1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 DAVID THOMPSON, Case No. 3:23-cv-00341-MMD-CSD 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 PERRY RUSSELL, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff David Thompson, formerly incarcerated in the custody of the 13 Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) at Northern Nevada Correctional Center 14 (“NNCC”), brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional 15 and other violations he suffered while housed at NNCC when prison officials detained him 16 in excessive sunlight and heat conditions for over three hours on a single occasion in July 17 2021. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 6.) Defendants1 filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 18 52, 54 (“Motion”)).2 Before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney’s 19 Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 75 (“R&R”)), to which Thompson now timely 20 objects (ECF No. 78 (“Objection”)), recommending the Court grant Defendants’ Motion 21 on their arguments that (1) Thompson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and 22 (2) no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the merits of the Eighth Amendment 23 conditions of confinement claim against Sergeant Walker. (ECF No. 75 at 1, 10.) The 24 1Defendant NDOC employees include Sergeant Sandra Walker and former 25 Warden Perry Russell. (ECF No. 52.) 26 2Thompson filed a response (ECF No. 68), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 27 73). Thompson filed a motion to extend time to file an objection to the R&R (ECF No. 76), which the Court granted (ECF No. 77). Defendants filed a motion to extend time to file an 28 opposition to the Objection (ECF No. 79), which the Court also granted (ECF No. 80). 1 Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate an absence of 2 genuine disputes of material fact and, for reasons further explained below, the Court 3 rejects the R&R’s recommendation to grant summary judgment on Defendants’ 4 exhaustion argument. The Court finds genuine disputes of material fact preclude 5 summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim and 6 therefore denies the Motion. The Court similarly denies summary judgment as to the 7 remaining grounds that the R&R did not address.3 8 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 9 A. Thompson’s Allegations 10 The Court previously screened Thompson’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6 11 (“FAC” or “Complaint”)) and found that it stated colorable claims under the Eighth 12 Amendment for weather-related, sanitation, and medical conditions and the Fourteenth 13 Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 14 the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) for disability discrimination.4 (ECF No. 7 (“Screening 15 Order”).) The following facts are taken from the Court’s Screening Order and adapted 16 from the Complaint.5 (Id. at 3.) 17 Thompson suffers from multiple serious medical conditions, including Behcet’s 18 disease—an auto-immune disorder—vertigo, and hearing impairment, which require him 19 to avoid prolonged exposure to sunlight. (Id.) Thompson, who was housed in the medical 20 unit (“Unit 3”) at NNCC and assigned a wheelchair for part-time use, had been enrolled 21 3Because the Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment on the 22 exhaustion ground, he did not address Defendants’ other arguments—that they are 23 entitled to qualified immunity and that some of the claims fail on the merits. 24 4The Court permitted Thompson to proceed on the Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against former Warden Perry Russell. (ECF No. 7 at 8-9.) The Court 25 allowed the remaining claims to proceed against NDOC employee Sergeant Sandra Walker, including: (1) an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim for alleged 26 detainment in excessive heat conditions (id. at 7-8); (2) a Fourteenth Amendment Equal 27 Protection Clause claim (id. at 9-10); and (3) disability discrimination claims under the ADA and RA against Walker in her official capacity (id. at 10-12). 28 1 in the prison’s chronic care clinic for over a decade. (Id. at 4.) He asserts that both Warden 2 Russell and Sergeant Walker were aware of his medical conditions and mobility 3 restrictions. (Id.) 4 On July 11, 2021, at 11:15 a.m., Walker ordered Thompson and approximately 5 100 other elderly and medically vulnerable Unit 3 inmates to be detained for over three 6 hours on the outdoor athletic field without access to water, toilets, shade, or shelter during 7 an extreme heat warning, with temperatures exceeding 100 degrees.6 (Id.) 8 Thompson alleges that the decision to detain Unit 3 outside on the field was 9 discriminatory. (Id.) In particular, Thompson claims Unit 3 inmates were told “they were 10 being detained on the athletic field because Walker didn’t want their wheelchairs and 11 walkers on the gym floor,” 7 while able-bodied inmates from the same unit were allowed 12 to return indoors at 12:05 p.m.8 (Id. at 5.) 13 Thompson claims he suffered extreme sunburn, heat exhaustion, migraines, fever, 14 chills, and incontinence during the detention and continued to suffer ongoing symptoms, 15 thereafter, including worsened migraines, new skin issues, vertigo, and increased 16 reliance on his wheelchair. (Id. at 4.) Thompson’s continuing requests for medical 17 attention were either ignored or denied. (Id. at 5.) 