Bernard Darnell May Jr. v. Yllas, et al.
Bernard Darnell May Jr. v. Yllas, et al.
Trial Court Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 BERNARD DARNELL MAY JR., Case No.: 2:25-cv-01631-APG-DJA
4 Plaintiff Dismissal Order
5 v.
6 YLLAS, et al.,
7 Defendants
8
9 Plaintiff Bernard Darnell May Jr. brings this civil-rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF No. 1-1. On 11 September 5, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered May to file a fully complete application to 12 proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action on or before 13 November 3, 2025. ECF No. 3. The magistrate judge warned May that the action could be 14 dismissed if he failed to timely comply.
Id. at 2. That deadline expired and May has not filed a 15 complete IFP application, paid the full $405 filing fee, or otherwise responded. 16 I. Discussion 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 18 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 19 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,
782 F.2d 829, 831(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 20 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 21 Carey v. King,
856 F.2d 1439, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 22 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 23 Postal Service,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: 1 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 2 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 1217, 1226(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,
5
833 F.2d at 130). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of May’s claims. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 9 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 10 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,
542 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 1976). The 11 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 12 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish
15 v. Cal. Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,
291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 18 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 19 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,
779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 20 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless May either files a complete IFP 21 application or pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second 22 order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 23 delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not 1} } indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful 2|| alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. IL. Conclusion 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 5|| dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 6|| May’s failure to file a fully complete IFP or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with the 7|| magistrate judge’s September 5, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 8|| accordingly and close this case. If May wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing fee or file a complete IFP. 10 11 Dated: November 13, 2025 12 Ca. Andrew P. Gordon 13 Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Reference
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