1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, 4 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:25-cv-000754-GMN-NJK 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, 6 UNICITY INTERNATIONAL, INC., MOTION TO DISMISS 7 Defendant. 8 9 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 22), filed by Defendant 10 Unicity International, Inc. Plaintiff Alexander Rodriguez filed a Response, (ECF No. 30), to 11 which Defendant replied, (ECF No. 33). 12 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, 13 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 This action arises from a series of workplace disputes between Plaintiff and his former 16 employer, Defendant Unicity, that ultimately resulted in Plaintiff’s termination. (See generally 17 First Amend. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 16). Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from May 18 2024 until he was terminated in August 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 17). The first dispute arose in August 19 2024, when Plaintiff observed a coworker (“Martin”) throwing boxes at an African American 20 employee and using the n-word. (Id. ¶ 8). Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint. (Id.). Upon 21 receiving Plaintiff’s complaint, his supervisor admitted Martin had a history of making racist 22 remarks in the workplace and moved Plaintiff and the African American employee to the other 23 side of the facility. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff also complained to HR and another supervisor at Unicity 24 about Martin’s racist remarks and Defendant’s failure to address the problem, but did not 25 receive a response. (Id. ¶ 10). 1 Around August 8, 2024, a Unicity supervisor emailed Plaintiff stating she was “sorry for 2 the situation you are in.” (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff notified Unicity’s HR directors about Martin’s 3 continued efforts to treat employees of color badly, threaten the jobs of employees of color, and 4 that he was being retaliated against for his complaints. (Id.). Plaintiff also notified Unicity’s 5 HR directors that he had ongoing anxiety, but neither director engaged in the process of 6 reporting his disability, nor attempted to accommodate his disability. (Id. ¶ 14). Later that 7 same day, Plaintiff suffered an anxiety attack and took leave for the day. (Id. ¶ 15). The next 8 day, an HR representative emailed Plaintiff promising to investigate Martin’s conduct and the 9 incidents Plaintiff addressed in his complaints. (Id. ¶ 16). A few days later, Plaintiff was 10 terminated. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated his employment in retaliation 11 for his protected activity and in discrimination of his disability. (Id.). 12 Plaintiff brings the instant action alleging claims for negligent supervision and retention, 13 discrimination under Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) 613.330, discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 12112, retaliation under NRS 613.340, retaliation under

, retaliation under 15

, and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. (See generally id.). 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Dismissal is appropriate under FRCP 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

, 19 555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on

20 which it rests, and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions 21 couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly,

. Accordingly, FRCP 22 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 23 of a cause of action will not do.”

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 24 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 25 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Twombly,

). “A 1 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 2 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

This 3 standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

4 If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide whether to grant leave to 5 amend. The court should “freely give” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad 6 faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant. . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by 7 virtue of. . . the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman 8 v. Davis,

(1962). Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear 9 that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See DeSoto v. Yellow 10 Freight Sys., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim. The 13 Court takes up each of Plaintiff’s claims in turn. 14 A. Negligent Supervision and Retention 15 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligent supervision and retention claim on the 16 grounds that he relies solely on alleged discriminatory conduct, rather than on an intentional 17 wrongful act, and that he fails to allege injury. (Mot. Dismiss 6:1–3, ECF No. 22). Defendant 18 also moves to dismiss this claim arguing that Plaintiff is precluded from bringing this claim by 19 available statutory remedies. (Id. 6:17–19).

20 The Court first addresses Defendant’s preclusion argument, before turning to the merits 21 of Plaintiff’s claim. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s common-law negligent supervision and 22 retention claim is precluded by the comprehensive statutory remedies provided under NRS 23 613.330, the ADA, and Title VII. (Id.). Defendant contends that Nevada law generally does not 24 allow a plaintiff to pursue a tort claim based on discriminatory conduct when statutory 25 frameworks already provide exclusive remedies for such conduct. (Id. 6:19–20). Defendant 1 maintains that permitting both would undermine the statutory limitations on damages and 2 circumvent the legislature’s intent for a uniform remedial scheme. (Reply 4:13–15, ECF No. 3 33). The Court is unpersuaded, however, because Defendant does not show that Nevada 4 Supreme Court authority extends statutory preclusion to all negligence-based torts whenever 5 discrimination is alleged. The Court notes that while tortious discharge actions have been 6 preempted by statutory remedies, Nevada precedent does not uniformly bar all tort claims that 7 overlap with statutory rights. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith,

