Jontae Lewis v. Ronald Oliver
Jontae Lewis v. Ronald Oliver
Trial Court Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JONTAE LEWIS, Case No.: 2:25-cv-00030-APG-EJY
4 Plaintiff Order
5 v.
6 RONALD OLIVER,
7 Defendant
8
9 Plaintiff Jontae Lewis brings this civil-rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Southern Desert 11 Correctional Center. ECF No. 10. On October 27, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Lewis to 12 update his address and either pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action or file an application to 13 proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) for non-inmates by November 28, 2025. See ECF No. 13. The 14 magistrate judge warned Lewis that the action could be dismissed if he failed to timely comply. 15
Id. at 2. That deadline expired without Lewis updating his address, paying the full filing fee, or 16 filing a complete IFP application for non-inmates. His mail from the court is also being returned 17 as undeliverable. See ECF Nos. 11, 12, 14. 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 19 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 20 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,
782 F.2d 829, 831(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 21 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 22 Carey v. King,
856 F.2d 1439, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 23 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 1 Postal Serv.,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with 2 court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must 3 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 4 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring
5 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 6 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 1217, 1226(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 7
833 F.2d at 130). 8 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 9 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Lewis’s claims. The third 10 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 11 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 12 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,
542 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 1976). The 13 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 14 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.
15 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 16 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 17 v. Cal. Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 18 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 19 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,
291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 20 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 21 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,
779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 22 this action cannot realistically proceed without Lewis updating his address and addressing the 23 filing fee, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Lewis is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and squander the court’s finite resources. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor 4 favors dismissal. 5 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 6|| dismissal. 7 I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Lewis’s 8|| failure to file an updated address and address the filing fee in compliance with the magistrate judge’s October 27, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. If Lewis wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint, provide the court with his current address, and address the matter of the filing fee in a new case. 12 Dated: December 11, 2025 13 ( Bor Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Reference
- Status
- Unknown