1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 PEEJMAN SHADALO,

8 Petitioner, Case No. 2:25-cv-02076-RFB-BNW

9 v. ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 10 JOHN MATTOS, et al.,

11 Respondents.

12 13 Before the Court is Petitioner Peejman Shadalo’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief 14 (ECF No. 12).1 Amongst other arguments, Petitioner claims that his ongoing detention at the hands 15 of Respondents is unlawful because his removal from the United States is not reasonably 16 foreseeable. Based on Petitioner’s undisputed allegations, and the evidence he supplies, the Court 17 finds that a preliminary injunction is warranted at this time. 18 /// 19 /// 20 1 Although Petitioner seeks a temporary restraining order, see ECF No. 12, the Court treats his motion as a 21 request for a preliminary injunction. Both forms of injunctive relief are subject to the same legal standard. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,

, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Respondents were given 22 notice of this motion, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1) (“The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.”). And Respondents had more than enough 23 time to respond to Petitioner’s motion. See ECF No. 13. Nonetheless, Respondents have failed to offer any responses in this case. See ECF No. 17. In the absence of Respondents’ opposition, the Court finds there is no benefit in 24 additional briefing, or an evidentiary hearing, on this matter. Given the liberty interest at stake and the length of Petitioner’s detention, the Court finds this urgent preliminary injunction requires immediate attention. See Aparicio 25 v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01919-RFB-DJA,

, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2025); see also Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson,

(9th Cir. 1986) (clarifying that a district court 26 may rely solely on briefing, and the affidavits of the parties, where the urgent need for injunctive relief so requires). Therefore, pursuant to its inherent authority to manage its own docket, the Court converts Petitioner’s Motion for 27 Temporary Restraining Order into one for a preliminary injunction. See Dietz v. Bouldin,

(2016) (“[A] district court possesses inherent powers that are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily 28 vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 On October 24, 2025, Petitioner Peejman Shadalo filed a petition for a writ of habeas 3 corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. See ECF No. 1-1. His case 4 was originally assigned to the Honorable Cristina D. Silva, United States District Judge for the 5 District of Nevada. 6 On October 29, 2025, Mr. Shadalo’s case was transferred to the Honorable Richard F. 7 Boulware, II, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada. See ECF No. 3. 8 On October 30, 2025, the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender for the District of 9 Nevada (“FPD”) to represent Mr. Shadalo based on the complexity of his case, his economic 10 circumstances, and the interests of justice. See ECF No. 4. The Court gave the FPD 14 days to file 11 an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Mr. Shadalo’s behalf. See id. at 3. 12 On November 13, 2025, Mr. Shadalo filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File 13 Amended Petition. See ECF No. 8. Through it, Mr. Shadalo sought an additional 13 days to file 14 his amended petition. See id. at 2. The Court granted this motion on that same day, and it gave Mr. 15 Shadalo until November 26, 2025, to file an amended petition. See ECF No. 9. 16 On November 24, 2025, Mr. Shadalo filed a verified, amended petition for a writ of habeas 17 corpus. See ECF No. 10. Simultaneously, Mr. Shadalo filed the instant Motion for Temporary 18 Restraining Order. See ECF No. 12. Through them, Mr. Shadalo challenges his ongoing detention 19 at the hands of Respondents, as well as the procedures undergirding his potential removal to an 20 undesignated third country. See ECF Nos. 10, 12. The Court screened these filings and determined 21 Mr. Shadalo had alleged a prima facie case for relief. See ECF No. 13. 22 Accordingly, on November 25, 2025, the Court issued an order to show cause pursuant to 23

. See

The Court’s Order instructed Respondents to (a.) file a “return certifying 24 the true cause of detention” and (b.) respond to Mr. Shadalo’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 25 Order. See

The Court ordered Respondents to file their return on, or before, December 9, 2025. 26 See

The Court also ordered Respondents to file their response to Petitioner’s motion on, or 27 before, December 2, 2025. See

Respondents missed both deadlines, and—to date—they have 28 not filed any oppositions in this case. 1 In response, Mr. Shadalo filed a Notice of Respondents’ Non-Opposition on December 4, 2 2025. See ECF No. 16. Through it, Petitioner urges the Court to grant his Motion for Temporary 3 Restraining Order because Respondents effectively consented to it. See

Similarly, on December 4 10, 2025, Mr. Shadalo filed an Emergency Motion to Grant Amended Petition, or in the 5 Alternative, for a Status Check to Address the Government’s Failure to Respond. See ECF No. 17. 6 There, Petitioner argues that the Court should grant his amended petition for a writ of habeas 7 corpus because he “established a prima facie case for” relief and Respondents “ignored this 8 Court’s order to show cause.”

