1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 Bridget C., Case No. 2:22-cv-01978-BNW

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 Kilolo Kijakazi,

8 Defendants.

9 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 10 § 406(b). ECF No. 30. Defendant responded. ECF No. 31. For the reasons set forth below, 11 Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. 12 I. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Pursuant to Section 406(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social 14 security] claimant, . . . the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee 15 for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits.” 42

(b)(1)(A). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful 17 claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht v. 18 Barnhart,

(2002). When contemplating a fee motion under section 406(b), 19 courts must first look to the contingency fee agreement and then test for reasonableness. See 20 Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009). To determine reasonableness, courts 21 may consider “(1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether the 22 attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the 23 amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and 24 counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases.” Barry H. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:19- 25 CV-02446-AGS,

, at *1 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2023) (quoting Avina v. Saul, No. 26 18-CV-1728 W (MSB),

, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2021)). Courts should also 27 consider whether inferior representation justifies an award of less than 25% such as “any delay in 1 the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether the benefits of the 2 representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the risk counsel assumed by 3 accepting the case.” Bartle v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-1431-CAB-MSB,

, at *1–2 4 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 7, 2023) (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151–52) (citing Gisbrecht,

789). 6 When an attorney receives EAJA fees and 406(b) fees for the same work, he or she must 7 refund the smaller award to his or her client. See Gisbrecht,

. 8 II. ANALYSIS 9 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s fee request of $28,512.00 is reasonable. On November 14, 10 2022, Plaintiff entered into a Social Security Representation Agreement with counsel wherein he 11 agreed that the fee for the successful prosecution the matter would be 25% of the past due 12 benefits awarded. ECF No. 30 at 22. Accordingly, the contingency fee agreement is within the 13 statutory ceiling. See

(b)(1)(A). Because there is no evidence of “fraud or 14 overreaching” in the negotiation of the Representation Agreement and because the fee agreement 15 is within the statutory ceiling, the Court looks to the character of the representation and the results 16 achieved to determine reasonableness. Crawford,

; see also Gisbrecht,

at 808. 18 Plaintiff’s counsel did not render substandard representation or delay litigation. See 19 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151–52. Indeed, counsel obtained a favorable decision for his client and 20 represents she has been deemed entitled to receive $114,050.00 in past due benefits. 21 Plaintiff's counsel spent a reasonable amount of time – 21.3 hours of supervised attorney 22 time working on this matter to achieve a successful result. Counsel has submitted a detailed 23 billing statement in support of the requested fee that the Court has reviewed. ECF No. 30 at 42- 24 43. There is nothing in the billing statement showing “substandard performance, delay, or 25 benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151–52. 26 The Court notes that counsel's de facto hourly rate of $1,338.15 is certainly on the higher 27 end, however, several cases have found rates of $1300 - $1600 to be appropriate. See, e.g., 1 || 2023) (“The de facto hourly rate is thus $1,438.35, which—although high, as discussed in further 2 || detail below—is in line with hourly rates approved by courts in similar cases, including in this 3 || district.”). There is also no evidence or indication that Plaintiff's counsel’s work was inferior, that 4 || he engaged in dilatory conduct, or that he delayed the proceedings to potentially incur more fees. 5 || Accordingly, none of the factors the Court considers for reasonableness favor reducing the fee 6 || award. 7 I. CONCLUSION 8 Plaintiff's counsel successfully accomplished a remand and an order for retroactive 9 || benefits of $114,050.00 for his client and seeks $28,512.00 in fees, which is less than 25% of 10 || past-due benefits. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 11 || § 406(b). The Court awards Mark Kalagian attorney fees in the amount of $28,512.00. The Court 12 || orders Mark Kalagian to reimburse Plaintiff the amount of $4,900.00 for EAJA fees previously 13 || received. 14 DATED: November 17, 2025 15 — Lng bas BRENDA WEKSLER □ 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28