George M. Mattox v. Cortez, et al.

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA George M. Mattox, Case No.: 2:24-cv-02359-JAD-MDC 4 Plaintiff Order Dismissing v. and Closing Case Cortez, et al., 7 Defendants

9 Plaintiff George Mattox brings this civil-rights lawsuit to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Southern Desert Correctional Center. On December 10, 2025, this court ordered Mattox to update his address and either pay the $405 filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) for non-inmates by January 9, 2026.1 That deadline expired without a response from Mattox, and his mail from this court is being returned as undeliverable.2 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case.3 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules.4 In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must 1 ECF No. 11.

2 ECF Nos. 12, 13.

3 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).

4 See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to update their address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

1 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.5 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Mattox’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action.6 The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

10 The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the need to consider dismissal.7 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.”8 Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Mattox case-related filings, and this court cannot operate without collecting reasonable fees, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Mattox is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and 5 See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130).

6 See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976).

22 7 See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002).

8 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). further squander the court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal.

3 Having thoroughly weighed these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 4} dismissal. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that THIS ACTION IS DISMISSED without 5|| prejudice based on Mattox’s failure to file an updated address and either pay the filing fee or seek to proceed IFP in compliance with the court’s order. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and CLOSE THIS CASE. If Mattox wishes to pursue his 8] claims, he must file a complaint, provide the court with his current address, and either pay the 9|| filing fee or file a complete IFP application in a new case.

10 Dated: January 16, 2026 US. Dy Judge Joie A. Dorsey