1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 3 R.O. Brooks Freshwadda, Case No. 2:23-cv-00880-CDS-DJA

4 Plaintiff Order Denying Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for 5 v. Entry of Final Judgment, and Motion for Summary Judgment 6 Nicholas Boutos, et al.,

7 Defendants [ECF Nos. 35, 38, 39] 8 9 Pro se plaintiff R.O. Brooks Freshwadda filed an emergency motion for reconsideration 10 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Emerg. mot., ECF No. 35. Therein, he argues that 11 the order dismissing this case without prejudice (ECF No. 32) was manifestly unjust because 12 the court did not consider his opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See id. The 13 defendants oppose the motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 36. They argue that Freshwadda fails to meet the 14 reconsideration standard, and that the court correctly applied the Henderson factors and 15 dismissed this action because of Freshwadda’s failure to diligently prosecute his case. See id. The 16 motion is now fully briefed. Reply, ECF No. 37. Further, on December 4, 2025, Freshwadda filed 17 a motion for entry of final judgment and a motion for summary judgment. Mots., ECF Nos. 38, 18 39. For the reasons set forth herein, I deny all pending motions. 19 I. Legal authority 20 A. Emergency motions 21 The local rules of this district provide the court with the sole discretion to determine 22 whether an “emergency” motion is, in fact, an emergency. Local Rule 7-4(c). Emergency motions 23 “should be rare” because of the “numerous problems they create for the opposing party and the 24 court in resolving them.” LR 7-4(b); Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc.,

(D.

). Indeed, the filing of emergency motions is disfavored and should be confined to “the 26 most limited circumstances.” Cardoza,

. That is because emergency motions 1 burden both the parties and the court, requiring each to “abandon other matters to focus on the 2 pending ‘emergency.’”

3 Generally, an emergency motion is appropriate only when the movant has shown: (1) the 4 movant will be irreparably prejudiced if the court resolves the motion under the normal briefing 5 schedule; and (2) the movant is without fault in creating the crisis that requires emergency relief 6 or, at the very least, the crisis occurred because of excusable neglect.

(citing Mission Power 7 Eng’g Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,

(C.D. Cal. 1995)). If there is no irreparable 8 prejudice, then no sufficient justification for bypassing the default briefing schedule exists, and 9 the motion may be properly decided on a non-expedited basis.

at 1142–43. 10 Local Rule 7-4 sets forth the proper procedure for filing emergency motions. It requires 11 that a party filing an emergency motion include a declaration that includes 12 [a] statement of movant certifying that, after participation in the meet-and-confer process to resolve the dispute, the [moving party] has been unable to resolve the 13 matter without court action. The statement also must state when and how the 14 other affected people or entities were notified of the motion or, if not notified, why it was not practicable to do so. If the nature of the emergency precludes a meet and 15 confer, the statement must include a detailed description of the emergency, so the court can evaluate whether a meet and confer truly was precluded. 16 17 LR 7-4(a)(3). 18 B. Motion for reconsideration 19 Motions for reconsideration offer “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the 20 interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani,

, 945 21 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). “Indeed, ‘a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, 22 absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly 23 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling 24 law.’” Id. (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop,

, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). A motion to 25 reconsider must provide a court with valid grounds for reconsideration. 26 1 Under Rule 59(e), reconsideration may be appropriate if “(1) the district court is 2 presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or made 3 an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling 4 law.” Ybarra v. McDaniel,

(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).1 Clear error is “plain 5 and indisputable, and [it] amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible 6 evidence in the record.” Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Welfare Funds v. Apollo Grp., Inc.,

, 7 231 (D. Ariz. 2012) (cleaned up). “Unhappiness with the outcome is not included within the 8 rule; unless the moving party shows that one of the stated grounds for reconsideration exists, 9 the Court will not grant a reconsideration.” Roe v. LexisNexis Risk Sols., Inc.,

, at 10 *2 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2013); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment 11 must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”). In this district, motions for 12 reconsiderations are governed by Local Rule 59-1. 13 II. Discussion 14 I first address Freshwadda’s reconsideration motion and find that it fail for two reasons. 15 First, his motion fails to comply with the local rules. Although pro se litigants are not held “to 16 the same standards to which we hold sophisticated parties acting with the benefit of legal 17 representation,” United States v. Mesle,

(9th Cir. 2010), they are nevertheless 18 bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this district’s local rules.2 See Jacobsen v. Filler, 19

20 1 Freshwadda moves under Rule 59(e) so I address it herein. I note however, that Rule 60 is more applicable, so I evaluate his motion under that rule as well. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “allows 21 a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby,