9 The Court’s Order on Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief follows. 10 11 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 12 As a preliminary matter, the Court makes the following findings of fact based on 13 Petitioner’s undisputed allegations and the evidence he supplies. The Court accepts the truth of his 14 allegations at this juncture. See Carlson v. Landon,

(9th Cir. 1950) (citation 15 omitted). 16 Petitioner Peejman Shadalo was born in Iran, but he fled his birth country alongside his 17 parents when he was approximately 7 years old. See ECF No. 10 at 4 (Petitioner’s verified 18 application for a writ of habeas corpus); see also ECF No. 1-1 at 16 (signed declaration of 19 Petitioner’s mother, Sara Golchen). At first, Mr. Shadalo’s family moved to Germany, but they 20 ultimately resettled in the United States in 2001 as refugees. See ECF No. 10 at 4; see also ECF 21 No. 1-1 at 16. Mr. Shadalo later adjusted his status and became a lawful permanent resident. See 22 ECF No. 10 at 4; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 18 (Mr. Shadalo’s permanent resident card). But he was 23 unable to pursue American citizenship because he suffered a traumatic brain injury and developed 24 an opioid addiction. See ECF No. 1-1 at 16; see also

at 22–24 (letters from True North Recovery 25 & Wellness Center discussing Mr. Shadalo’s substance-abuse treatment). 26 In 2013, Mr. Shadalo was placed in removal proceedings, and on October 10, 2013, the 27 Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) ordered him removed to Iran. See ECF No. 10 28 at 4; see also ECF No. 11-2 at 2 (Mr. Shadalo’s order of removal). Simultaneously, Mr. Shadalo 1 was granted deferral of removal to that same country pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. 2 See ECF No. 10 at 4; see also ECF No. 11-2 at 2. Petitioner and the Department of Homeland 3 Security waived appeal as to both of these determinations. See ECF No. 11-2 at 2. Mr. Shadalo 4 was then detained for approximately 90 days, but he was released because Immigration and 5 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) could not effectuate his removal. See ECF No. 10 at 4. Specifically, 6 ICE was unable to effectuate his removal to Iran or Germany. See

7 For over a decade Mr. Shadalo remained at liberty in the United States, albeit under a term 8 of probation with the Utah Department of Corrections and an order of supervision from ICE. See 9 ECF No. 10 at 4; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 21 (character and compliance assessment from Mr. 10 Shadalo’s supervising probation agent); cf. also ECF No. 12 at 2 (Motion for Temporary 11 Restraining Order). Throughout this period, Mr. Shadalo got engaged to his current fiancé, and he 12 founded a mechanic business. See ECF No. 1-1 at 10 (Petitioner’s signed custody redetermination 13 request); id. at 13 (Petitioner’s certificate of business). Then, on June 25, 2025, Mr. Shadalo was 14 detained by ICE while attending an appointment with his probation officer in Salt Lake City, Utah. 15 See ECF No. 10 at 4. He was then transferred to the Nevada Southern Detention Center, and he 16 has been detained there ever since. See id. at 5. 17 To date, ICE has been unable to remove Mr. Shadalo from the United States. He continues 18 to be protected against removal to Iran. See ECF No. 10 at 4. He has repeatedly attempted to secure 19 travel documents from Germany, pursuant to ICE’s requests, but Germany has refused to accept 20 him. See id. And he has “not received any documents identifying another country of removal, or 21 any plan of removal.” Id. at 5. 22 23 III. JURISDICTION 24 The Constitution guarantees the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within 25 the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004) (citing U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, 26 cl.2). “Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide an 27 effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the 28 detention of a person.” Carafas v. LaVallee,

(1968) (citations omitted). 1 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of 2 Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. 3 Cyr,

(2001) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 4 in Nasrallah v. Barr,

(2020). Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to grant 5 writs of habeas corpus to noncitizens who are being detained “in violation of the Constitution or 6 laws or treaties of the United States.”

