1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 DAVID CHARLES BUNNELL, 4 Petitioner, Case No.: 2:25-cv-02259-GMN-EJY 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 6 KRISTI NOEM, et al, RESTRAINING ORDER 7 Respondents. 8 9 Pending before the Court is Petitioner David Charles Bunnell’s Motion for Temporary 10 Restraining Order, (ECF No. 15). Respondents Michael Bernacke, Pam Bondi, Todd Lyons, 11 and Kristi Noem filed a Response, (ECF No. 22), to which Respondent John Mattos filed a 12 Joinder, (ECF No. 23).1 Petitioner replied, (ECF No. 24). Because Petitioner satisfies the 13 requirements for injunctive relief, the Court GRANTS his Motion for Temporary Restraining 14 Order. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Petitioner David Bunnell is a citizen of Iran who moved to the United States in 1977. 17 (Am. Pet. 4:2–4, ECF No. 13). His parents and siblings eventually became U.S. citizens. (Id. 18 4:4–5). In 1980, Petitioner was officially adopted by Charles Bunnell, a U.S. citizen. (Id. 4:5– 19 6). At that time, Bunnell was issued a birth certificate and social security number and believed 20 that he was a U.S. citizen as a result of the adoption. (Id. 4:6–8). In 2012, he learned that he 21 had never obtained citizenship when he was placed in removal proceedings and ordered 22

23 1 Respondent John Mattos’ deadline to file a response was on December 8, 2024. (Minute Order, ECF No. 16). 24 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, a court may extend time “on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Mattos did not file a motion to 25 extend time to file a response and did not explain why his failure to file a response by the deadline was due to excusable neglect. Without such a motion, the Court STRIKES Mattos’ untimely Joinder to the Federal Respondents’ Response. 1 removed to Iran. (Id. 4:8–10). Petitioner was held in detention for “around 90 days” after his 2 removal was ordered before he was released because he could not be removed. (Id. 4:10–12). 3 On June 22, 2025, over 13 years after he was previously released from detention, 4 Petitioner was detained again. (Id. 4:13–15). He has since been detained at Nevada Southern 5 Detention Center (“NSDC”) for over 5 months. (Id. 5:7–9). Despite complying with ICE’s 6 requests to seek travel documents from Iran, Petitioner was informed by a woman at the Iranian 7 consulate that Iran will not accept him because they have no records indicating Bunnell is a 8 citizen of Iran or ever lived in Iran. (Id. 4:17–5:6). Petitioner has never lived in or held a lawful 9 status in any other country. (Id. 5:6–7). 10 On November 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 11 1-1), alleging that his detention is unlawful and seeking immediate release from ICE custody. 12 After the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender as counsel for Petitioner, he filed an 13 Amended Petition, (ECF No. 13), and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, (ECF No. 14 15). 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A. Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and 18 preliminary injunctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The purpose of a TRO is to “preserv[e] the status 19 quo and prevent [] irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing.” Granny 20 Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 21

(1974). A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon 22 a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

23 Inc.,

(2008). 24 The standard for issuing a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a 25 preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,

, 1 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking a TRO must demonstrate: (1) likelihood of success on 2 the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the 3 balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 4

. These four factors—the Winter factors—must be shown whenever injunctive 5 relief is sought. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011). 6 Although individual appellate panels have questioned the usefulness of the distinction, 7 the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between “mandatory” and “prohibitory” injunctions. Hernandez 8 v. Sessions,

, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2017). Prohibitory injunctions maintain the status 9 quo, preventing further constitutional violations.

. By contrast, mandatory injunctions 10 go further, ordering “a responsible party to ‘take action.’” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos 11 Pharma GmbH & Co.,

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 12

(1996)). A mandatory injunction “goes well beyond simply maintaining the 13 status quo [and is thus] . . . particularly disfavored.”

(quoting Anderson v. United States, 612

, 1114 (9th Cir. 1980)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has explained that mandatory 15 injunctions “should not be approved in the absence of a risk of ‘extreme or very serious 16 damage.’” Hernandez,

(quoting Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc.,

). 17 Mandatory injunctions are most likely to be appropriate when “the status quo . . . is exactly 18 what will inflict the irreparable injury upon complainant.”

at 999 (quoting Friends for All 19 Child., Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,

, 830 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

U.S.C. § 2241 Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every 22 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004)

23 (citing U.S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 24 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 25 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973). A writ of habeas 1 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 2 Constitution or federal law.

