Thomas Oates v. Ronald Oliver, et al.
Thomas Oates v. Ronald Oliver, et al.
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * * 7 THOMAS OATES, Case No. 2:25-cv-01365-RFB-DJA 8
9 Plaintiff, ORDER
10 v.
11 RONALD OLIVER, et al., 12 Defendants. 13
14 Plaintiff Thomas Oates brings this civil-rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983to redress 15 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada 16 Department of Corrections (“NDOC”). (ECF No. 1-1). On August 4, 2025, this Court ordered 17 Oates to either pay the full $405 filing fee or file a complete application to proceed in forma 18 pauperis by October 3, 2025. (ECF No. 3). That deadline expired without payment of the filing 19 fee, a complete in forma pauperis application, or other response from Oates. And according to the 20 NDOC inmate database, Oates is no longer in custody, but he has not filed his updated address 21 with the Court as required by Local Rule IA 3-1. See ECF No. 2 at 2. 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 23 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 24 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,
782 F.2d 829, 831(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 25 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 26 Carey v. King,
856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 27 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 28 1 Service,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 2 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 3 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 4 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 5 their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 6 Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 1217, 1226(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,
833 F.2d at 130). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 8 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Oates’s claims. The third 9 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 10 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 11 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,
542 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 12 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 13 the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 15 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 16 v. Cal. Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 17 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 18 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,
291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 19 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 20 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,
779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 21 this Court cannot operate without collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without 22 Oates’s compliance with the Court’s orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 23 another deadline. But repeating an ignored order often only delays the inevitable and further 24 squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will 25 be an exception. And without an updated address, the likelihood that the order would even reach 26 Oates is low. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. 27 So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 28 /// ] Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice based on Thomas Oates’s failure to address the matter of the filing fee in compliance with this Court’s order. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. No other documents may 5 | be filed in this now-closed case. If Oates wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in 6 | anew case and either pay the full filing fee or complete an in forma pauperis application. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Oates may move to reopen this by filing a motion for 8 | reconsideration within 28 days of the entry of this Order. In this motion, Oates would need to 9 | explain the circumstances that led to his not being able to address the filing fee as directed by the 10 | Court. If the Court finds there is good cause or a reasonable explanation for the failure, the Court 11 | will reopen the case. 12 DATED: November 14, 2025. 13 AS 4 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16
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Reference
- Status
- Unknown