1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 DEVONTAE ANTHONY CARTER, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01389-APG-BNW

4 Plaintiff Order

5 v.

6 CHIEF OF NORTH LAS VEGAS POLICE,

7 Defendant

8

9 Devontae Anthony Carter brings this civil-rights action under

to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at North Las Vegas 11 Detention Center. ECF No. 5. On September 1, 2025, I ordered Carter to file an amended 12 complaint by December 1, 2025. ECF No. 4. I warned Carter that the action could be dismissed 13 if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline.

at 6–7. That deadline expired and 14 Carter did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 16 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 17 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 18 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 19 Carey v. King,

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 20 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 21 Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with 22 court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must 23 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 1 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 2 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 3 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 4

).

5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 6 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Carter’s claims. The third 7 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 8 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 9 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The 10 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 11 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 13 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 14 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic

15 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 16 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 17 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 18 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because 19 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Carter files an amended complaint, the 20 only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating 21 an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite 22 resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no 23 hint that Carter needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the screening order. 1}| Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 2\| factor favors dismissal. 3 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 4|| dismissal. 5 I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Carter’s 6] failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with my September 1, 2025, order. The 7\| Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. If Carter wishes to 8|| pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 9 I FURTHER ORDER that Carter’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot. 1] Dated: December 11, 2025

Chief United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23