(c)(3). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 3 includes challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis,

, 687 4 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim,

(2003). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 At the outset, the Court will convert Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 7 Order into one for preliminary injunction. Respondents had notice and the opportunity to 8 respond. There is no benefit in additional briefing and the standard is the same. Given the 9 nature of relief granted by the Order, the Court converts this to a Motion for Preliminary 10 Injunction. The now Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s 11 motion in turn. 12 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 13 The first Winter factor, the likelihood of success on the merits, “is a threshold inquiry 14 and is the most important factor in any motion for preliminary injunction.” Baird v. Bonta, 81

, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). 16 Petitioner raises six grounds for relief: (1) his continued detention violates due process 17 because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable as required under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

(2001); (2) his continued detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act 19 (“INA”); (3) ICE unlawfully revoked his release when it failed to follow its own regulations; 20 and (4) ICE’s current policy and procedures relating to third-country removals violate the 21 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and Petitioner’s due process rights, and (5) Petitioner’s 22 detention under that policy violates his due process rights. (See generally Am. Pet., ECF No.

23 13). These grounds can be grouped into challenges of three general issues: (1) Petitioner’s 24 continued detention, (2) Petitioner’s re-detention, and (3) the Administration’s third-country 25 removal program. 1 i. Due Process for Continued Detention 2 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 3 Constitution, no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 4 law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that “the Due Process Clause 5 protects a [noncitizen] subject to a final order of deportation.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94. 6 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the INA does not authorize “indefinite, perhaps 7 permanent, detention” of noncitizens subject to final orders of removal. Id. at 699. 8 The authority of ICE to detain noncitizens under federal law derives from 8 U.S.C 9 § 1231, which directs the Attorney General of the United States to affect the removal of any 10 noncitizen from this country within 90 days of a final order of removal.

(a)(1). 11 The removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal 12 becomes “administratively final,” (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay 13 of removal, or (3) the date on which the [noncitizen] is released from non-immigration 14 detention or confinement. § 1231(a)(1)(B). During the removal period, detention is mandatory. 15 § 1231(a)(2). Under § 1231, the removal period may be extended beyond 90 days for a variety 16 of reasons including a determination by DHS that “removal is not practicable or proper.” Id. 17 Because “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention. . . would raise a serious 18 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court has “read an implicit limitation” into the statute 19 and has held that a noncitizen may only be detained for “a period reasonably necessary” to 20 effectuate their removal. Zadvydas,

. When a removable noncitizen is detained 21 beyond this reasonable time and “removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold 22 continued detention unreasonable.”

. The Supreme Court adopted a six-month period

23 of presumptive reasonableness after the removal order is final and confirmed that “[a 24 noncitizen] may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant 25 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”

. The Court further 1 determined that “after this 6–month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to 2 believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, 3 the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”

. If the 4 Government fails to meet its burden, then the noncitizen must be released from detention. See 5 Jennings v. Rodriguez,

(2018). 6 Here, Petitioner has met his burden to show that “there is no significant likelihood of 7 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas,

. First, as of 8 December 22, 2025, Petitioner has been continuously detained for more than six months.2 9 Second, Petitioner has shown that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Detention 10 becomes “indefinite” when there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant 11 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Diouf v. Mukasey,

, 12 1233 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Zadvydas,

). Petitioner alleges that he cannot be 13 removed to Iran. He explains that during a call an ICE agent arranged for Petitioner with the 14 Iranian consulate, a woman at the consulate said, “Iran cannot issue him travel documents as 15 there are no records indicating Bunnell is a citizen of Iran or ever lived in Iran.” (Am. Pet. 5:1– 16 4). She further told Petitioner that Iran does not have a birth certificate for him, and that “we 17 don’t even know who you are.” (Id. 5:5–6). Petitioner further asserts that he has never lived in 18 or held lawful status in any other country and has not received any documents identifying any 19 other country of removal. (Id. 5:6–7). 20 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s statements are “too speculative and conclusory to 21 satisfy Petitioner’s burden.” (Resp. 11:15–16). Referencing Petitioner’s statement that he 22 “cannot be removed to Iran,” they insist that a petitioner in these circumstances must “present

23 24 2 This determination does not include the 90 days for which Petitioner was detained in 2012. Though Respondents repeatedly assert that Petitioner has been in custody for less than 6 months, as of the date of this 25 Order, Petitioner has now been in detention for a continuous six months since he was re-detained on June 22, 2025. Thus, the Court does not need to reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether detention should be calculated cumulatively. 1 evidence beyond his own speculation.” (Id. 11:20–21 (quoting Rene v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 2 Homeland Sec., No. 06-0336 JAG,

, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2007))). The Court 3 disagrees. Petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to have information or evidence that only 4 DHS has access to. See Carlson v. Landon,

(9th Cir. 1950) (“[P]etitioner has 5 gone about as far as he could go to prove his claim. . . If there is good reason for the 6 [challenged detention] it is locked in the Director’s own chest of knowledge and is unrevealed 7 for proof against it. Surely, in this circumstance, petitioner is not burdened by the impossible 8 task of imagining and refuting causes . . . What more could petitioner have alleged in his 9 [petition?]”). 10 Beyond that, Petitioner’s allegations that he cannot be removed to Iran are not 11 speculative; he specifically identifies a date and call during which Petitioner was informed by 12 the Iranian consulate that Iran will not accept him because they don’t know who he is and do 13 not have a birth certificate for him. (Am. Pet. 5:1–6). Petitioner is not required to “show the 14 absence of any prospect of removal—no matter how unlikely or unforeseeable.” Zadvydas, 533 15 U.S. at 702. He need only show that there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant 16 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Here, Petitioner’s 17 allegations regarding this call provide a “good reason to believe” that he cannot be removed to 18 Iran. Respondents’ inability to effectuate removal in the over 13 years since an immigration 19 judge issued his final order of removal further supports Petitioner’s claim that removal is not 20 likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. These facts, combined with the undisputed fact that 21 the Government has identified no other possible countries for his removal, is sufficient to 22 satisfy Petitioner’s initial burden.

23 Having found that Petitioner met his initial burden of “provid[ing] good reason to 24 believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” 25 the Court now turns to whether Respondents have “respond[ed] with evidence sufficient to 1 rebut that showing.” See Zadvydas,

. Respondents first point to the fact that 2 Iran “has recently accepted approximately 100 Iranian citizens who have been deported to the 3 United States,” (Resp. 12:1–3), presumably to demonstrate that deportation to Iran is not 4 impossible. But Respondents provide no evidence to rebut or even a statement denying 5 Petitioner’s allegations that he was told by the Iranian consulate during that interview that they 6 would not accept him because they don’t have his birth certificate and don’t know who he is. 7 Regardless of whether deportation to Iran is technically possible given the recent successful 8 deportation of Iranian citizens to Iran, Petitioner’s allegations are specific to him, not about the 9 general likelihood that Iranian citizens can be deported to Iran. So, Respondents’ statement 10 regarding the recent flights to Iran does not rebut Petitioner’s allegations that he personally 11 cannot be removed to Iran. 12 Respondents also assert that Petitioner’s interview with the Iranian consulate on 13 November 5 shows that ICE is “actively pursuing Petitioner’s removal to Iran.” (Resp. 12:3–5). 14 But the standard for lawful continued detention is not that the Government simply continue 15 “good faith efforts to effectuate [removal],” so Respondents’ bare assertion that they are still 16 making efforts to remove him is not sufficient to meet their burden. See Zadvydas,

702. 18 Respondents further argue that the fact Petitioner had an interview with the Iranian 19 consulate is, in and of itself, sufficient to rebut Petitioner’s showing. Respondents rely on 20 Barenboy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,

, 261 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2005), where they explain 21 that the Third Circuit found a petitioner failed to show no reasonable likelihood of removal in 22 the foreseeable future where the embassy was still willing to consider the petitioner’s

23 citizenship application. (Resp. 12:5–8). But the facts of that unpublished case are materially 24 distinguishable from those here. In contrast to Petitioner’s assertions that the Iranian consulate 25 told him they would not accept him, the petitioner in Barenboy had a letter from the Moldovan 1 Embassy indicating that it was still willing to consider his application.

n. 3. 2 Thus, the Court is unpersuaded by Respondents’ reliance on this case. 3 Finally, Respondents contend that the absence of an exact date of Petitioner’s removal 4 does not undermine the conclusion that there is a significant likelihood of removal, relying 5 again on a Third Circuit case. (Resp. 12:17–13:3) (citing Castellanos v. Holder,