, 22 528 (2005). Subsection (b)(6) of that Rule also allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for any reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Like Rule 59, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is to be “used 23 sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances exist. See Harvest v. Castro,

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Latshaw 24 v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2006)). To be entitled to relief, the moving party “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control.” Latshaw,

. For the 25 same reasons explained here, Freshwadda does not demonstrate reconsideration is warranted here, especially given he was given multiple opportunities to comply with the court’s orders to prosecute his 26 case and failed to do so. 2 Freshwadda was previously warned that he must follow the local rules. See ECF No. 20. 1

, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that pro se parties are not excused from 2 following the rules and orders of the court). Here, Freshwadda’s motion fails to comply with 3 Local Rule 7-4. Specifically, the motion neither attaches a declaration nor addresses the meet 4 and confer requirement. See LR 7-4(a)(3). The motion also fails to comply with LR 7-4(d) 5 requiring that, at the time an emergency motion is filed or shortly thereafter, the moving party 6 must “advise the courtroom administrators for the assigned district judge and magistrate judge 7 that the motion was filed.” LR 7-2(d). Freshwadda did not contact my courtroom administrator. 8 Finally, having reviewed the motion, there is no basis for this motion to be filed as an emergency. 9 Although Freshwadda’s failure to comply with the local rules is sufficient reason to deny his 10 motion for reconsideration, I nonetheless address the motion on its merits. 11 Freshwadda’s reconsideration motion is also denied because he fails to satisfy the 12 requirements for the relief he seeks. Freshwadda argues that the dismissal order is erroneous 13 because I failed to consider his opposition to the motion to dismiss that was filed on October 1, 14 2025, and misapplied the Henderson factors. See ECF No. 35 at 2–6. I disagree on both fronts. 15 First, Freshwadda’s argument that I failed to consider his opposition to the motion to 16 dismiss is misplaced. This court mooted the pending motion to dismiss after dismissing this 17 case for failure to prosecute. As explained in the August 15, 2025 show cause order, 18 “Freshwadda has yet to comply with Local Rule 26-1(a), which requires a plaintiff to “initiate the scheduling of the conference required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) to be 19 held within 30 days after the first defendant answers or otherwise appears.” D. Nev. Local Rule 26-1(a). Here, defendants filed an answer to the complaint almost 20 two years ago, on November 21, 2023. Answer, ECF No. 12. A review of the docket reveals that Freshwadda has not engaged in discovery, much less diligently 21 prosecuted this case.” 22 23 ECF No. 26 at 3. Further, Freshwadda has been previously warned that the court would dismiss 24 the case for want of prosecution.

His response to the show cause order did not explain his 25 failure to prosecute. See ECF No. 27. Instead, he attempted to shift responsibility for moving this 26 case forward onto the defendants, when the rules clearly place that responsibility on him as the 1} plaintiff. Id. at 3-4. He contends that his motions practice demonstrates diligence. Id. at 4 (citing 2|| ECF Nos. 17, 19 that were stricken by the court). But Freshwadda’s motion for reconsideration wholly fails to explain why he repeatedly disregarded this court’s order to comply with Local Rule 26-1(a). Although he filed an opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, that does not 5]| alleviate his responsibility to comply with this court’s orders and the Local Rules to prosecute 6|| his case. His failure to comply, even after multiple warnings, was fatal to his case. See Notice, 7|| ECF No. 15; Order to comply, ECF No. 20; Order to show cause, ECF No. 26. Simply put, Freshwadda was required to diligently prosecute this case, and he failed to do so. 9 Second, Freshwadda’s argument that I misapplied the Henderson factors also fails. 10}| Freshwadda bases his arguments solely on mere disagreement with my reasoning, But “[m]ere 11|| disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.” Haw. Stevedores, 12]| Inc. v. HT@T Co,

(D. Haw. 2005). His motion does not support a finding 13]| that clear error was committed nor that my initial decision was manifestly unjust. 14|| Consequently, his motion for reconsideration is denied. 15 Because his motion for reconsideration fails, this action remains closed, so his motion for entry of final judgment and a motion for summary judgment are denied as moot. Conclusion 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Freshwadda’s motion for reconsideration [ECF No. 35] DENIED. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Freshwadda’s motion for entry of judgment and motion for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 38, 39] are DENIED as moot. 22 No further filings may be made in this closed action. *) 23 Dated: December 9, 2025 /, / 24 . LZ 25 Cristirla Silva United States District Judge 26 /