*201OPINION

On January 12, 1989, the Clark County grand jury returned indictments against respondents for conspiracy to sell cocaine and trafficking in cocaine. NRS 453.3395(3), 453.401 and 453.321. Alleging, inter alia, that the state failed to properly establish the weight of the cocaine before the grand jury and that the indictments were based on unlawfully disclosed oral and wire communications, respondents filed in the district court a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On June 1, 1989, the district court granted respondents’ petition. This appeal followed.

The district court concluded that the state failed to establish properly the weight of the cocaine before the grand jury. Relying on NRS 50.315, the district court concluded that the weight of a controlled substance cannot be established before the grand jury by affidavit.1

At the time of appellant’s indictment, however, NRS 50.315 applied only “in an administrative proceeding or in a criminal trial in the district court in any county in the district or a preliminary examination or trial in any justice’s or municipal court in any county in the district.” The statute was inapplicable to grand jury proceedings. The district court therefore erred in concluding that this statute was controlling.

Under NRS 172.135, an expert’s affidavit is admissible before *202the grand jury in lieu of his personal testimony or deposition.2 The affidavit of criminalist Minoru Aoki was therefore admissible to establish the weight of the cocaine in this case.

The district court further held that the indictment was based on unlawful disclosures of oral and wire communications in violation of NRS 179.410 through NRS 179.525. The district court apparently accepted respondent’s claim that because “the grand jury hearing” was not furnished with a copy of the court order and accompanying application under which the interception was authorized, and a transcript was not provided, the evidence was inadmissible under NRS 179.500.3 This was error.

The legislature limited NRS 179.500 to “any trial, hearing or other proceeding in any court of this state.” Grand jury proceedings are not included. Thus, the district court erred when it applied NRS 179.500 to a grand jury proceeding. See McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986) (where a statute is clear on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the intent of the legislature).

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s order granting respondents’ pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.