1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01736-APG-DJA

4 Plaintiff Dismissal Order

5 v.

6 ELY STATE PRISON, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiff Tyrone Noel Nunn brings this civil-rights action under

to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF No. 1-1. On 11 September 22, 2025, I denied Nunn’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered him 12 to pay the $405 filing fee in full by October 22, 2025, because he had three strikes under 28

(g). ECF No. 3. I warned Nunn that the action would be dismissed if he failed to 14 pay the $405 filing fee by that deadline.

. That deadline expired and Nunn did not pay the 15 filing fee, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 16 I. Discussion 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 20 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 21 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 22 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 23 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 1 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must 2 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 3 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 4 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re

5 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 6

). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 8 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third 9 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 10 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 11 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The 12 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 13 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to

15 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 16 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 17 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 19 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 20 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 21 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 22 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 23 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 1} Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Nunn pays the $405 filing fee, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 4|| the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate 5}| that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Nunn needs additional time or evidence 6]| that he did not receive the original order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. IT. Conclusion 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 10|| dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 11}|Nunn’s failure to pay the $405 filing fee in compliance with my September 22, 2025, order. The 12|| Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 13|| documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Nunn wishes to pursue his claims, he must 14|| file a complaint in a new case and pay the full filing fee. 15 16 Dated: October 28, 2025 17 _4 Chief United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23