(3d Cir. 2009)). But the Court does not base its findings in this case on the lack of a certain 7 date of removal. Instead, as explained above, the Court concludes that the Respondents have 8 not “respond[ed] with evidence sufficient to rebut [Petitioner’s] showing” that there is good 9 reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 10 future. Having reached that conclusion, the Court finds that Petitioner has met his burden of 11 showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his detention violates his due 12 process rights.3 13 ii. Revocation of Release 14 Even if Petitioner had not shown a strong likelihood of success on his continued 15 detention claim, he has also shown a likelihood of success on his claim that the revocation of 16 his release was unlawful. 17 Respondents have the authority to detain non-citizens with final orders of removal to 18 effect deportation. See

; Zadvydas,

. But when a non-citizen has 19 been released from immigration detention, the revocation of that release is governed by 8

(i), which authorizes ICE to revoke a noncitizen’s release for purposes of 21 removal. Specifically, a noncitizen’s release may be revoked “if, on account of changed 22 circumstances,” it is determined that “there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may

23 24

25 3 Having found that Petitioner is likely to succeed on his claim that his continued detention violates his due process rights, the Court need not reach his argument that his continued detention violates the APA. 1 be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”

(i)(2). Upon such a 2 determination: 3 [T]he [noncitizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to 4 Service custody to afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification. The [noncitizen] may submit any evidence or 5 information that he or she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be 6 removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any 7 contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release. 8 9

§ 241.13(i)(3). Respondents do not dispute that this regulation applies here, nor do they 10 argue that it is not required. (See generally Resp.). Instead, they assert that Petitioner violated 11 the conditions of his supervised release because he failed to “provide ICE with written copies 12 of requests to Embassies or Consulates requesting the issuance of a travel document,” including 13 requests he was required to make to attempt to obtain travel documents to Iran. (Id. 5:18–28 14 (citing Order of Supervision, Ex. B to Resp., ECF No. 22-2)). 15 Petitioner specifically asserts that he has never been told that he was returned to custody 16 because of a “conditions” violation, has not received the interview required by regulation, and 17 has not been invited to contest the revocation of his order of supervision. (Am. Pet. 16:18–19; 18 17:1–4). Respondents notably do not contest these allegations. They do not assert that 19 Petitioner was notified of the reasons for revocation, nor do they contend he was provided an 20 informal interview or given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation. (See 21 generally Resp.). 22 Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations. United States ex rel. 23 Accardi v. Shaughnessy,

(1954). Because there is no indication that an 24 informal interview was provided to Petitioner, nor an opportunity for him to respond to the 25 reasons for revocation, the Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed on his claims that his de- 1 detainment was unlawful. See Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP,

1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding that a petitioner was likely to succeed on the 3 merits where there was no indication he had been provided a formal interview) (collecting 4 cases). 5 iii. Third-Country Removal 6 Lastly, Petitioner contends that ICE’s policy of removing noncitizens to a third country 7 with no notice or opportunity to seek fear-based protection violates his due process rights and 8 constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation of the APA. (Am. Pet. 17:21– 9 10:16). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims that there is a threat of removal to a third 10 country without due process is speculative because DHS has not engaged in efforts to 11 effectuate Petitioner’s removal to any other country but Iran. (Resp. 13:6–9). 12 As the Court has previously found in Cavieres Gomez v. Mattos, No. 2:25-cv-00975- 13 GMN-BNW,

at *6–7 (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2025), Petitioner has a due process 14 right to receive meaningful notice and opportunity to present a fear-based claim to an 15 immigration judge before DHS deports him to a third country. “Immigration proceedings must 16 provide the procedural due process protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.” Vilchez v. 17 Holder,

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lacsina Pangilinan v. Holder,

708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009)). “A ‘noncitizen must be given sufficient notice of a country of 19 deportation that, given his capacities and circumstances, he would have a reasonable 20 opportunity to raise and pursue his claim for withholding of deportation.’” Nguyen v. Scott, 796

(W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (quoting Aden v. Nielsen,

998, 1009 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,

(1976)).

