1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2

3 Salahuddin Fard Smart, Case No. 2:25-cv-00351-CDS-NJK

4 Plaintiff Dismissal Order

5 v.

6 Judge Rebecca Saxe, et al.,

7 Defendants 8 9 Plaintiff Salahuddin Fard Smart brings this civil-rights action under

to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF No. 1-1. On 11 October 6, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Smart to update his address by October 31, 2025. 12 ECF No. 4. That deadline expired without an updated address from Smart, and his mail from the 13 court is being returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 5. 14 I. Discussion 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 16 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 17 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an 18 action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 19

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule 20 requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether 22 to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 23 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 24 prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and 25 (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 1 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 2 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Smart’s claims. The third 3 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 4 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 5 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 6 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 7 the factors favoring dismissal. 8 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 9 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. 10 Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives 11 before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 12

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth 13 Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of 14 the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend 15 coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 16 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but 17 must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th 18 Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the court and the 19 defendants to send Smart case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative is to 20 enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that 21 the second order would even reach Smart is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the 22 inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a 23 meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 24 25 26 Conclusion 2 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 3 dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Smart’s to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s October 6, 2025, order. 5 It is further ordered that Smart’s application to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 1] is 6|/denied as moot. 7 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No 8 documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Smart wishes to pursue his claims, he 9|/must file a complaint in a new case and provide the court with hés current address. 10 Dated: November 5, 2025 7) I] LZ 12 Cristing La Kat Unite, ates District Judge 1B / 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26