(c)(3); see also Trump v. J.G.G.,

670, 672 (2025) (clarifying that an immigration detainee’s challenge to their confinement, and 8 removal, falls “within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus”) (per curium) (citations and 9 quotation marks omitted); see also Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr,

(9th Cir. 2020) 10 (“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under

to consider habeas challenges to 11 immigration detention . . . .”); see also Zadvydas v. Davis,

(2001) (“We 12 conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and 13 constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.”). 14 As habeas petitions must be verified, see

, their undisputed factual 15 allegations must be taken at face value. See Carlson v. Landon,

(9th Cir. 1950) 16 (citations omitted). Similarly, the certified, undisputed allegations of respondent(s) should also be 17 accepted as true unless they are contradicted by relevant evidence. See

18 19 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), a court may grant a preliminary 21 injunction to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” A preliminary injunction is “an 22 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 23 to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008) (citation omitted). To 24 obtain such relief, a plaintiff “must show that: (1) [they are] likely to succeed on the merits, (2) 25 [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of 26 equities tips in [their] favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 27

(9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 28 The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “sliding scale” variant of the Winter standard, where a 1 strong showing of one factor can offset a weaker showing of another factor. See All. for the Wild 2 Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011). According to this test, “serious questions 3 going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support 4 issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood 5 of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”

(quotation marks 6 omitted). A “serious question” is one on which the movant “has a fair chance of success on the 7 merits.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1984). 8 9 V. DISCUSSION 10 A. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 11 Based on these factors, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a preliminary 12 injunction. As discussed below, the Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his 13 claim and the remaining Winter factors weigh strongly in his favor. 14 i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 15 Turning to the “most important” factor, see Garcia v. Google, Inc.,

(9th 16 Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), the Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed in showing that his 17 ongoing detention is statutorily—and constitutionally—unlawful. 18 1. Post-Removal-Period Detention 19 By way of background, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101– 20 1537, provides a “complex statutory framework of detention authority.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 21

(9th Cir. 2008). Generally, § 1231 governs the detention of non-citizens who 22 are subject to final orders of removal. See

(a); see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 23

, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez,

(2018)) 24 (clarifying that § 1231(a) supplies DHS’s detention authority once a non-citizen is subject to a 25 final removal order). Specifically, when a non-citizen “is ordered removed, [the Department of 26 Homeland Security (“DHS”)] must physically remove [them] from the United States within a 90- 27 day ‘removal period.’” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,

(2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1231(a)(1)(A)). During this removal period, “detention is mandatory.” Id. (citing § 1231(a)(2)). 1 Critically, a non-citizen’s removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (i.) when their removal 2 order becomes administratively final; (ii.) when a court that stayed deportation enters a final order 3 regarding the non-citizen’s removal; or (iii.) when the non-citizen is released from non- 4 immigration detention. See

(a)(1)(B); see also Guzman Chavez,

5 (citing

(a)(1)(B)). 6 As soon as a non-citizen’s removal period lapses, they must be released subject to 7 supervision, see

(a)(3), unless they fall into one of four statutory categories. See 8

(a)(6); see also Zadvydas v. Davis,

(2001) (citations omitted) 9 (“The post-removal-period detention statute applies to certain categories of [non-citizens].”). 10 Namely, DHS may continue to detain a non-citizen who is: (i.) inadmissible; (ii.) removable under 11 certain provisions of § 1227(a); (iii.) a risk to the community; or (iv.) unlikely to comply with their 12 removal order. See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez,

(2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 13 § 1231(a)(6)) “Continued detention under this provision [triggers] the ‘post-removal period.’” 14 Guzman Chavez,

. 15 As written, the INA does not limit the length of post-removal-period detention. See 8

(a)(6). Since a statute that authorizes “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention” 17 poses a “serious constitutional threat,” Zadvydas,

(citation omitted), the Supreme 18 Court has read an implicit limitation into § 1231(a)(6) based on “the Constitution’s demands.” 19 Guzman Chavez, 549 U.S. at 529 (quoting Zadvydas,

). Specifically, the Zadvydas 20 Court “held that [a non-citizen] may be detained only for ‘a period reasonably necessary to bring 21 about that [non-citizen’s] removal from the United States.’”

