1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 SHELBY V. FRATELLO and RYNE M. Case No.: 2:25-cv-01606-APG-EJY SEETO, 4 Order (1) Denying Motions for Temporary Plaintiff Restraining Order and Preliminary 5 Injunction, (2) Granting in Part v. Defendants’ Motion to Seal, and (3) Setting 6 Deadline to File a Motion to Seal DAN WILDE, et al., 7 [ECF Nos. 24, 25, 30] Defendants 8

9 Shelby Fratello and Ryne Michael Seeto1 sue Clark County and several Clark County 10 employees for various claims arising out of the removal of their child, A.R.S., from their 11 custody.2 Among the relief the plaintiffs request in their first amended complaint is A.R.S.’s 12 return to their custody. ECF No. 28 at 44. 13 Prior to filing the first amended complaint, Seeto moved for a temporary restraining order 14 (TRO) (1) seeking A.R.S’s return or placement with the plaintiffs’ immediate local family; 15 (2) enjoining the defendants from making “medical, psychological, educational, or custodial 16 decisions regarding [A.R.S.] without written parental consent or court order”; (3) preserving 17 relevant evidence and communications; and (4) holding a preliminary injunction hearing. ECF 18 No. 25 at 15. Seeto anticipated that the defendants would assert that I should abstain under 19 20

21 1 The first amended complaint states that Fratello and Seeto are suing on behalf of their minor child, A.R.S. ECF No. 28 at 5. However, under current Ninth Circuit law, “a parent may not 22 proceed pro se on her children’s behalf.” Grizzell v. San Elijo Elementary Sch.,

(9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

(2025). 23 2 The plaintiffs also sue Seeto’s ex-wife, who allegedly conspired with state actors related to enforcement against Seeto for arrears in child support. ECF No. 28 at 6-77. 1 Younger v. Harris,

(1971), so he attached to his motion a memorandum of law 2 arguing why I should not abstain. 3 Defendants Dan Wilde and Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) oppose.3 4 Wilde and DFS argue that Younger abstention applies. They also contend that the plaintiffs have

5 received due process in the state court proceedings and the records from those proceedings 6 confirm that the child was endangered in the plaintiffs’ custody, is safe in state custody, and 7 would be at risk of harm if returned to the plaintiffs. Specifically, they note there was evidence 8 of the parents’ drug use and domestic violence, that their home had drug residue and guns 9 accessible to a child, and that there were two other individuals in the plaintiffs’ house who were 10 under the influence and uncooperative with police at the time A.R.S. was removed from the 11 home. Finally, they contend that Seeto’s motion is not supported by sufficient evidence to grant 12 the extraordinary relief he requests. 13 The parties are familiar with the facts, so I repeat them here only as necessary to resolve 14 Seeto’s motions. I deny Seeto’s motions because I abstain from granting the requested

15 injunctive relief under Younger and because his request for evidence preservation is unnecessary. 16 I. ANALYSIS 17 “Federal courts have a presumptive, or what is sometimes said to be virtually unflagging, 18 obligation to decide cases within their jurisdiction.” Yelp Inc. v. Paxton,

(9th 19 Cir. 2025) (simplified). But “Younger abstention is an exception to that rule.”

Younger 20 abstention is based on the recognition that “there are some classes of cases in which the 21 withholding of authorized equitable relief because of undue interference with state proceedings is 22

3 Wilde and DFS were the only defendants in the original complaint. ECF No. 1-1 at 6. The first 23 amended complaint adds defendants, but none has been served so they have not responded to Seeto’s motions. 1 the normal thing to do.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491

, 359 (1989) (quotation omitted); see also Yelp, Inc.,

(stating “courts 3 have long had discretion not to exercise equity jurisdiction when alternatives are available” 4 (simplified)).

5 “Although originating in the criminal context, Younger has been extended to prevent 6 federal court injunctions of certain ongoing state civil proceedings.” Yelp Inc.,

. 7 For a civil case like this one, I may abstain under Younger “only when the state proceedings: 8 (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in 9 enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and 10 (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges.”

(quotation omitted). To abstain, each element 11 must be satisfied. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund,

(9th 12 Cir. 2014). If the Younger abstention requirements are met, I “then consider whether the federal 13 action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an 14 exception to Younger applies.”

