1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Paul McCreary and Robert Sturgis, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01687-APG-BNW

4 Plaintiffs Order Dismissing and Closing Case

5 v.

6 James Dzurenda, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiffs Paul McCreary, Robert Sturgis, and Matthew Travis Houston attempted to 10 initiate this

action together. ECF No. 1-1. On September 14, 2025, I dismissed 11 Houston from this action without prejudice because he failed to comply with his vexatious 12 litigant pre-filing order requirements. ECF No. 3. I gave McCreary and Sturgis the opportunity 13 to continue with this lawsuit by directing them to file an amended complaint and to either 14 collectively pay the full $405 filing fee together or to each file individual applications to proceed 15 in forma pauperis (IFP) by October 31, 2025.

That deadline expired without any response 16 from McCreary or Sturgis. 17 I. Discussion 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 19 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 20 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 21 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 22 Carey v. King,

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 23 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 1 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: 2 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 3 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 4 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re

5 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 6

). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 8 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of McCreary’s and Sturgis’s 9 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 10 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a 11 pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

, 12 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 13 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to

15 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 16 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 17 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 19 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 20 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 21 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless McCreary and Sturgis file an amended 22 complaint and either file complete IFP applications or pay the $405 filing fee for a civil action, 23 the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s 2\| finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. 3} Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. II. Conclusion 6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 8|| McCreary’s and Sturgis’s failure to file an amended complaint and satisfy the matter of the filing fee in compliance with my order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 10|| and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If McCreary or 11|| Sturgis wish to pursue their claims, they must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing fee or file complete IFP applications. 13 14 Dated: November 5, 2025 Z, 15 Andrew P. Gordon 16 Chief United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23