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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6

7 Theresa Gouveia, Case No. 2:25-cv-00887-CDS-NJK 8 Plaintiff(s), Order 9 v. [Docket No. 14] 10 Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 11 Defendant(s). 12 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the expert opinions of J. Jay Todd. 13 Docket No. 14. The motion argues that Todd provided initial expert opinions that were improperly 14 disclosed as “rebuttal” opinions. 15 I. Local Rule Violations 16 Before turning to the substance of the motion, the Court notes threshold deficiencies with 17 the motion. First, the caption of the motion indicates that the filing was made in the local state 18 court, as opposed to being filed in this federal district court. See Docket No. 14 at 1; but see Local 19 Rule IA 10-2 (providing required caption for filings in this courthouse). Second, the filing 20 combines the motion and exhibits into one document, creating a lengthy PDF file. See Docket No. 21 14 at 1-43; but see Local Rule IC 2-2(a)(3)(A) (“Exhibits and attachments must not be filed as part 22 of the base document in the electronic filing system. They must be attached as separate files”).1 23 Counsel must familiarize themselves with the rules of this courthouse and comply with the rules 24 moving forward. See, e.g., Dela Rosa v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp. Sys., Inc.,

, 1244 25 1 The Court does not catalogue herein all the ways in which the motion falls short on the 26 basics and there are other ways. For example, while referenced predominately as “Jay Jones” or “J. Jay Jones” in the bulk of the motion, the subject expert’s name is actually “J. Jay Todd.” See 27 Docket No. 14 at 40; see also id. at 14 (conclusion of motion seeking to strike “Defendant Jay Jones’s’ [sic] initial opinions” (emphasis added)). In addition to ensuring compliance with the 28 local rules, counsel must carefully review their filings for accuracy and clarity. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Just as an attorney who always practices in state court is expected to know the 2 rules of administration and operation particular to that court, we expect an attorney practicing law 3 in federal court to become familiar with and follow rules applicable to practice in this court”). 4 II. Substance of Motion 5 The Court may not exclude an improper expert report if the underlying violation is 6 harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “Harmlessness may be established if a disclosure is made 7 sufficiently before the discovery cutoff to enable the movant to depose the expert and challenge 8 his expert report.” Pac. Indemn. Co. v. Nidec Motor Corp.,

, 1097 (D. Nev. 9 Aug. 25, 2016) (collecting cases). Courts routinely find harmlessness sufficient to avoid exclusion 10 sanctions when a rebuttal report served a month before the discovery cutoff includes information 11 that should have been included in an initial report. See, e.g., Felix v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 2017

, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2017) (addressing harmlessness for improper rebuttal report 13 served 33 days before discovery cutoff). Indeed, the very case law on which the motion is 14 predicated does not impose exclusion sanctions. See Nunez v. Harper,

, at *5 15 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2014) (“it does not appear that exclusion of Dr. Duke’s report is the appropriate 16 remedy”); Amos v. Makita U.S.A., Inc.,

, at *4, 5 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2011) (“there is 17 no harm because there is little chance of prejudicing Plaintiff. Any prejudice that might have 18 occurred is easily remedied;” “exclusion of Makita’s expert witness is not the proper sanction”). 19 In this case, the subject expert report was served on November 17, 2025. Docket No. 14 20 at 3. A month remained in the discovery period at the time of disclosure, see Docket No. 8, during 21 which Plaintiff could have sought to depose Todd and serve a rebuttal report.2 Although Plaintiff 22 argues that the expert report was improperly labeled as a rebuttal, the motion provides no 23 24 25

26 2 Plaintiff waited a month to file this motion and now claims that she lacks the time to rebut this report or depose Todd, circumstances that Plaintiff says create “great” prejudice. Docket No. 27 14 at 13. Of course, “courts are generally unimpressed by tenuous assertions of prejudice when any harm could have been minimized through the movant’s prompt action in either obtaining a 28 stipulation with opposing counsel or moving the Court for relief.” Silvagni, 320 F.R.D. at 243 n.7. 1} explanation as to how striking it could be warranted (even assuming that it was improperly 2|| labeled)’ given the time remaining within the discovery period when it was disclosed. 3} II. Conclusion 4 Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED without prejudice. If Plaintiff continues to seek relief on this issue, she must file a renewed request addressing the issues raised above by 6|| December 23, 2025. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: December 16, 2025

Nancy J»Koppe 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27), ——__________ > The Court expresses no opinion herein as to whether the report was improperly labeled 28]| because, even assuming that it was, the motion fails to show that the relief requested is warranted.