18 B. Grievance History and Exhaustion 19 Three days after the incident, Thompson filed an informal-level grievance 20 6According to Defendants, Unit 3 inmates were moved outside to allow staff to 21 conduct a unit compliance check. (ECF No. 52 at 3-4; ECF No. 52-10 at 3.) In her sworn declaration, Walker states that she instructed the correctional officers conducting the 22 compliance check to offer “gate calls” every 30 minutes, allowing inmates access to water, 23 shade, and restrooms. (ECF No. 52-10 at 3.) 24 7In her sworn declaration, Walker counters that she “never ordered the correctional officers conducting the unit compliance check to prohibit inmates who used wheelchairs 25 or walkers from entering the gym.” (ECF No. 52-10 at 3.) 26 8Thompson asserts that inmates from the “SCU” division of Unit 3 were “called 27 back inside.” (ECF No. 7 at 5.) In Nevada prisons, the Structured Care Unit (“SCU”) houses individuals with mental health needs. https://doc.nv.gov/facilities/nncc facility/. 28 Thus, the Court infers that Thompson’s reference to SCU inmates refers to those without 1 (Grievance No. 20063124885) on July 14, 2021, referencing conditions of confinement. 2 (ECF No. 52-3 at 4.) He then filed a first-level grievance on August 18, 2021 (id. at 13) 3 and a second-level grievance on October 6, 2021 (id. at 26). Defendants now move for 4 summary judgment, in part, on the basis that Thompson failed to exhaust his 5 administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) as to 6 all claims except the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, which 7 Defendants seek to dismiss based on an absence of genuine dispute of material facts. 8 (ECF No. 52 at 7-9, 13-14.) 9 DISCUSSION9 10 The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 11 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where, as here, 12 a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court must “make a de novo 13 determination of those portions of the R&R to which objection is made.” Id. The Court’s 14 review is thus de novo because Thompson filed his Objection (ECF No. 78). The Court 15 first addresses Defendants’ administrative exhaustion argument and rejects Judge 16 Denney’s recommendation to grant summary judgment. The Court next turns to the merits 17 of Thompson’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Walker and 18 finds, on de novo review, that, because genuine disputes of material fact exist, the Court 19 will deny summary judgment. 20 A. Substantive Exhaustion and Adequacy of Thompson’s Grievances 21 Defendants argue in their Motion that Thompson failed to exhaust his 22 administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA, as to his (1) Eighth Amendment 23 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim, (2) Fourteenth Amendment equal 24 protection claim, and (3) disability discrimination claims under the ADA and RA. (ECF No. 25 52 at 7-9.) In particular, Defendants argue that while Thompson grieved his detention in 26 27 9The Court incorporates by reference Judge Denney’s description of the background of the case and recitation of pertinent allegations in the FAC, provided in the 28 R&R. (ECF No. 75 at 1-2.) 1 extreme weather during the compliance check, he did not raise concerns about his 2 medical care or allege age- or disability-based discrimination during the grievance 3 process, and therefore failed to put NDOC on notice of those remaining claims10. (Id. at 4 9.) Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Thompson,11 however, the Court 5 disagrees. 6 Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 7 under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 8 jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 9 are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is 10 “‘an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.’” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 11 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007)). To 12 exhaust administrative remedies within the NDOC, inmates must follow the procedures 13 set forth in Administrative Regulation (“AR”) 740, and they must complete three tiered 14 levels of a grievance: informal, first, and second review. (ECF No. 52-7.) 15 The PLRA requires proper exhaustion. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 16 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (“proper 17 exhaustion” means “using all steps the agency holds out”); see also Reyes v. Smith, 810 18 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that to properly exhaust their administrative 19 remedies under the PLRA, a plaintiff must adhere to “critical procedural rules”). This 20 means that, generally, inmates must adhere to institutional grievance procedures. The 21 Supreme Court has opined on the level of detail necessary in a grievance to put the prison 22 23 10Remaining claims include the (1) Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim, (2) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 24 claim, and (3) ADA and RA discrimination claims. 25 11In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. 26 Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). “If undisputed evidence 27 viewed in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving] prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 28 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). However, “[i]f material facts are disputed, summary judgment 1 on notice of a claim and has held: “[t]he level of detail necessary . . . to comply with the 2 grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the 3 prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper 4 exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007) (holding that prisoners could 5 not be required to name all defendants in a grievance where the prison’s procedures did 6 not mandate such). 