(Nev. 8 2000). Recent cases expressly distinguish negligent supervision from tortious discharge, 9 finding that the existence of statutory remedies does not automatically preclude a common law 10 claim unless the legislature clearly intended such exclusivity or where the tort claim merely 11 restates the statutory violation. See Freeman Expositions, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 520

(Nev. 2022). Thus, the Court finds insufficient grounds to hold the negligent 13 supervision and retention claim preempted at the pleading stage, especially where Plaintiff’s 14 allegations may involve facts beyond those directly addressed by the statutory remedies. 15 Now turning to the merits, to state a claim for negligent training and supervision in 16 Nevada, Plaintiff must show “(1) defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) defendant 17 breached that duty by hiring, retaining and/or supervising an employee even though defendant 18 knew, or should have known, of the employee’s dangerous propensities; (3) the breach was the 19 cause of plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) damages.” Hall v. SSF, Inc.,

(Nev. 1996).

20 “Nevada law does not permit the inference that an employer was negligent in training or 21 supervising simply because [its] employees acted in a discriminatory manner.” Reece v. 22 Republic Servs., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00114-GMN-RJJ,

, at *11 (D. Nev. Mar. 23 10, 2011). The Supreme Court of Nevada has recognized that negligent supervision and 24 retention claims do not necessarily depend on the employee’s actions being intentional; rather, 25 such claims focus on whether the employer knew of the employee’s conduct and failed to take 1 appropriate action. ETT, Inc. v. Delegado, No. 46901,

, at *7 (Nev. 2010). 2 Thus, Plaintiff must allege facts specifically indicating how the employer violated this duty. 3 Borenstein v. Animal Found., No. 2:19-cv-00985-CDS-NJK,

, at *8 (D. Nev. 4 May 9, 2025). 5 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant employed him and had a duty to use reasonable 6 care in supervising and retaining Martin, which is sufficient to establish prong one at this stage. 7 (FAC ¶¶ 28–29). Plaintiff satisfies prong two by alleging that Defendant breached this duty 8 through negligent supervision of Martin, and knowledge of Martin’s unfitness by failing to 9 investigate reports of Martin’s misconduct, among other specific examples. (See

). 10 Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim should be dismissed because 11 it relies on alleged discriminatory conduct rather than some intentional wrongful act is 12 unpersuasive because Plaintiff’s factual allegations of Defendant’s knowledge and failure to act 13 are sufficient to satisfy the second prong at the pleading stage. Plaintiff next states that 14 Defendant’s breach was the direct and proximate cause of his injuries including lost earnings, 15 salary, job benefits, and emotional distress satisfying prongs three and four at this motion to 16 dismiss stage. (Id. ¶ 30). Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has 17 plausibly alleged a negligent supervision and retention claim. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 18 the Motion to Dismiss this claim. 19 B. Disability Discrimination Claims

20 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s discrimination claims under NRS 613.330 and 42

fail because Plaintiff does not allege the bare elements for a prima facie claim. 22 (Mot. Dismiss 8:15–16). Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), an employer 23 may not discriminate “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.” 24

. To establish a discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must 25 establish that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is a qualified individual 1 with a disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. 2 Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2018). “Nevada courts apply the 3 ADA approach to Plaintiff’s state law claims.” Campos v. Town of Pahrump, No. 2:13-cv- 4 00218-RFB-GWF,

, at *1114 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2017). Therefore, the Court 5 will address the federal and state law disability discrimination claims together. 6 1. Allegations of Disability 7 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims fail because he has not 8 adequately alleged that he is disabled. (Mot. Dismiss 8:15–18). Under the ADA, a “disability” 9 is defined as (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 10 life activities,” (2) “a record of such an impairment,” or (3) “being regarded as having such an 11 impairment.”