(quoting Zadvydas,

689). The Supreme Court also held that six months is a presumptively reasonable period of time 23 to deport a non-citizen. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–701. Practically speaking, this means that 24 the government may presumptively detain a non-citizen for up to six months once they are ordered 25 removed from the United States. “After that point, if the [non-citizen] ‘provides good reason to 26 believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ the 27 [g]overnment must either rebut that showing or release the [non-citizen].” Guzman Chavez, 549 28 U.S. at 529 (citation omitted) (quoting Zadvydas,

). 1 Thus, post-removal-period detention violates the INA and the Constitution when a non- 2 citizen’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Cf. Arteaga-Martinez,

(citation 3 omitted) (reaffirming that Zadvydas construed

“in light of the Constitution’s 4 demands.”). 5 2. Petitioner’s Post-Removal-Period Detention Is Likely Unlawful 6 Based on the facts of this case, the Court finds that Petitioner has established a likelihood 7 of success on the merits of his unlawful detention claim. 8 As a preliminary matter, Petitioner falls within the ambit of

because he is 9 subject to a final order of removal. See

(a). Nonetheless, the Court finds he is not 10 subject to mandatory detention because his removal period ended nearly 12 years ago. The 11 Executive Office of Immigration Review ordered Petitioner removed on October 10, 2013. 12 Because Petitioner and DHS waived their appellate rights, Petitioner’s removal order became 13 administratively final that same day. See

(a)(47)(B)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. 14 § 1241.1(b) (“An order of removal . . . shall become final . . . [u]pon waiver of appeal by the 15 respondent.”); see also Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible,

(9th Cir. 2017). Thus, 16 Petitioner’s removal period began running on October 10, 2013, and it lapsed on January 8, 2014— 17 i.e., 90 days later. See 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(1)(A).2 As soon as it did, Petitioner entered the post- 18 removal period and was no longer subject to § 1231(a)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention requirement. 19 See

(a)(3); Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578–79 (citations omitted). 20 Since Petitioner is beyond the removal period, the Court must first decide whether his 21 ongoing detention is presumptively reasonable. It is not.3 In making this determination, the Court 22 considers the full amount of time that Petitioner has spent in immigration detention since he was 23 ordered removed. In other words, the Court considers his multiple periods of detention in the 24 aggregate. Otherwise, the government could simply circumvent the INA by releasing and re- 25 2 The Court relies on the date of Petitioner’s removal order because the remaining provisions of 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1231(a)(1)(B) appear to be inapplicable in this case. 3 As an aside, it is unclear whether the presumption articulated in Zadvydas even applies in cases of re- 27 detention. See, e.g., S.F. v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-01084-MTK,

, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2025) (“[F]ederal courts have refrained from applying the presumption of reasonableness under Zadvydas in re-detention 28 cases.”) (collecting cases). But, given the length of Petitioner’s detention, the Court need not reach this issue in this case. 1 detaining non-citizens such that they never reach six months of continuous detention. That would 2 amount to indefinite detention in all but name, which is statutorily and constitutionally 3 impermissible. See Zadvydas,

; see also Nguyen v. Scott,

, 722 4 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted) (Surely, “under the reasoning of Zadvydas, a series of 5 releases and re-detentions by the government . . . in essence results in an indefinite period of 6 detention, albeit executed in successive six month intervals.”). Thus, the Court finds Petitioner has 7 already been detained for more than six months in the aftermath of his final order of removal. 8 When Petitioner was ordered removed in 2013, ICE detained him for approximately three months. 9 See ECF No. 10 at 4. ICE re-detained Petitioner earlier this year, and he has been incarcerated at 10 Nevada Southern Detention Center for approximately 5.8 months. See id. at 5. Collectively, 11 Petitioner has been detained for around 8.8 months. Therefore, his period of post-removal 12 detention exceeds the bounds of that which is presumptively permissible under the INA and the 13 Constitution. See Zadvydas,