23 “[I]ndividuals whose rights are being determined are entitled to notice of the issues to be 24 adjudicated, so that they will have the opportunity to prepare and present relevant arguments 25 and evidence.”Andriasian v. I.N.S.,

(9th Cir. 1999). “In the context of 1 country of removal designations, last minute orders of removal to a country may violate due 2 process if an immigrant was not provided an opportunity to address his fear of persecution in 3 that country.” Najjar v. Lynch, 630 F. App’x. 724, 725 (9th Cir. 2016) (non-precedential 4 memorandum disposition). Thus, in accordance with the ample case law above, Petitioner has 5 a due process right to receive meaningful notice and opportunity to present a fear-based claim 6 to an immigration judge before DHS deports him to a third country.4 Accordingly, the Court 7 finds that Petitioner’s requested injunctive relief on this ground is warranted. 8 B. Irreparable Harm 9 The Ninth Circuit has recognized the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to 10 immigration detention” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention 11 facilities” and “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of 12 detention. Hernandez v. Sessions,

(9th Cir. 2017). Here, Petitioner alleges 13 that he has health complications and needs “extensive medical treatment.” (Pet. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1- 14 1). He further explains that his wife and stepson are facing looming eviction, and the business 15 he runs with his son is struggling due to his detention. (Am. Pet. 11:26–12:1). 16 Further, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 17 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio,

(9th 18 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns,

(1976)). Where, as here, the “alleged 19 deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of 20 irreparable injury is necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford,

, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 21 2005). The Ninth Circuit has also noted that “unlawful detention certainly constitutes ‘extreme 22 or very serious’ damage, and that damage is not compensable in damages.” Hernandez, 872

23 24

25 4 Because the Court finds that Petitioner puts forth a successful argument under the Fifth Amendment right to due process, it need not determine whether the stated policy violates the APA. 1 F.3d at 999. Thus, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of issuing a preliminary 2 injunction. 3 C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest 4 The last two Winter factors merge when the Government is the opposing party, as is the 5 case here. See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell,

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing 6 Nken v. Holder,

(2009)). Here, the balance of the equities and the public 7 interest tip sharply in Petitioner’s favor. Preventing the violation of constitutional rights serves 8 the public interest. Preminger v. Principi,

(9th Cir. 2005); see also 9 Melendres v. Arpaio,

(“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the 10 violation of a party’s constitutional rights.”). 11 The only interest asserted by the Government is in the “lawful enforcement of the 12 immigration laws.” (Resp. 15:23–24). But “the public interest in enforcement of immigration 13 laws, although significant, does not override the public interest in protecting the safeguards of 14 the Constitution.” Domingo-Ros v. Archambeault, No. 25-CV-01208-DMS-DEB,

1425558, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2025). While the Government has an interest in executing 16 removal orders, agencies cannot act unlawfully even pursuing legitimate ends. Ala. Ass’n of 17 Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

(2021). Petitioner has 18 demonstrated that he is likely unlawfully detained in violation of his due process rights and is 19 suffering the harms of immigration detention. “On the other hand, the burden on Respondents 20 in releasing Petitioner from detention is minimal, especially considering Petitioner’s 21 compliance with the requirements of the Order of Supervision.” Hoac,

, at 22 *6. There is nothing in the current record to suggest that releasing Petitioner would impede

23 Respondents’ ability to remove him if the necessary travel document is obtained. 24 /// 25 /// 1 D. Status Quo 2 In his motion, Petitioner asks the court to release him from detention “to preserve the 3 status quo.” (Mot. TRO 2:11–12). The status quo ante litem is “the last uncontested status 4 which preceded the pending controversy[.]” GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co.,

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc.,

, 809 6 (9th Cir. 1963)); see Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer,

(9th Cir. 2014) 7 (“the ‘status quo’ refers to the legally relevant relationship between the parties before the 8 controversy arose.”) (citing McCormack v. Hiedeman,

(9th Cir. 2012)). 9 Respondents argue that Petitioner is seeking mandatory injunctive relief disrupting the 10 status quo in the form of immediate release from custody, and thus faces a heightened burden. 11 (Resp. 9:5–9).5 But “several district courts have recently concluded that releasing a re-detained 12 noncitizen who had been on supervised release preserves rather than alters the status quo.” 13 Nguyen v. Scott,

, 718 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (collecting cases). And 14 several of those courts have thus concluded that similarly situated petitioners “seek a 15 prohibitory injunction because they seek to preserve the status quo preceding this litigation— 16 their physical presence in the United States free from detention.”

(quoting Domingo-Ros v. 17 Archambeault, No. 25-CV-1208-DMS-DEB,

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 18 2025)); see also Doe v. Becerra,

, 1090 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) 19 (“Petitioner had remained out of custody for over five years until his bond was suddenly 20 revoked. It is questionable whether that status quo is properly considered to be detention when 21 the Government suddenly took an allegedly unconstitutional action in rearresting Petitioner 22 without a hearing.”).