(1)(A). An individual meets the definition by satisfying any 12 one of these three provisions. As for the first provision, major life activities include “caring for 13 oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, 14 bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 15 working.”

(2)(A). Courts consider the nature, severity, duration, and long- 16 term impact of the impairment when determining if an individual is substantially limited. 29

(j)(2). Short-term or non-chronic impairments, such as broken limbs or 18 concussions, typically do not qualify.

(j). 19 Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that he “has a disability or disabilities or is regarded as having a

20 disability.” (FAC ¶ 35). Plaintiff further alleges that his anxiety substantially limits his ability 21 to work and interacting with others. (FAC ¶¶ 14–15). In his Response, he clarifies that he 22 suffers from anxiety, which he maintains limits his major life activity of working. (Resp. 11:26, 23 ECF No. 30). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that anxiety disorders can constitute an 24 impairment under the ADA. McAlindin v. County of San Diego,

(9th Cir. 25 1999). Anxiety, unlike temporary conditions, is generally considered a persistent and ongoing 1 impairment. Plaintiff also pleads that he informed two of Defendant’s HR representatives 2 about his ongoing anxiety and subsequent anxiety attack due to the hostile work environment in 3 which Martin and Defendant created, which prevented him from working for the rest of the day 4 and required him to take leave, satisfying the requirement that his disability limits a major life 5 activity. (See FAC ¶ 15); (Resp. 12:18–20). Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff has 6 plausibly pled that he is disabled under the ADA. 7 2. Qualified Individual with a Disability 8 Under the ADA, a “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as “individual who, 9 with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 10 employment position that such individual holds or desires.”

(8). Defendant 11 contends that Plaintiff does not allege he is a qualified individual with a disability because he 12 does not adequately plead that he was capable of performing the essential functions of his 13 position as an in-person shipping and receiving warehouse worker, with or without reasonable 14 accommodation. (Mot. Dismiss 8:16–18); (Reply 7:27–28). But in his FAC, Plaintiff alleges 15 that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, as a Warehouse Clerk for 16 Defendant, with or without reasonable accommodation. (FAC ¶¶ 6, 46). And in his Response, 17 Plaintiff explains that his position required him to assist with shipping customer orders, and that 18 he performed these duties without any accommodation. (Resp. 14:8–11). Viewing the 19 allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has plausibly alleged that he was qualified

20 to perform the essential functions of his position. 21 3. Adverse Employment Action Because of the Disability 22 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a prima facie case of 23 discrimination or shown that his purported disability was a motivating factor in his termination. 24 (Mot. Dismiss 9:23–27); (Reply 8:3–4). Plaintiff alleges that on August 8, 2024, he informed 25 two of Defendant’s HR representatives that he suffered from ongoing anxiety and experienced 1 an anxiety attack later that day. (FAC ¶¶ 14–15). Four days later, Defendant terminated his 2 employment. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff argues that the close timing between the disclosure of his 3 disability, request for accommodation, and subsequent termination constitutes specific and 4 substantial evidence of discriminatory motive. (Resp. 15:2–11). Indeed, proximity in time 5 between Defendant’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s disability and adverse action is strong 6 circumstantial evidence that the adverse action was because of the disability. See, e.g., 7 Bradshaw v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. 23-CV-593 TWR (BLM),

, at *11 8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a 9 causal connection between his report of anxiety and termination. But the Court disagrees that 10 Plaintiff has plausibly pled that he requested an accommodation, which the Court addresses in 11 more detail below. 12 In sum, Plaintiff has stated a prima facie claim for disability discrimination under the 13 ADA and Nevada law. The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 14 Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims. 15 C. Retaliation Claims 16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against him after he (1) identified his disability 17 to HR in violation of the ADA and Nevada law and (2) reported Martin’s racist behavior to HR 18 and his supervisor in violation of Title VII and § 1981. To state a prima facie claim of 19 retaliation under the ADA, Nevada law, Title VII, and

, a plaintiff must allege

20 that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse 21 employment action, and (3) “a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse 22 action.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA,

