the instant stipulation seeking relief from the initial 9 disclosure deadline set to expire about 15 hours later. See Docket No. 370 (notice of electronic 10 filing). The stipulation identifies no discovery having been conducted since 2020. See Docket 11 No. 370 at 2. Hence, it appears no discovery of any kind was conducted following entry of the 12 scheduling order setting the deadlines now at issue. See Local Rule 26-3(a). With respect to the 13 reasons why discovery has not been completed on the schedule previously ordered, the parties 14 indicate that “[p]rior discovery had occurred as jurisdictional discovery in this action, but that 15 substantive discovery regarding the full claims and defenses asserted in this action remained to be 16 completed.” Docket No. 370 at 3. This is substantially the same representation the parties made 17 many months ago. See Docket No. 366 at 2. The stipulation also indicates that “[t]he [p]arties 18 need an additional month to obtain and secure expert witnesses.” Docket No. 370 at 3. No 19 explanation is provided as to why that is so. 20 II. STANDARDS 21 “The district court is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation,” 22 including in issuing and enforcing scheduling orders. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,

(9th Cir. 2002). “The Ninth Circuit has also repeatedly and emphatically addressed 24 the importance of scheduling orders as tools for district courts to manage their heavy caseloads.” 25 Desio v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

, 641 (D. Nev. 2021) (collecting cases). 26 As articulated in one of those cases: 27 A scheduling order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” The 28 district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits 1 of [the] case. Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the 2 litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier. 3 Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation 4 omitted). In short, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the scheduling 5 orders entered pursuant to that rule, must “be taken seriously.” Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42

(9th Cir. 1994); see also Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,

(9th 7 Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “deadlines are [to be] taken seriously by the parties, and the best way 8 to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines”).2 “District court oversight is encouraged to avoid 9 ‘protracted discovery, the bane of modern litigation.’” Garcia v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 332

, 354 (D. Nev. 2019) (quoting Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co.,

(7th 11 Cir. 2000)); see also, e.g., Sherman v. United States,

(9th Cir. 1986) 12 (explaining that Rule 16 is meant to encourage “forceful judicial management” of case 13 administration). 14 A request to extend unexpired deadlines in the scheduling order must be premised on a 15 showing of good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Local Rule 26-3. The good cause analysis turns 16 on whether the subject deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the exercise of diligence.

F.2d at 609. “The diligence obligation is ongoing.” Morgal v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. 18 of Supervisors,

(D. Ariz. 2012). “The showing of diligence is measured by 19 the conduct displayed throughout the entire period of time already allowed.” Williams,

Supp. 3d at 1178 (citing Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

(N.D. Cal. 21 2010) and Jackson v. Laureate, Inc.,

(E.D. Cal. 1999)). “[C]arelessness is 22 not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 23 24 2 “The Ninth Circuit is protective of this particular rule, as it deems Rule 16 to be an 25 essential tool in controlling heavy trial court dockets.” Williams v. James River Grp. Inc.,

, 1177 n.3 (D. Nev. 2022) (quoting Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Rehrig Pac. Co., No. 26 1:11-cv-01273-LJO-BAM,

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013)). The Ninth Circuit has at times taken a softer approach to extensions of deadlines outside the Rule 16 context, but 27 those cases do not apply to requests to extend case management deadlines pursuant to Rule 16. See, e.g., Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 n.3 (citing Espinosa v. Corrections Corp. of Am., No. 28 2:19-cv-01617-RFB-NJK,

, at *1 n.1 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2021)). 1 F.2d at 609. When diligence has not been shown in support of an extension request, “the inquiry 2 should end.” Id. 3 That an extension request is made jointly “neither mandates allowance of the extension 4 sought nor exempts parties from making the necessary showings to justify that relief. Failure to 5 provide such showings may result in denial of a stipulated request to extend the case management 6 deadlines.” Williams, 627 F. Supp. 3d at 1178. 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 The instant request falls woefully short of meeting the governing standard. The parties’ 9 representation is that they have engaged in zero discovery for years, including in the months since 10 they conducted the Rule 26(f) conference and in the months since the scheduling order was entered. 11 See Docket No. 370 at 2. Obviously, doing nothing is antithetical to the required showing of 12 diligence. 13 The reasoning advanced is likewise unpersuasive. The stipulation indicate that the parties 14 need more time for discovery and, in particular, more time to obtain and secure expert witnesses. 15 Id. at 3. That the parties want more time for discovery is inherent in every request to extend 16 discovery deadlines, that is literally the purpose of the request. On the other hand, decades of 17 settled law mandates that determining whether good cause exists turns on the reasons why the prior 18 period allotted for discovery proved to be insufficient. The stipulation provides no explanation of 19 any kind why the parties here could not comply with the current schedule (which provided many 20 months to conduct discovery and obtain experts) by exercising reasonable diligence. 21 In short, the stipulation fails to establish good cause for the extension sought. Moreover, 22 because the stipulation was filed at the last minute, rather than 21 days in advance of the subject 23 deadline, the parties likely find themselves in a pickle of their own making because the deadline 24 for initial expert disclosures expired last night before this order could issue. Cf. Local Rule IC 3- 25 1(a). Given that the request is made jointly and as a one-time courtesy to the parties so the case 26 can be decided on its merits, the Court will allow the parties time to comply with their initial expert 27 disclosure obligations up to and including October 17, 2025. All other deadlines in the 28 scheduling order remain unchanged. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in limited part and otherwise DENIES the stipulation to extend case management deadlines. The initial expert disclosure deadline is extended to October 4] 17, 2025. All other deadlines in the scheduling order remain unchanged. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: October 10, 2025 fe. Nancy J. Koppe 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28