15 A. The Younger factors are met, and the injunctive relief Seeto requests would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings. 16 17 First, there is no dispute that the child welfare proceedings pre-date this lawsuit and are 18 ongoing. DFS took A.R.S. into custody on July 23, 2025, this lawsuit was filed about a week 19 later, the family court proceedings have been ongoing, and a hearing is scheduled for January 13, 20 2026. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1-1; 32-7 at 4; 32-9; 32-11; 32-13. Second, child welfare actions are 21 quasi-criminal enforcement actions. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

, 79-80 22 (2013) (citing Moore v. Sims,

(1979)). Child welfare and protecting 23 children from dangerous home environments are important state interests. See Mueller v. Auker, 1

(9th Cir. 2012) (A state “has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child . . 2 . .” (quotation omitted)). Seeto does not dispute these factors. 3 However, Seeto challenges whether the Nevada courts have allowed him and Fratello to 4 raise federal challenges. He contends that despite trying to raise constitutional challenges in

5 state court, they have been “rebuffed at every turn.” ECF No. 25-3 at 7. He argues that he and 6 Fratello have been denied due process because the state court refused to review video footage at 7 the initial protective custody hearing on July 28, their motions were denied without a hearing, 8 and they were denied discovery and the opportunity to present witnesses on their behalf. Seeto 9 argues that he has exhausted state court remedies because the Supreme Court of Nevada denied 10 their interlocutory appeal due to a lack of a final order from the family court. 11 I do not rule on the plaintiffs’ due process claim at this time. But I conclude that Seeto 12 has not sufficiently shown that the Nevada courts are unwilling to entertain constitutional 13 challenges such that Younger abstention should not apply. The state court records show that the 14 plaintiffs were notified of and attended various hearings in state court and were advised of their

15 rights to be represented by an attorney and to present evidence. ECF Nos. 32-7 at 2-3; 32-9; 32- 16 11; 32-13 at 2. Fratello was represented by counsel. ECF Nos. 32-7 at 5; 32-13 at 2. Seeto chose 17 to represent himself. ECF No. 32-7 at 5. 18 Seeto has walked out of or not attended hearings that have been afforded to him. See ECF 19 Nos. 32-11 at 2; 32-14 at 1. For example, according to the family court’s order arising out of the 20 July 29 protective custody hearing, Seeto yelled at the court, “made aggressive actions toward 21 the Court’s marshals,” grabbed Fratello in what the court perceived to be an effort to prevent her 22 from speaking, and Seeto and Fratello “left the courtroom before the conclusion of the hearing, 23 continuing to yell at the Court and exited in an aggressive manner.” ECF No. 32-7 at 4. At the 1 September 29 hearing, Seeto was able to object to evidence, but Seeto apparently left the hearing 2 after an evidentiary ruling did not go his way. ECF No. 32-11 at 2. Witnesses testified at the 3 September 29 hearing, and had Seeto stayed at the hearing he presumably could have cross- 4 examined the witnesses, presented his own witnesses, and raised federal claims. Id. at 3. At that

5 hearing, Fratello indicated she did not want to proceed to trial and wanted to work toward 6 reunification with A.R.S. Id. Seeto did not show up to the November 25 hearing where, again, 7 he presumably could have raised federal claims. ECF No. 32-14 at 1. 8 The plaintiffs thus have been afforded notice and opportunities to be heard. And despite 9 Seeto’s characterization that he exhausted state avenues for relief, he has not because he has 10 abandoned or did not attend available opportunities to raise his federal claims. The fact that 11 Seeto has not obtained the rulings he wanted or when he wanted them does not mean the state 12 courts do not allow for constitutional challenges. Further, there are upcoming hearings at which 13 the plaintiffs can raise federal claims, and the plaintiffs can appeal any final order or seek 14 mandamus relief. I do not presume that “the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional

15 rights.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

(1982). 16 Because all four Younger requirements have been satisfied, I next consider whether 17 allowing Seeto’s injunctive relief requests to proceed would have the practical effect of enjoining 18 the state proceedings. Some requests would. The state court has entered orders granting 19 temporary legal and physical custody to DFS, approving case plans for reunification with the 20 parents, and granting DFS the authority to consent to necessary or emergency care for the child 21 while the child remains in the state’s custody. ECF Nos. 32-7 at 4; 32-13 at 3-4; 32-14 at 1. It 22 has set hearings in January and July 2026. ECF No. 32-13 at 4. Seeto’s request that I order the 23 child to be returned to the parents, enjoin the defendants from making medical or custodial 1 decisions regarding the child without the parents’ consent, and hold a preliminary injunction 2 hearing would have the practical effect of enjoining the state court proceedings. Accordingly, 3 Younger abstention applies to these requests unless an exception exists. 4 However, Seeto’s request that the defendants be ordered to preserve all evidence would

5 not effectively enjoin the state court proceedings. But as I already advised the plaintiffs, the 6 request for evidence preservation is unnecessary because the defendants are already under a duty 7 to preserve evidence. ECF No. 22 at 2 (citing Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc.,

, 766 8 (9th Cir. 2015) (A party has a duty to preserve documents when it has “some notice that the 9 documents were potentially relevant to the litigation.” (quotation omitted))). There is no 10 indication that the defendants have destroyed or are likely to destroy evidence. So I deny the 11 request for an injunction to preserve evidence. 12 B. No exception to Younger abstention applies. 13 Seeto argues that even if Younger ordinarily would apply in these circumstances, 14 exceptions exist in this case. First, he argues that the defendants should be judicially estopped

15 from asserting Younger abstention because they removed this case to federal court. Next, he 16 argues he has exhausted all avenues of relief in state court, including an appeal to the Supreme 17 Court of Nevada, which was dismissed. He also contends that this case falls within Younger’s 18 exception for bad faith official conduct or harassment. Finally, he argues that applying Younger 19 here would violate the Constitution because the fundamental right of a parent to the care, 20 custody, and control of their child is at stake.4 21

22 4 Seeto violated Local Rule 7-3(b)’s 24-page limit by attaching a separate 18-page memorandum regarding Younger to his 16-page motion. The defendants did not specifically respond to all the 23 arguments Seeto raised in his separate memorandum. Regardless, because Younger involves the discretionary exercise of my equity powers and implicates comity and federalism concerns, I address Seeto’s arguments in his separate memorandum without requiring a further response 1 There are exceptions to Younger abstention when a litigant can “show[] bad faith, 2 harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, 401 3 U.S. at 54. These exceptions are “narrow.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

(1975). 4 None applies in this case.

5 First, I reject Seeto’s judicial estoppel argument because the defendants’ positions are not 6 so inconsistent as to require judicial estoppel. The defendants removed the case based on federal 7 question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Federal questions remain in the plaintiffs’ first amended 8 complaint. ECF No. 28; see also ECF No. 22 at 2 (advising the plaintiffs that if they filed an 9 amended complaint that asserted only state law claims, I would remand the case to state court). 10 As discussed above, Younger abstention applies only to claims that would have the practical 11 effect of enjoining state court proceedings. It is not clear that all of the plaintiffs’ claims would 12 fall into this category. For example, it does not appear that allowing the sexual assault claim for 13 damages under

to proceed in this court would have the practical effect of 14 enjoining the state court proceedings. See ECF Nos. 1-1 at 10; 28 at 26-28. Additionally, when a

15 claim for damages is at issue, “an abstention-based stay order, rather than a dismissal, is 16 appropriate.” Gilbertson v. Albright,

(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, 17 the defendants’ position that the case is properly removed to federal court based on federal 18 question jurisdiction is not “clearly inconsistent” with their position that the requested injunctive 19 relief is not an available remedy because of Younger. Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 20

(9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). 21

from the defendants. See Yelp Inc. v. Paxton,

(9th Cir. 2025) (stating that 22 Younger is based on “the recognition that courts have long had discretion not to exercise equity jurisdiction when alternatives are available” (simplified)); Gilbertson v. Albright,

, 23 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[I]interference with state proceedings is at the core of the comity concern that animates Younger.”). 1 Next, Seeto argues he has exhausted all avenues of relief in state court, including an 2 appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which was dismissed. As discussed above, Seeto has 3 not exhausted all avenues of relief. And Seeto has not pointed to authority that state court 4 exhaustion is a recognized Younger exception.