(9th Cir. 2003) (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1981); Pope v. Motel 6,

(Nev. 2005) (NRS 613.340); Pardi v. Kaiser 24 Found. Hosps.,

(9th Cir. 2004) (ADA). 25 1 1. Protected Activity 2 a. Under the ADA and Nevada Law 3 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s disability retaliation claims under NRS 613.340 and 42

are not plausibly pled because he neither opposed any unlawful practice nor 5 requested a reasonable accommodation. (Mot. Dismiss 10:17, 11:7–10). Plaintiff, however, 6 contends that he engaged in protected activity when he informed Defendant’s HR 7 representatives of his disability and need for an accommodation. (Resp. 16:15–16). A request 8 for accommodation qualifies as protected activity if it is sufficiently direct and specific to 9 notify the employer that the employee requires assistance due to a disability. Hayes v. Wal- 10 Mart Stores, Inc., No. 09-47-HA,

(D. Or. Feb. 17, 2011). The 11 request need not be in writing, use specific language, or be made personally by the employee, 12 so long as it clearly communicates the need for an adjustment or change related to a medical 13 condition. See, e.g., Hoang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-819-KI,

, at 14 *1101 (D. Or. June 29, 2010); Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., No. CV 08-338 TUC DCB, 15

(D. Ariz. June 24, 2010). Nevertheless, the initial burden rests with the 16 employee or their healthcare provider to identify the disability, describe its limitations, and 17 suggest reasonable accommodations. Maes v. Henderson, No. CV-N-97-00597-ECR(RAM), 18

(D. Nev. Jan. 29, 1999). 19 Taking the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that his

20 notification to HR on or about August 8, 2024, informing HR representatives that he 21 experienced ongoing anxiety, does not amount to a direct or specific request for 22 accommodation because Plaintiff fails to allege that he requested an accommodation. (FAC ¶ 23 14 (“Mr. Rodriguez also notified Amber and Allyson that he had ongoing anxiety, but neither 24 engaged in the interactive process or attempted to accommodate his disability.”)). Thus, 25 1 Plaintiff’s disclosure of ongoing anxiety to HR, without a specific request for accommodation 2 or adjustment, does not constitute a protected activity under the ADA or NRS 613.340. 3 b. Under Title VII and § 1981 4 Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee who engages in protected activity, 5 including opposing practices made unlawful by the statute or participating in investigations, 6 proceedings, or hearings under it. 42 USC § 2000e-3. The opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a) 7 safeguards employees who oppose conduct they reasonably believe to be discriminatory, even 8 if that conduct turns out not to violate Title VII, provided the belief is objectively reasonable. 9 Panelli v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 3:08-CV-0295-RAM,

, at *1026 10 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2010). Opposition need not be formal and can include internal complaints or 11 informal expressions of concern about perceived discrimination. Andreatta v. Eldorado Resorts 12 Corp., No. 2:15-CV-00749-RFB-NJK,

(D. Nev. Oct. 5, 2016). 13 Courts have consistently held that employees who report discrimination against others are also 14 protected under Title VII’s opposition clause. Kennedy v. UMC University Medical Center, No. 15 2:14-CV-01678-RFB-PAL,

, at *1109 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2016); Wilson v. 16 City of Fresno, No. 1:19-CV-01658-KES-BAM,

, at *1104 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 17 2025). Moreover, retaliation claims cognizable under § 1981 include claims by an individual, 18 regardless of race, who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different individual, 19 suffering direct racial discrimination. See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries,

, 452

20 (2008). 21 Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in protected activity under Title VII and § 1981 when 22 he reported and opposed instances of race discrimination in the workplace. (FAC ¶¶ 66, 77, 23 87). Indeed, Plaintiff first alleges that on or about August 1, 2024, he reported to his supervisor 24 that a coworker, Martin, had thrown boxes at and used racial slurs toward an African American 25 employee. (FAC ¶ 8). His supervisor allegedly acknowledged that Martin had “a history of 1 racist remarks” and subsequently relocated Plaintiff and the coworker to another area of the 2 facility. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff further states that he reported the incident to HR and a supervisor 3 the same day. (Id. ¶ 10). Second, on August 7, 2024, Plaintiff observed an African American 4 employee crying after an encounter with Martin and reported the incident to HR the following 5 day, stating that Martin routinely mistreated and threatened employees of color. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13). 6 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaints of racial harassment directed at others do not 7 constitute protected activity, (Mot. Dismiss 10:23–25), but Defendant is incorrect, see Panelli, 8 No. 3:08-CV-0295-RAM,