7 A prison grievance need not contain all the elements or specificity of a future legal 8 claim to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 9 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A grievance need not include legal terminology . . . unless . . . in some 10 way needed to provide notice of the harm being grieved. A grievance also need not 11 contain every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim.”). This is 12 because “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and 13 facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Id. (citing Johnson v. 14 Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, an inmate’s compliance with the 15 PLRA exhaustion requirement as to some, but not all, claims does not warrant dismissal 16 of the entire action. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219-24; Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175 17 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a total exhaustion requirement and holding that where a 18 prisoner’s complaint contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a district court 19 should dismiss only the unexhausted claims). 20 The Ninth Circuit applies the Strong standard to determine the required level of 21 factual specificity in an inmate’s grievance. See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 22 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)). Under Strong, 23 when a prison’s grievance procedures are “silent” or “incomplete” as to factual specificity, 24 “a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is 25 sought.” See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strong, 297 26 F.3d at 650) (holding that a prisoner’s “failure to grieve deliberate indifference does not 27 invalidate his exhaustion attempt” in § 1983 suit alleging cruel and unusual punishment 28 and unsafe living conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Under the Nevada 1 prison grievance system, an inmate may resolve a claim through the NDOC’s 2 administrative process when they can “factually demonstrate a loss or harm,” which 3 “aris[es] out of . . . issues within the authority and control of the NDOC.” (ECF No. 52-7 4 at 2.) 5 The grievances filed demonstrate that Thompson put NDOC officials on clear 6 notice of the harsh weather conditions his unit was exposed to and provides a basis for 7 the deliberate indifference, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims. First, in 8 his informal grievance, Thompson writes that Unit 3 inmates were ordered to stay on the 9 athletic field from approximately 11:10 a.m. to 2:45 p.m. while officers conducted a 10 compliance check, detailing “temperatures above 100 [degrees]” and an absence of 11 shade or “any [restroom] facilities.” (ECF No. 52-3 at 6-7.) In denying Thompson’s 12 informal grievance, prison officials referred to “conditions of confinement not meeting 13 minimum standards,” which they averred to remedy by placing inmates in the gymnasium 14 in the future. (Id. at 12.) Thompson further stated in his first-level grievance that, “The 15 men of unit three C wing were called back in the unit at 12:15, but the rest of the men in 16 the unit, mostly 50 to 60 years of age, were forced to stay out in the extreme heat, locked 17 in the athletic field untill 2:48,” suggesting that Thompson’s unit of elderly and disabled 18 inmates was treated differently from able-bodied counterparts—supporting his equal 19 protection and disability discrimination claims. (Id. at 16.) Moreover, Thompson noted that 20 he was aware of two other men who needed medical attention during the incident and 21 stated, “but we could not get any officers’ attention,” further grieving that “there had not 22 been any gate calls for them to get inside.” (Id.) Thompson reported that, as a result, he 23 suffered “major burns” to both arms, his neck, and the top of his head along with extreme 24 migraine headaches, elevated blood pressure, fever, and extreme exhaustion. (Id. at 8.) 25 In response, prison officials claimed, “Medical attention was provided in the form of 26 Sunscreen and IBU’s.” (Id. at 25.) 27 In their Motion, Defendants argue that Thompson’s grievances addressed only the 28 conditions of confinement during the incident and that he neither requested medical care 1 as a remedy nor complained of being denied care. (ECF No. 52 at 9.) However, the full 2 grievance record shows that (1) Thompson emphasized the harm to his physical health 3 by describing symptoms he experienced both during and after the incident; (2) Thompson 4 asserted prison officials’ apparent indifference to inmates’ medical needs; and (3) prison 5 officials operated under the belief that Thompson’s grievances, in part, raised concerns 6 about medical issues and a lack of adequate care. Defendants further contend that 7 Thompson failed to allege any age- or disability-based discrimination. (Id.) However, as 8 noted above, Thompson alluded to the fact that one group of inmates was treated 9 differently from another based on physical capabilities and based on upon age. 10 Thompson’s grievances were thus based on the same underlying context now supporting 11 his Eighth Amendment medical indifference, equal protection, and disability 12 discrimination claims. The grievance process is intended to alert prisons to “the nature of 13 the wrong”—here, primarily conditions of confinement but also corresponding 14 constitutional issues and discriminatory treatment12—and “not to lay groundwork for 15 litigation”. See Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120 (holding that a grievance need not state every 16 relevant fact, nor state a legal cause of action). And, here, the Court finds Thompson 17 adequately complied with NDOC grievance procedures by alerting officials to a “loss or 18 harm . . . arising out of . . . issues within the authority and control of the NDOC” in sufficient 19 factual detail. (ECF No. 52-7 at 2.) 