5 Seeto also contends that this case falls within Younger’s exception for bad faith official 6 conduct and harassment. In “the Younger abstention context, bad faith generally means that a 7 prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” 8 Yelp Inc.,

(quotation omitted). Seeto has not shown bad faith. DFS obtained 9 warrants signed by one judge, an order for protective custody signed by a different judge, and an 10 order after a disposition hearing approving the DFS case plan by another judge. ECF Nos. 32-4; 11 32-5; 32-7; 32-8; 32-13; 32-14 at 1. That DFS was able to prevail at each stage before different 12 judges strongly suggests that the defendants brought the child welfare proceedings with a 13 reasonable expectation of obtaining protection for the child, which they in fact obtained. See Yelp 14 Inc.,

(“To warrant enjoining state court proceedings because the state lawsuit is

15 lacking in merit, that lack of merit must thus be so palpable and overwhelming as to fairly 16 demonstrate bad faith.”). 17 Seeto also has not sufficiently shown harassment within the Younger context. “Younger 18 allowed that enjoining state court proceedings could be appropriate if the District Court properly 19 finds that the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass.”

(quotation omitted). 20 And “harassment indicative of bad faith could include filing state court litigation in retaliation 21 for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”

“But just as an allegation of bad faith is 22 not a talisman sufficient to overcome an otherwise proper exercise of abstention, the same must 23 be true of an allegation of retaliatory motive based on the exercise of constitutional rights, lest 1 Younger’s bad faith exception overtake Younger altogether.”

(simplified). Rather, “any 2 retaliatory motive or harassment [must] be sufficiently severe or pervasive to legitimize [a 3 federal court’s] halt of state court proceedings in which these same constitutional objections 4 could be raised.”

.

5 Seeto has not shown that the state court judges were biased, that the defendants have 6 pursued a “serial pattern of litigation” against the plaintiffs, or “a past history of personal 7 conflict” or “animus” toward the plaintiffs “that would raise an inference of vindictive 8 retaliation.”

(simplified). Although the plaintiffs make a serious allegation of sexual 9 assault, Wilde denies it and asserts that he has a recording of Fratello informing her sister that 10 she was going to make false allegations against Wilde. ECF No. 32-1 at 2. I need not and do not 11 make a credibility determination on this issue because even if the sex assault allegation is true, 12 Wilde was not the sole decisionmaker regarding the child welfare proceedings. The state court 13 records show Wilde’s supervisor signed off on Wilde’s preliminary protective hearing report, 14 and another DFS employee and deputy district attorneys attended the hearings. See ECF Nos. 32-

15 6 at 2, 10; 32-7 at 2; 32-13 at 2. Even if Wilde had an improper motive, there is no evidence the 16 other DFS employees or deputy district attorneys shared that motive. Accordingly, I do not find 17 harassment sufficient to invoke an exception to Younger. 18 Finally, Seeto argues that applying Younger here would violate the Constitution because 19 the fundamental right of a parent to the care, custody, and control of their child is at stake. 20 Parents have the “fundamental right . . . to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 21 control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville,

(2000). But the state also has a 22 “strong” interest in domestic relations matters, and the state court system has “superior 23 competence . . . in settling family disputes.” Cf. Peterson v. Babbitt,

(9th Cir. 1 1983) (discussing the domestic relations exception). The fact that a constitutional right is at 2 issue is not an exception to Younger. See Stockton v. Brown,

, 1140 (9th Cir. 3 2025) (stating that “free-speech rights are treated like other constitutional rights in the Younger 4 analysis—in the interest of comity, we generally rely on state courts to vindicate those rights in

5 state proceedings”); Yelp Inc.,

(“The cases are clear that a First Amendment 6 defense is not sufficient, standing alone, to justify Younger’s bad faith exception.”). 7 The requirements for invoking Younger abstention are met, granting Seeto the requested 8 injunctive relief would enjoin the state proceedings, and no exception applies. I therefore abstain 9 from considering the injunctive relief Seeto requests. As a result, I deny his motions for a TRO 10 and preliminary injunction. 11 C. I grant in part the defendants’ motion to seal because Nevada law protects the confidentiality of child welfare proceedings and the records contain medical 12 information, but the defendants have not shown all exhibits should be sealed.

