1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:25-cv-01986-JAD-EJY Terrell Avalon Lancaster, 4 Plaintiff Order Denying Ex Parte Motion for 5 v. Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Order to Show Cause 6 Clark County, et al., [ECF No. 8] 7 Defendants

8 Pro se plaintiff Terrell Avalon Lancaster sues Clark County, the District Attorney’s 9 Family Support Division (DAFS), various district attorneys, DFAS agents, and state-court judges 10 for alleged constitutional violations stemming from his state-court child-support proceedings. I 11 recently denied his motion for a temporary restraining order because he didn’t properly support 12 his motion or explain why he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. He now renews his 13 ex parte motion with a more robust filing, contending that specific facts entitle him to an 14 injunction against all defendants that prevents them from taking action related to or arising from 15 his state-court case. But Lancaster is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims because 16 immunity likely protects the judge and district-attorney defendants from suit, and this court will 17 likely be required to abstain from intervening in his state-court proceedings. So I deny his 18 renewed motion. 19 Discussion 20 Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary” remedies 21 “never awarded as of right.”1 The Supreme Court clarified in Winter v. Natural Resources 22 Defense Council, Inc. that, to obtain an injunction, plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely 23

1 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008). 1 to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of 2 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the 3 public interest.”2 The Ninth Circuit recognizes an additional standard: if “plaintiff[s] can only 4 show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of 5 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships

6 tips sharply in the plaintiffs’ favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.”3 7 In his renewed motion, Lancaster supports each claim with specific facts that he believes 8 show his entitlement to relief. He claims that the state court lacked jurisdiction over his child- 9 support dispute because a DAFS agent fraudulently induced him to accept service of an order 10 upon consent that created his case.4 He also contends that his professional driver’s license was 11 suspended based on a “never-served 2023 order” in deprivation of his procedural due-process 12 rights.5 He further alleges that DAFS retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment 13 rights because three weeks after he filed an emergency motion to challenge the suspension, 14 DAFS “initiated a punitive contempt proceeding against him.”6

15 Even if I were to accept Lancaster’s representations as true, it’s likely that this federal 16 court should abstain from hearing his case. The comity-based abstention doctrine developed in 17 the United States Supreme Court case of Younger v. Harris prevents federal courts from 18 19 20 2

. 21 3 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011)). 22 4 ECF No. 8 at 3. 23 5

6 Id. at 4. 1 interfering in pending state-court proceedings that implicate important state interests.7 The 2 Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have determined that domestic-relation disputes, like the 3 child-support battle at issue here, are the types of cases that federal courts should refrain from 4 intervening in.8 Even for cases in which a plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights, 5 this federal court will not intervene unless there is an extraordinary circumstance that creates a

6 threat of irreparable injury that cannot be eliminated through proper motion practice in the state- 7 court case.9 And “minimal respect for the state processes . . . precludes any presumption that the 8 state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.”10 The allegations in Lancaster’s 9 complaint and injunctive-relief motion do not demonstrate that his constitutional concerns would 10 not be addressed by the state court. Though he contends that the family-court judge refused to 11 hear his concerns about the district attorney’s conduct, the proper course of action is to challenge 12 those rulings through the state-court appellate process, not to turn to federal court.11 13 14

15

16 7 Younger v. Harris,

(1971); see also Duke v. Gastelo,

(9th Cir. 2023) (describing the factors that courts must consider to determine whether Younger abstention 17 should apply to a state-court case). 8 Moore v. Sims,

(1979) (applying Younger abstention to a case 18 challenging the constitutionality of a family-court custody order); H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel,

(9th Cir. 2000) (applying Younger to a state-court custody dispute, noting that 19 the “state has a vital interest in protecting the authority of the judicial system,” particularly “in the field of domestic relations, over which federal court have no general jurisdiction”). 20 9 See Younger, 401 U.S. at 52–54. 21 10 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

(1982). 11 Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Ct.,

, 223 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court has 22 held that Younger abstention applies to prevent federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding in which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies.”); Gilbertson v. 23 Albright,

, 969 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[P]roceedings are deemed on-going for purposes of Younger abstention until state appellate review is completed . . . .”). 1 Other legal doctrines likely bar Lancaster’s claims. Judicial immunity likely applies to 2|| bar suit against the judge defendants.!* Prosecutorial immunity likely shields the district- 3]| attorney defendants and DAFS agents.'? Because immunity likely applies to the defendants, and 4!| Younger abstention likely applies to prevent this court’s intervention in Lancaster’s state-court 5|| proceedings, I cannot conclude that Lancaster is likely to succeed on the merits of his constitutional claims. 7 Lancaster is reminded that, because he seeks to proceed without paying the filing fee in 8|| this case, his in forma pauperis application must be ruled on and his complaint must be screened 9|| by the magistrate judge before this case can advance further.'* That screening process may take 10]| several months. 11 Conclusion 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Terrell Lancaster’s motion for a temporary 13]| restraining order and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue [ECF 14|| No. 8] is DENIED. q y US. Di Judge Je ie A. Dorsey 16 Novesaber 13, 2025 17 18 2 See In re Castillo,

, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Anglo-American common law has long recognized judicial immunity, a ‘sweeping form of immunity’ for acts performed by judges that to the ‘judicial process.’” (quoting Forrester v. White,

(1988); Imbler v. Pachtman,

, 423 n.20 (1976)); Stump v. Sparkman,

(holding that a judge is entitled to immunity from suit even if “the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” (cleaned up)). '3 See Safouane v. Fleck,

(9th Cir. 2007) (“Absolute immunity attaches to prosecutors and to other officers standing in their shoes for performing the traditional function of prosecutors: ‘initiating a prosecution and... presenting the State’s case.’” (quoting Miller v. Gammie,

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 4 98 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).