20 Therefore, the record demonstrates that Thompson followed proper grievance 21 procedures through all levels of review and that his grievances were sufficiently specific 22 to provide notice of the relevant issues. Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable 23 to Thompson, a rational trier of fact could find that Defendants failed to prove the 24 affirmative defense of non-exhaustion. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, 1176 (recognizing 25 defendants’ initial burden to prove this affirmative defense). The Court therefore rejects 26 12Both the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 794, apply in the 27 prison context. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that these Acts can constitutionally be applied to state prisons. See 28 Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895-99 (9th Cir. 2002); Clark v. Cal., 123 F.3d 1267, 1 Judge Denney’s R&R and denies Defendants’ Motion on the issue of administrative 2 exhaustion. 3 B. Eighth Amendment—Conditions of Confinement Claim 4 The Court turns to the merits of Thompson’s Eighth Amendment conditions of 5 confinement claim against Walker and finds that a genuine factual dispute exists as to 6 whether Walker knew of and disregarded a risk to Thompson’s health or safety on the 7 day of the incident. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 8 317, 322 (1986); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding 9 that summary judgment requires the moving party to bear the burden of showing that 10 there are no genuine issues of material fact); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 11 242, 256 (1986) (Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56’s requirements, the burden then 12 shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a 13 genuine issue for trial.”). 14 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments 15 and “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and 16 decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation and internal quotation 17 marks omitted). While prison conditions need not be “comfortable,” deprivations 18 constituting an “unnecessary and wanton inflection of pain” or denying the “minimal 19 civilized measure of life’s necessities” are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth 20 Amendment violation. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (citation and 21 internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, prison officials have a duty to guarantee 22 adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 23 832 (1994). 24 When a prison official is accused of imposing unsafe conditions of confinement in 25 violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the 26 inquiry turns on whether the official “acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk 27 of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). A prison official is 28 deliberately indifferent when two requirements are met: (1) the objective requirement that 1 the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the subjective requirement that the prison 2 official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”13 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-35 (“[A] 3 prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane 4 conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious 5 harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”). 6 In evaluating the objective prong, courts may consider some conditions “in 7 combination” when, taken together, they amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See 8 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (“[F]or example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a 9 failure to issue blankets” can produce a “mutually enforcing effect,” depriving human 10 needs such as “warmth.”). Moreover, when evaluating conditions of confinement, courts 11 should also consider the length of time the prisoner has been subjected to the condition. 12 See Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 13 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The circumstances, nature, and duration of a 14 deprivation of [ ] necessities must be considered in determining whether a constitutional 15 violation has occurred.”) And “the more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be 16 withheld.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731 (referencing the Eighth Circuit’s finding, see Gordon 17 v. Faber, 973 F.2d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 1992), that an Eighth Amendment violation occurred 18 “where prison officials required inmates to remain outdoors in subfreezing temperatures 19 for less than two hours, even though the inmates were provided with hip-length, lined 20 denim coats and allowed to move freely”). Temperature is also a factor. See Graves v. 21 Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming that “dangerously high 22 temperatures that pose a significant risk to detainee health violate the Eighth 23 Amendment” and holding that “one measure of an inadequate, as opposed to merely 24 uncomfortable, temperature is that it poses ‘a substantial risk of serious harm’” (internal 25 citation omitted)). Here, the Court finds that detaining elderly and physically disabled 26 inmates with preexisting medical conditions, such as Thompson, in excessive heat for a 27 13To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, a 28 plaintiff must make both of these showings. See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 1 prolonged period poses a “substantial risk of serious harm” and satisfies the objective 2 prong. 