; Andreatta, No. 2:15-CV-00749-RFB- 9 NJK,

; Kennedy, No. 2:14-CV-01678-RFB-PAL,

4497062, at *1109; Wilson, No. 1:19-CV-01658-KES-BAM,

, at *1104; 11 CBOCS W., Inc.,

. 12 Considering the reports Plaintiff made to supervisors and HR representatives, the Court 13 finds that his complaints reporting racially discriminatory conduct in the workplace constitute 14 protected activity under Title VII and

. 15 2. Adverse Employment Action 16 Under the ADA, Nevada law, Title VII, and

, an adverse employment 17 action is any action “reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected 18 activity.” Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Campbell 19 v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ.,

(9th Cir. 2018). Under this standard, Plaintiff’s

20 allegations that he suffered adverse employment actions when he was moved to another 21 location in the warehouse after he complained and was terminated shortly thereafter, (see FAC 22 ¶¶ 9, 17), satisfy this element under the ADA, Nevada law, Title VII, and

. 23 24 25 1 3. Causation 2 a. Under the ADA and Nevada Law 3 To state a retaliation claim under the ADA and Nevada law, a plaintiff must establish 4 that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Pardi,

at 849. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately pled that he engaged in a 6 protected activity under the ADA and Nevada law, he also cannot satisfy this element. 7 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in violation of the ADA 8 and NRS 613.340. However, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend to cure any deficiencies. 9 b. Under Title VII and

10 The causal link under Title VII and § 1891 “can be inferred from circumstantial 11 evidence such as the employer’s knowledge of the protected activities and the proximity in time 12 between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Dawson v. Entek Int’l,

, 13 936 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, a reasonable fact finder could infer causation based on the temporal 14 proximity between Plaintiff’s protected activity and his termination. As alleged, Plaintiff 15 complained to his supervisor on August 1, 2024, that a coworker, Martin, used racial slurs 16 toward an African American employee, and his supervisor acknowledged that Martin “had a 17 history of racist remarks in the workplace.” (FAC ¶ 9). He further alleges that on August 8, 18 2024, an HR director emailed him stating she was “sorry for the situation you are in,” and that 19 same day, he notified both HR directors that Martin’s racist behavior was ongoing and that he

20 believed he was being retaliated against for complaining. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff’s employment 21 was terminated eleven days after his initial complaint to HR. Given the short time frame 22 between Plaintiff’s complaints and his termination, and the specificity of his allegations that 23 Defendant was aware of his protected activity, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly 24 alleged causation at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Bagley v. Bel-Aire Mech. Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2016) (finding a “36-day gap between the protected activity and the adverse 1 ||employment action” established causation). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 2 || Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs retaliation claims under Title VII and

. 3 D. Failure to Accommodate 4 To state a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that 5 || they requested a reasonable accommodation for disability.

(b)(5). As 6 || discussed above, Plaintiff's FAC does not plausibly allege that he made such a request. 7 || Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim, but grants 8 || Plaintiff leave to amend to cure any deficiencies that he may be able to remedy. 9 In sum, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. 10 || Plaintiff shall be given leave to amend so he can attempt to cure the deficiencies identified in 11 || this Order. 12 CONCLUSION 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 22), is 14 ||} GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The Motion is granted with respect to □□□□□□□□□□□ 15 || claims for retaliation under the ADA and NRS 613.340 and failure to accommodate. The 16 || Motion is denied as to Plaintiff's other claims. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have 21 days from the date of this 18 || Order to file an amended complaint. 19 DATED this 9 day of December, 2025. 20 Up Gloria M. xa arro, District Judge United States District Court 23 24 25

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