1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 DEVIN LAMPKIN, Case No. 2:25-cv-01083-GMN-DJA

4 Plaintiff ORDER DISMISSING AND CLOSING CASE 5 v.

6 WILLIAMS,

7 Defendant

8

9 Plaintiff Devin Lampkin filed this civil-rights action under

to 10 redress constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered at High Desert State Prison. 11 On October 2, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to either pay the full $405 filing fee or file 12 a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis by October 31, 2025. (ECF No. 6.) 13 That deadline expired without any response by Plaintiff. 14 I. DISCUSSION 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 16 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 17 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

(9th Cir. 18 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 19 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) 20 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to update 21 their address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987) (affirming 22 dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an 23 action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 24 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 25 of prejudice to the Defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 26 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 27 Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

). 28 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 1 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. The 2 third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 3 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 4 ordered by the Court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

, 5 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 6 their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 7 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 8 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 9 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 10 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 11 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 12 Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 13 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 14 Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this Court cannot operate without 15 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without Plaintiff’s compliance 16 with the Court’s orders, the only alternative is to enter another order setting another 17 deadline. But repeating an ignored order often only delays the inevitable and further 18 squander the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this 19 case will be an exception. 20 Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 21 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these 22 dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 23 II. CONCLUSION 24 It is therefore Ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s 25 failure to address the matter of the filing fee in compliance with the Court’s Order. 26 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 27 case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint and address the 28 matter of the filing fee in a new case. 1 It is further Ordered that the motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 4) is denied as 2} moot. 3 DATED: November 10, 2025 Yj, 4 her 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-3-