3 To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show actual knowledge—that 4 prison officials knew of and disregarded a risk to inmate health or safety created by the 5 condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826. Here, the primary factual dispute revolves around 6 whether Walker had knowledge of the three-hour outdoor detention. In their Motion, 7 Defendants dispute the subjective prong, arguing that Walker was not deliberately 8 indifferent because she “had no actual knowledge of th[e] alleged confinement condition” 9 and therefore did not violate Thompson’s Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 52 at 14.) 10 Defendants assert that Walker did not “personally participate[]” in the alleged three-hour 11 unconstitutional confinement because she completed her shift at 11:18 a.m., 12 approximately three minutes after the Unit 3 inmates were taken out to the athletic field. 13 (Id. at 13.) Notwithstanding, Walker, herself, concedes in her declaration that she was on 14 shift that day and ordered the compliance check on Unit 3 along with the inmates’ 15 placement on the athletic field. (ECF No. 52-10 at 3.) Walker further acknowledges that 16 she was aware of the physical mobility issues affecting some of the Unit 3 inmates. (Id.) 17 Moreover, in his Complaint and grievance record, Thompson alleges a series of 18 factual circumstances detailing prison officials’ failure to conduct regular gate calls during 19 the detention along with inmates’ complaints of discomfort. (ECF No. 52-3 at 16 20 (“Additionally, some men from unit one were out there with us were complaining that there 21 had not been any gate calls for them to get inside out of the blistering sun.”).) While 22 Walker claims she was “not notified of any issues raised by an inmate” and that 23 correctional officers were instructed to conduct gate calls every 30 minutes (ECF No. 52- 24 10 at 3), the Court finds that such a determination requires a fact-intensive assessment, 25 making summary judgment improper. 26 In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all 27 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp., 793 28 F.2d at 1103. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Thompson, the Court 1 finds that Defendants fail to show an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to 2 the subjective component of Thompson’s Eighth Amendment claim as applied to Walker. 3 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion as to the conditions of confinement 4 claim. 5 C. Qualified Immunity14 6 Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for Thompson’s Eighth 7 Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. (ECF No. 52 at 6, 9-20.) First, they 8 argue Thompson cannot establish an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement 9 violation because he cannot show that Walker was subjectively aware of his condition 10 during the detention. (Id. at 12-15.) Next, Defendants argue Thompson is unable to 11 establish an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to a serious medical 12 need based upon insufficient medical records and notice. (Id. at 12-13, 15-16.) 13 Defendants further contend that Thompson cannot show that Walker intentionally 14 discriminated against him due to his disability or age in violation of the Fourteenth 15 Amendment Equal Protection Clause. (Id. at 13, 16-20.) Thompson counters that 16 Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendants violated clearly 17 established law along with his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 68 at 18 2-6.) 19 Qualified immunity is an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” 20 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts 21 to balance two important and sometimes competing interests: “the need to hold public 22 officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 23 officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 24 reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks 25 and citation omitted). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the Court must 26 consider “(1) whether the official violated a constitutional right and (2) whether the 27 28 14The magistrate judge did not analyze qualified immunity in the R&R. The Court 1 constitutional right was clearly established.” C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1022 2 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson 555 U.S. at 232). District courts have discretion to address 3 these prongs in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 4 Regarding the conditions of confinement claim, as discussed above, Defendants 5 have not demonstrated an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 6 they violated Thompson’s Eighth Amendment rights by detaining elderly and physically 7 disabled inmates with preexisting medical conditions in excessive heat for a prolonged 8 period. 9 Regarding the medical deliberate indifference claim, Defendants have similarly 10 failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. Defendants’ argument that Thompson 11 “fail[ed] to establish that he had a serious medical need” or that he failed to properly grieve 12 his resulting symptoms to NNCC medical staff is unconvincing. (ECF No. 52 at 15-16.) 13 Under the second prong of a qualified immunity analysis, the proper inquiry is whether a 14 reasonable official would have understood that their actions violated Thompson’s rights. 15 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “A right is clearly established when it is 16 ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is 17 doing violates that right.