13 The public has a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 14 including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commnc’ns, Inc.,

, 597 15 (1978). Thus, there is “a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Ctr. for Auto 16 Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC,

(9th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). A party 17 seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by 18 meeting either the good cause or compelling reasons standards depending on the type of filing 19 before the court. Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu,

(9th Cir. 20 2006). Where, as here, a motion for injunctive relief “is more than tangentially related to the 21 merits of a case,” the party seeking to seal must show compelling reasons to overcome the 22 presumption of public access. Ctr. for Auto Safety,

. Thus, I may seal the 23 defendants’ exhibits only if I find “a compelling reason and articulate[] the factual basis for [my] 1 ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.”

(quotation omitted). I must 2 also balance “the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain 3 judicial records secret.”

(quotation omitted). What constitutes a “compelling reason” 4 lies within my discretion.

5 The defendants have shown compelling reasons for sealing some of the exhibits attached 6 to their response. Nevada Revised Statutes § 432B.280 provides that, subject to certain 7 exceptions, “information maintained by an agency which provides child welfare services, 8 including, without limitation, reports and investigations made pursuant to this chapter, is 9 confidential.” Section 432B.290(e) provides that a child welfare services agency may provide 10 information to a court “for in camera inspection only, unless the court determines that public 11 disclosure of the information is necessary for the determination of an issue before it.” I mention 12 some facts from those records as necessary to explain my reasons for abstaining under Younger 13 so the litigants and the public can understand my ruling. But the public need not view the 14 underlying records where Nevada law presumptively makes them confidential. Those records

15 discuss the welfare of an infant and some of the attached exhibits contain private medical 16 information. See Abbey v. Hawaii Emps. Mut. Ins. Co. (HEMIC),

(D.

), on reconsideration in part (Feb. 7, 2011) (“The need to protect medical privacy 18 qualifies as a compelling reason that overcomes the presumption of public access to judicial 19 records.” (simplified) (listing cases)). Accordingly, I grant the defendants’ motion to seal ECF 20 Nos. 32-2 through 32-9 and 32-11 through 32-14. 21 However, the defendants have not shown compelling reasons to seal the index of exhibits 22 (ECF No. 32), Wilde’s declaration (ECF No. 32-1), or the entire Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 23 Department police report (ECF No. 32-10). I see no reason to seal the index or Wilde’s 1 declaration, so I deny the defendants’ motion as to those exhibits and order the clerk to unseal 2 them. 3 The police report contains the minor child’s name, medical information, information the 4 police received from child protective services and DFS, and a description of what happened at a

5 family court hearing, so those portions should remain sealed. ECF No. 32-10 at 3. But the 6 defendants have not explained why that information could not be redacted while the remainder of 7 the report was made public. The police report as presented to the court is already redacted in 8 part to comply with Local Rule IC 6-1. Id. at 2 (removing personal identifiers like date of birth 9 and addresses, but not redacting the minor child’s name). I will keep the police report sealed 10 temporarily to give the defendants and the plaintiffs the opportunity to file a motion to seal that 11 shows compelling reasons to keep any other portions of the police report sealed. If no party files 12 a motion to seal, I will direct the defendants to file a publicly accessible version that redacts the 13 above identified information. 14 II. CONCLUSION

15 I THEREFORE ORDER that the plaintiff Ryne Michael Seeto’s motions for injunctive 16 relief (ECF Nos. 24, 25) are DENIED. 17 I FURTHER ORDER that the defendants’ motion to seal (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED in 18 part. 19 I FURTHER ORDER the clerk of court to unseal ECF Nos. 32 and 32-1. The other 20 exhibits, ECF Nos. 32-2 through 32-14, will remain sealed. 21 I FURTHER ORDER that any party seeking to seal portions of the Las Vegas 22 Metropolitan Police Department police report (ECF No. 32-10) that I have not already identified 23 as approved for sealing must file a motion to seal by January 9, 2026. 1 I FURTHER ORDER that if no party files a motion to seal by January 9, 2026, then by 2|| January 16, 2025, the defendants must file a publicly accessible version of the police report that redacts the minor child’s name, medical information, information the police received from child 4|| protective services and DFS, a description of what happened at a family court hearing, and any personal identifiers under Local Rule IC 6-1. 6 DATED this 19th day of December, 2025. 7

8 ANDREW P.GORDON 9 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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