23 24 5 In making this argument, Respondents cite only non-binding authority from the Third Circuit. In fact, throughout their Response, Respondents cite an abundance of out-of-circuit authority (including mostly cases 25 from the Third Circuit) to support arguments where plenty of binding authority exists in this Circuit. Respondents’ failure to cite a single binding authority other than Zadvydas in its argument is both unpersuasive and unhelpful to the Court. 1 The Court agrees with the many well-reasoned courts in this district that have 2 determined that the relief sought here would preserve the status quo. And even assuming 3 without deciding that the injunctive relief requested does constitute a mandatory injunction, that 4 higher standard is met here. “An alleged violation of Petitioner’s due process rights and his 5 continued unlawful detention in violation of those rights constitutes extreme or very serious 6 damage that will result in the absence of an injunction.” Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 7 1090 (citing Hernandez,

). 8 E. Relief Requested 9 First, Petitioner requests that he be released immediately. (§

:15). The 10 remedy for a Zadvydas claim is generally release of the habeas petitioner under conditions of 11 supervision. Zadvydas explains that “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should 12 hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 699– 13 700. It further provides that the noncitizen’s “release may and should be conditioned on any of 14 the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the 15 [noncitizen] may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions.”

at 16 700. Moreover, when a court considers a due process claim, it may tailor relief to the specific 17 problem that gives rise to the due process violation. Morrissey v. Brewer,

, 481 18 (1972). Because the Court holds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates the Fifth 19 Amendment based on the analytical framework provided in Zadvydas, the Court finds that 20 Petitioner’s immediate release, subject to reasonable terms of supervision provided under 8

(a)(3), is warranted. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700; see also Trejo, 2025

, at *11 (ordering in the alternative that Petitioner be released from custody

23 subject to reasonable terms of supervision under Zadvydas). 24 Second, Petitioner requests that the Court prohibit Respondents from re-detaining 25 Petitioner in the future absent proof of changed circumstances making his removal reasonably 1 foreseeable. Third, Petitioner requests that the Court prohibit Respondents from removing 2 petitioner to a third country without providing Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel with adequate 3 notice of intent to seek removal to a third country and due process in the form of an opportunity 4 to seek to reopen Petitioner’s immigration court proceedings to seek fear-based relief from 5 removal. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that these forms of relief are 6 warranted. 7 F. Bond 8 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant preliminary injunctive 9 relief ‘only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the 10 costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 11 restrained.’” Johnson v. Couturier,

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

(c)). “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court 13 with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any.’”

(quoting Jorgensen v. 14 Cassiday,

(9th Cir. 2003)). “In particular, ‘[t]he district court may dispense 15 with the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the 16 defendant from enjoining his or her conduct.’”

at 1086 (quoting Jorgensen,

919). Petitioner requests that the court not require him to post security because there is no 18 quantifiable harm to Respondents. (Reply 10:1–3, ECF No. 24). 19 The Court finds that no security is required here. Courts regularly waive security in 20 cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer,

(9th Cir. 2011); Maldonado 21 Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB-EJY,

, at *23 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 22 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163-KES-SKO,

, at *10 (E.D. Cal.

23 Sep. 23, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI-RFL,

, at *4 (N.D. 24 Cal. Jul. 4, 2025). 25 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDRED that Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 3 (ECF No. 15), is converted to a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and is GRANTED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner must be released from detention 5 immediately under reasonable terms of supervision set forth in

(a)(3). 6 Determining reasonable terms of supervision shall not in any way impede the immediate 7 release of Petitioner. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents must file a notice on the docket no 9 later than December 24, 2025, to certify compliance with the Court’s order. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from re-detaining 11 Petitioner in the future absent proof of changed circumstances making his removal reasonably 12 foreseeable. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from removing Petitioner 14 to a third country without providing Petitioner with adequate notice of intent to seek removal to 15 a third country and due process in the form of an opportunity to seek to reopen Petitioner’s 16 immigration court proceedings to seek fear-based relief from removal. 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 ///

23 /// 24 25 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this preliminary injunction shall remain in effect, 2 || absent a successful motion to modify or dissolve it, until this Court issues a final decision on 3 || Petitioner's habeas petition. 4 Counsel for Respondents are directed to immediately provide notice of this Order to the 5 restrained parties they represent. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send a copy of this 6 || Order to the Warden of Nevada Southern Detention Center in Pahrump, Nevada. 7 DATED this _22 _ day of December, 2025. i, 9 __ 10 Gloria M. Najarro, District Judge United States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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