1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 ROBERT STURGIS, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01265-APG-BNW

4 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case

5 v.

6 JAMES DZURENDA, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiff Robert Sturgis appeared to initiate this

action by filing an 10 incomplete application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with the involvement of Matthew 11 Travis Houston. ECF No. 1. The magistrate judge directed Sturgis to file a complete IFP 12 application and a complaint. ECF No. 3. In response, Houston filed an IFP application and 13 complaint listing himself and Sturgis as plaintiffs (both without Sturgis’s signature). ECF Nos. 4, 14 5. On October 6, 2025, I dismissed Houston from this action without prejudice because he failed 15 to comply with his vexatious litigant pre-filing order requirements. ECF No. 6. I gave Sturgis 16 the opportunity to continue with this lawsuit by directing him to file an amended complaint and 17 to either pay the full $405 filing fee or file a complete IFP application by November 3, 2025.

18 That deadline expired without any response by Sturgis, and it appears that Sturgis has refused to 19 sign for mail sent to him by the Court. ECF Nos. 7, 10. 20 I. Discussion 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 22 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 23 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 1 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 2 Carey v. King,

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 3 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 4 Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with

5 court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must 6 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 7 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 8 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 9 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 10

). 11 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 12 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Sturgis’s claims. The third 13 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 14 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the

15 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The 16 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 17 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 19 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 20 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 21 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 22 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 23 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 1} meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 2|| this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Sturgis files an amended complaint and 3|| either pays the $405 filing fee or files a complete IFP application, the only alternative is to enter second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances 6] here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. IT. Conclusion 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 11]| Sturgis’s failure to file an amended complaint and satisfy the matter of the filing fee in compliance with my order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and 13]| close this case. If Sturgis wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint and address the 14|| matter of the filing fee in a new case. 15 16 Dated: November 6, 2025 17 _¢ Zo Chief United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23