. 14 Turning to the specific facts of this case, the Court finds that Petitioner has shown that his 15 removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Petitioner was ordered removed on October 10, 2013. That 16 was over twelve years ago. Despite an abundance of time, ICE has been unable to effectuate 17 Petitioner’s removal from the United States. ICE cannot deport Petitioner to his birth country 18 pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Germany has refused to accept Petitioner, even 19 though ICE has repeatedly attempted to deport Petitioner there. And Respondents have not 20 supplied any alternate plan for Petitioner’s removal. On this record, this Court has “good reason 21 to believe that there is no significant likelihood of [Petitioner’s] removal in the reasonably 22 foreseeable future.” Guzman Chavez, 549 U.S. at 529 (quoting Zadvydas,

). 23 Finally, Respondents have undoubtedly failed to rebut this showing. They have not 24 presented the Court with any information or argument in this case. See ECF Nos. 13, 16, 17. Thus, 25 Respondents have not provided a legal basis for Petitioner’s continued detention given the facts 26 established in the Petition. Petitioner should not be “burdened by the impossible task of imagining 27 and refuting [the] causes” of his detention. See Carlson,

. “The imagination can 28 hardly create a situation more incompatible with the spirit of our institutions that [ ] civil 1 official[ls’] completely secret viewpoint[s] could be the basis of sustained imprisonment.”

at 2 189. Respondents’ “long and inadequately explained delay[ ]” in providing any justification for 3 Petitioner’s ongoing detention necessarily raises the presumption that he “is being illegally 4 confined.” Ruiz v. Cady,

(7th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted) (cited approvingly 5 in Gordon v. Duran,

(9th Cir. 1990)). This presumption only bolsters the Court’s 6 conclusion that Respondents have failed to justify Petitioner’s detention by demonstrating that his 7 removal is, in fact, reasonably foreseeable. 8 In sum, at this procedural posture, the Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed in showing 9 that his ongoing detention is statutorily and constitutionally unlawful because his removal is not 10 reasonably foreseeable.4 11 ii. Irreparable Harm 12 The next factor requires a showing “that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible,” in 13 the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. See All. for the Wild Rockies,

. “It 14 is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes 15 irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio,

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. 16 Burns,

(1976)). Hence, “[w]hen an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right 17 is involved, most courts hold no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Vasquez 18 Perdomo v. Noem,

, 689 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Since this Court has 19 already concluded that Petitioner’s ongoing detention serves as a statutory and constitutional 20 violation, it follows “inexorably” that Petitioner has carried his burden as to irreparable harm. See 21 Hernandez v. Sessions,

(9th Cir. 2017). 22 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized, in concrete terms, the irreparable 23 harms “imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention (or other forms of imprisonment).” 24

In the absence of relief, “harms such as these will continue to occur needlessly on a daily basis.” 25

Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention itself imposes concrete, irreparable harms on 26 Petitioner. 27 ///

28 4 The Court does not reach Petitioner’s other arguments for injunctive relief because (i.) the Court is ordering relief on the instant ground and (ii.) Petitioner’s other claims are not ripe for review. 1 iii. Balance of Hardships and the Public Interest 2 The remaining two factors for a preliminary injunction, the balance of equities and the 3 public interest, “merge” when the government is the opposing party. See Baird v. Bonta,

1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Nken v. Holder,

(2009)). When “the impact 5 of an injunction reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a potential for public consequences, 6 the public interest will be relevant to whether the district court grants the preliminary injunction.” 7 Hernandez,

(quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,

(9th Cir. 8 2009)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “neither equity nor the public's interest are furthered 9 by allowing violations of federal law to continue.” Galvez v. Jaddou,