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam) 18 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). Here, Defendants concede 19 that they were aware of Thompson’s preexisting medical conditions, citing records 20 covering a three-year period during which Thompson was monitored for Behcet’s disease. 21 (ECF No. 52 at 2 (“Thompson’s medical records show he has had Behcet’s disease since 22 at least 2017.”), 15-16 (“[A]lthough Thompson has had Behcet’s disease . . . the record 23 also shows that from 2021 to 2024 Thompson was periodically monitored for this 24 condition and received appropriate medical treatment and medication.”); see also ECF 25 Nos. 52-4, 54.) A reasonable jury could therefore conclude that Defendants should have, 26 and could have, understood that placing Thompson and other medically compromised 27 Unit 3 inmates in excessive heat for a prolonged period was deliberately indifferent and 28 a clear violation of Eighth Amendment rights. 1 Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, Defendants cannot 2 show that they did not discriminate against Thompson or other disabled inmates. “To state 3 a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 4 Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 5 purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” 6 Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation 7 omitted). Here, Defendants argue that Thompson cannot meet the requirements for an 8 equal protection claim because he cannot establish that he belongs to a protected class. 9 (ECF No. 52 at 17.) Yet, even if “the disabled do not constitute a suspect class” for equal 10 protection purposes, see Does 1–5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996), a 11 governmental policy that treats the disabled differently from the non-disabled must be 12 rationally related to legitimate legislative goals. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 13 Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (invalidating city ordinance requiring special use permit to 14 house disabled persons in group home). As discussed above, Thompson has alleged that 15 he, along with other physically disabled Unit 3 inmates, were treated differently from their 16 able-bodied counterparts when they were forced to remain outside on the athletic field as 17 opposed to inside the gymnasium. A reasonable jury could find that such treatment did 18 not advance any “legitimate” state interests. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-440. 19 Moreover, under the Equal Protection Clause, “all persons similarly situated should be 20 treated alike,” and, here, a reasonable jury could also find that the Unit 3 inmates—with 21 their respective mental and physical disabilities—were similarly situated but not treated 22 alike, thereby violating Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. at 439 (citing Plyler v. 23 Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).15 24 Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Thompson, the Court finds that 25 15Defendants further argue—though not on qualified immunity grounds—that 26 Thompson cannot establish his ADA or RA discrimination claims because there is no 27 evidence that Walker engaged in discriminatory conduct toward him. (ECF No. 52 at 20- 21.) The Court applies its same analysis as above and finds that a genuine dispute of 28 material fact exists as to whether Walker discriminated against Thompson due to his 1 Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendants have not shown 2 an absence of genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they violated Thompson’s 3 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and whether Thompson’s rights were clearly 4 established at the time of violation. 5 D. Punitive Damages 6 Lastly, Defendants argue Thompson's claim for punitive damages should be 7 dismissed because there is no clear and convincing evidence of “wanton and willful 8 conduct” rising to the level of oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious behavior, as required 9 under Nevada law. (ECF No. 52 at 22.) However, as to § 1983 claims, “[i]t is well- 10 established that a ‘jury may award punitive damages . . . either when a defendant’s 11 conduct . . . involved a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of 12 others.’” Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir. 1993). Taken together, 13 Thompson’s allegations could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that prison officials 14 acted with reckless or callous disregard for the health and safety of Thompson and other 15 Unit 3 inmates by exposing them to excessive heat for over three hours in violation of the 16 Eighth Amendment—conduct that could support an award of punitive damages. 17 Accordingly, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Thompson, the Court 18 denies Defendants’ request for summary judgment as to the punitive damages claim, as 19 this question is one best left to a jury. 20 CONCLUSION 21 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 22 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 23 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 24 Motion before the Court. 25 It is therefore ordered that Judge Denney’s report and recommendation (ECF No. 26 75) is rejected. 27 It is further ordered that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 52) 28 is denied. 1 The Court refers this case to Judge Denney to conduct a settlement conference. 2 The proposed joint pretrial order is due 30 days from the settlement conference. 3 DATED THIS 17th Day of October 2025. 4 5 6 MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28