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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers, Local #135, Case No. 2:25-cv-01626-JCM-NJK 7 Plaintiff(s), Order 8 v. [Docket No. 34] 9 The Local 135 Joint Apprenticeship & 10 Training Committee, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to extend the time for service on Defendant 13 the Local 135 Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee (“the Committee”). Docket No. 34. A 14 response was filed by Defendants Jeremy Azevedo, Thomas Brackett, Christopher Hooks, Shane 15 Striley, and George Tiuaana (“Individual Appearing Defendants”). Docket No. 38.1 Plaintiff filed 16 a reply. Docket No. 41. The Court does not require a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the 17 reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion to extend. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This case arises out of a union dispute regarding fiduciary duties under ERISA. See Docket 20 No. 1 at ¶¶ 47-54 (first claim for relief). Plaintiff filed suit against several defendants, including 21 the Committee. See id. at ¶¶ 22-31. Although it did so with respect to other defendants, Plaintiff 22 did not effectuate service in timely fashion on the Committee. Plaintiff seeks to reopen the service 23 deadline and to extend it by 14 days to accomplish service on the Committee. Docket No. 38. 24 That is the matter currently before the Court. 25 26

27 1 Individual Defendants Altimirano and Valoaga have not appeared. There may be a dispute percolating regarding Altimirano and Valoaga. See, e.g., Docket No. 38 at 4. The Court 28 does not herein express an opinion on those issues. 1 II. STANDARDS 2 The timeframe for effectuating service in federal court is generally governed by Rule 4(m) 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 4 If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the 5 plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But 6 if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. 7 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The structure of Rule 4(m) gives rise to “two avenues for relief. The first is 9 mandatory: the district court must extend time for service upon a showing of good cause. The 10 second is discretionary: if good cause is not established, the district court may extend time for 11 service upon a showing of excusable neglect.” Lemoge v. United States,

(9th 12 Cir. 2009) (citation and footnote omitted).2 13 With respect to the latter discretionary extension, excusable neglect is governed by the 14 well-established Pioneer factors. See Lemoge,

. Those factors include (1) the 15 danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on 16 the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 17 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,

(1993). Even when 18 good cause is not shown, courts retain “broad” discretion to extend time to effectuate service. See 19 in re Sheehan,

(9th Cir. 2001). 20 In practice, requests for extension of the service deadline are granted liberally. See, e.g., 21 Clark v. Wash. State Dept. of Health,

, 1349-50 (W.D. Wash. 2024). Such 22 leniency is in accordance with the Rule 1 directives to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 23 determination of cases, as well as the overarching policy that cases should be decided on their 24 25 26 27 2 The Court may grant an extension to the service deadline even if it had expired before 28 that relief was sought. See Mann v. Am. Airlines,

(9th Cir. 2003). 1 merits when reasonably possible. See Silvagni v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

(D.

) (citing Eitel v. McCool,

(9th Cir. 1986)).3 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 The Court would tend to agree with the Individual Appearing Defendants that good cause 5 is lacking for a mandatory extension.4 Such a finding would not end the analysis, however, as the 6 Court may allow an extension of the service deadline even without a persuasive showing of good 7 cause. The Court finds that the circumstances here support a permissive extension. 8 First, there is little danger of prejudice to the Committee in granting an extension. 9 Although the case is moving forward in some respects, the Committee has actual knowledge of 10 the lawsuit, the case remains in its infancy, and no decisions have been rendered adverse to the 11 Committee. Moreover, the Committee’s interests would appear to be aligned with the Individual 12 Appearing Defendants, who have been advocating for those interests.5 13 Second, the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings are both 14 minimal. The default 90-day service period recently expired6 and Plaintiff promptly sought an 15 extension. Moreover, Plaintiff is only asking for 14 days to effectuate service. 16 17

18 3 As to the governing legal landscape, the Court notes that the response relies heavily on an unpublished memorandum disposition issued by the Ninth Circuit in 1998. See Docket No. 38 19 at 5-6. Such memorandum dispositions are not properly cited. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3. The response also relies extensively on a published Ninth Circuit decision that addresses former Rule 4(j) of the 20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but that rule was superseded and replaced with the more lenient Rule 4(m) that is now operative. See, e.g., Mann,

n.2. 21 4 The circumstances smack of inattention and carelessness, with counsel attesting that he 22 did not realize that the Committee had not been served until after the service deadline expired. See, e.g., Docket No. 34-1. 23 5 It is puzzling to assert prejudice in the form of the Committee losing its “voice” in these 24 proceedings within the very same papers filed by the Individual Appearing Defendants essentially advocating on behalf of the Committee. See Docket No. 38 at 8 n.4, 9. The Court has been given 25 no reason to believe there is not a community of interest between the Committee and the Individual Appearing Defendants. Cf. PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas,

, 434 n.5 (D. Nev. 2023) 26 (discussing Gilbert v. Zurich Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:04-cv-01774-KJD-GWF,

, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2006)). 27 6 Ninety days from the filing of the complaint would be November 27, 2025, which was 28 the Thanksgiving holiday. ] Third, the reason for the delay militates slightly in favor of relief or, at worse, is neutral. 2|| The record here shows inattention and carelessness, which are not good reasons for delay. Nonetheless, Plaintiff was not acting in bad faith and courts are permitted to excuse negligent 4] mistakes. Cf Pincay v. Andrews,

(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (affirming district 5| court finding of excusable neglect for failing to meet deadline due to calendaring error). 6 Fourth, as noted above, Plaintiff was not acting in bad faith. 7 In evaluating the pertinent considerations, the Court finds that there was excusable neglect 8|| such that a permissive Rule 4(m) extension is warranted. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to extend. Plaintiff 11] must serve the Committee within 14 days of the issuance of this order. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: December 15, 2025 14 ZR a fe. Nancy J. Koppe 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28