, 832 (9th Cir. 10 2022) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the balance of hardships 11 weighed in favor of plaintiffs who credibly alleged that the government was violating the INA). 12 The Court now turns to Respondents’ stake in a preliminary injunction. Although 13 Respondents offer no argument on this point, the Court acknowledges that the government 14 vindicates the public interest by enforcing this country’s immigration laws—e.g., by facilitating 15 the deportation of removable non-citizens. See Nken,

. The problem for 16 Respondents is that Petitioner’s ongoing detention appears to be unlawful. See supra Part V.A.i. 17 Thus, a preliminary injunction requiring his release would itself promote the rule of law. Similarly, 18 the Court finds that this form of injunctive relief would reduce Respondents’, and by extension the 19 public’s, fiscal and administrative burdens. Immigration detention is undoubtedly a costly 20 endeavor. See Hernandez,

(describing the “staggering” public costs of immigration 21 detention). Therefore, a preliminary injunction that limits unnecessary, unlawful detention would 22 enable Respondents to direct valuable public resources to appropriate endeavors. 23 On the other hand, the hardships faced by Petitioner, and the public interest, weigh 24 decisively in favor of ordering his immediate release. Since he was detained earlier this year, 25 Petitioner has been separated from his family, employment, and community. He has not been able 26 to marry his fiancé while incarcerated, see, e.g., ECF No. 1-1 at 19, and he has not been able to 27 render care for his ailing mother as her primary caretaker. See ECF No. 12 at 2, 11; see also 28 Hernandez,

(citation and quotation marks omitted) (“[I]n addition to the potential 1 hardships facing Plaintiffs in the absence of the injunction, the court may consider . . . the indirect 2 hardship to their friends and family members.”). And, because the Court has already found that 3 Petitioner’s ongoing detention is likely unlawful, “neither equity or the public interest are 4 furthered” by allowing Respondents to continue to violate the law. See Galvez, 52 F.4th at 832; 5 see also Hernandez,

(“The public interest benefits from an injunction that ensures 6 that individuals are not deprived of their liberty and held in immigration detention because of . . . 7 a likely unconstitutional process.”). 8 As such, this Court finds that the balance of the equities and the public interest “tip sharply 9 towards” Petitioner. See All. for the Wild Rockies,

. Therefore, Petitioner is 10 entitled to a preliminary injunction. See

11 B. SCOPE OF RELIEF 12 Injunctive relief “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 13 complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden,

640, 680 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Where relief can be structured 15 on an individual basis, it must be narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm shown[.]” Id. 16 (citation omitted). The federal habeas corpus statute “does not limit the relief that may be granted 17 to discharge of the applicant from physical custody.” Carafas,

. “Its mandate is 18 broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.”

“It provides that ‘[t]he court shall . . . 19 dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’”

(quoting

) (alteration in 20 original). 21 Above, the Court found that Petitioner is likely being detained unlawfully, as his removal 22 from the United States is not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, the Court finds that the specific 23 harm suffered by Petitioner must be remedied by ordering his immediate release subject to the 24 conditions of his prior order of supervision. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,

, 529 25 (2021) (citations omitted). 26 C. BOND 27 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), a court “may issue a preliminary injunction 28 . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs 1 | and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” FED. 2| R.Civ.P.65(c). “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court 3 | “with discretion as to the amount of security required, ifany.”’” Johnson v. Couturier,

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday,

(9th Cir. 2003)). 5 | “In particular, ‘[t]he district court may dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there 6 | isno realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct.’”

(quoting 7 | Jorgensen,

) (alteration in original). Respondents have not argued that releasing 8 | Petitioner will be costly; after all, they have offered no opposition to Petitioner’s motion for 9 | preliminary injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court declines to impose bond in this case. 10 1] VI. CONCLUSION 12 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunctive 13 | relief (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. Defendants must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner by no later than 5:00 P.M. on December 15, 2025, subject to the conditions of his prior order of 15 | supervision. See

(a)(3). 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Parties shall file a joint status report by December 16, 17 | 2025, confirming Respondents’ compliance with this Order. 18 19 DATED: December 14, 2025. 20 AS 21 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28

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