OPINION

By the Court,

In 1984, Damsco Escauriaza sued Karen Elliott’s former hus*980band, Jack Elliott, and obtained a $22,000.00 judgment against him. Escauriaza instructed the sheriff of Clark County to execute the judgment by levying upon an automobile that had been owned by Karen Elliott and Jack Elliott as community property, but which had been awarded to Karen Elliott in a divorce.

Nevada, like most states, has a statute which, by its terms, provides an exclusive1 and summary means for disposing of claims like Karen Elliott’s, that the sheriff has levied on the wrong property. The statute, NRS 31.070, is called a “third-party claims” statute. This statute sets forth a very simple procedure for cases where, as here, “the property levied on is claimed by a third person as his [or her] property.” NRS 31.070(1). All the claimant has to do under the statute is to make a sworn statement claiming rightful ownership and possession of the property levied-upon and present the claim to the sheriff. The sheriff, in turn, “must release the property” unless the person who instituted the levy on the property disputes the third-party claim and gives to the sheriff an undertaking equal to double the value of the property. Id. If such an undertaking is not presented to the sheriff within seven days of the claim, the sheriff simply returns the property to its true owner. Id. In cases in which the levying party puts up the required undertaking, NRS 31.070 provides for resolution of the opposing claims by “motion to the court without the necessity of an independent action.” NRS 31.070(2) (emphasis added).

For reasons that are more than a little obscure, Karen Elliott did not avail herself of the simple, exclusive, summary procedures set forth in NRS 31.070; instead, she filed a lawsuit, an *981“independent action” against the sheriff and Denton and Denton, the judgment creditor’s attorneys, even though NRS 31.070(1) expressly states that the sheriff “shall not be liable for damages to any such third person for the taking or keeping of such property if no claim is filed by any such third party” and even though NRS 31.070 provides the exclusive remedy2 to Elliott for the release of her car. (Emphasis added.)

In this first lawsuit (which is not the subject of this appeal), Elliott sought damages against Denton and Denton for wrongful attachment (sic) and also sought an injunction ordering Denton and Denton to return her car to her. Elliott settled her claim and dismissed her lawsuit against the sheriff; however, she continued to pursue her injunction action against Denton and Denton. Rather than dismiss the injunction action against the lawyers out of hand,3 the trial court, in February of 1986, actually issued an injunction ordering Denton and Denton to wrest the car out of the sheriff’s possession and return it to Karen Elliott, even though a substantial storage lien had to be paid by the law firm in order to comply with the court’s injunctive command. The trial court denied recovery on Elliott’s tort damage action against Denton and Denton for “wrongful attachment.”4

*982The basis for the trial court’s issuing, in the first lawsuit, a mandatory injunction against the judgment creditor’s attorneys remains a mystery. There would appear to be no conceivable justification for ordering the law firm to bail out Karen Elliott’s car; still, a mandatory injunction was entered, and it does appear from the record that in June of 1988, Denton and Denton did in fact honor the injunction by paying $4,000.00 in storage fees to the sheriff to gain possession of the car. After she got her car back, Karen Elliott sued Denton and Denton again. This second lawsuit is the subject of this appeal.

In her second lawsuit, Karen Elliott sued Denton and Denton for the “diminution in value of the automobile caused while in the Respondents’ possession or constructive possession and damages based upon the Respondents’ negligence in failing to properly provide for, preserve and care for the automoble.”5 (Elliott Op. Br. at 4; emphasis added.) The trial court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, and she now appeals the denial of her negligence6 claim against Denton and Denton.

One of the many paradoxical aspects of this case is that Karen Elliott did not argue to the trial court, and does not argue on appeal, that any member of or agent of the law firm of Denton and Denton was negligent. Perhaps the reason for this is that none of the lawyers in the Denton firm had the duty to “provide for, preserve and care for the automobile.” Until, in response to a mandatory injunction, Denton and Denton paid $4,000.00 to the sheriff so that the car could be returned to Karen Elliott, neither the law firm nor their client, Escauriaza, had the right to come near the car, much less to “preserve and care for” it. The law *983firm quite obviously, at no time, had any duty of due care with respect to Karen Elliott’s car. Consequently, there can be no breach of a duty of due care and no negligent tort liability on the part of Denton and Denton. The trial court’s judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.7

dissenting:

Equity, oh Equity, the fairest flower in the judicial garden, where art thou? From the deafening silence came the muted, agonized reply, “smothered by an overgrowth of technicalilies (pun intended)!”

Hopefully, my colleagues and others who may stumble across this dissent, will overlook my inability to resist a brief sojourn into the world of drama.

This case is about equity, or, perhaps more correctly, the lack thereof.1 It involves the appellant, Karen Elliott (Elliott), the only truly innocent party, and the respondent, Denton & Denton (Denton), a reputable law firm that was instrumental in separating Elliott from her 1964 Mercedes Benz 230-SL automobile. The trial evidence confirmed that the vehicle was listed as an antique.

*984The tortured history of this case commenced with a determined eifort by Denton to satisfy its client’s judgment against Elliott’s former husband, Jack Elliott.2 Denton obtained a writ of execution and caused Elliott’s Mercedes to be levied upon by the Clark County Sheriif’s Department. The vehicle was seized and stored at Southern Nevada Auto Parts despite Elliott displaying her documents of ownership to the levying officer. Moreover, both before and after the levy, Elliott’s attorney informed Denton that the vehicle was Elliott’s separate property and therefore immune to attachment or sale in satisfaction of her former husband’s separate debt. Unfazed, Denton scheduled, or permitted the scheduling of an execution sale of the Mercedes to occur on September 10, 1984.

Unable to convince Denton of the impropriety of taking her automobile, Elliott filed an action (hereinafter “the 1984 action”) against the sheriff, Denton, and Denton’s client, Escauriaza. In her complaint for wrongful attachment, Elliott sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. Denton’s answer interposed no affirmative defense addressing Elliott’s failure to make a statutory claim for the return of her vehicle. Equitable relief in the form of a temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction, issued enjoining the defendants from disposing of Elliott’s Mercedes. In the meantime, the car remained in storage pending the outcome of the action.

On March 11, 1986, following a bench trial in the 1984 action, the district court held that the Mercedes was Elliott’s separate property and that it could not be used to satisfy her former husband’s separate debt. A permanent injunction issued enjoining the defendants and their representatives from disposing of the vehicle. The district court also ordered the defendants to return possession of the car to Elliott “forthwith.”3 Undaunted, Denton disregarded the order requiring the immediate return of the Mercedes, and sought relief by appeal to this court. We affirmed the judgment in an order dismissing Escauriaza’s appeal. See Escauriaza v. Elliott, Order Dismissing Appeal, Docket No. 17481 (May 27, 1987).

*985Notwithstanding the order of the district court, affirmed by this court, requiring Denton to return Elliott’s car “forthwith,” Den-ton continued to resist compliance with the tenacity of a pit bull.4 After several show cause motions, the district court found the defendants jointly and severally in contempt for not returning the vehicle and again ordered them to do so. Faced with the threat of sanctions, Denton paid the $4,000 storage fee under protest and the Mercedes was finally released to Elliott in August, 1988-over fourteen months after we affirmed the order requiring the immediate return of the car to Elliott — in an extensively damaged condition. On appeal, Elliott contended that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint because the defenses asserted against her claim for damages were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Included within the bar, argues Elliott, was the attempt to invoke the attachment statutes (NRS Chapter 31) to defeat her right of recovery in the instant action.

As a third party claiming title to the levied property, Elliott’s claim was governed by the attachment rules embodied in NRS Chapter 31. See NRS 21.120(2).5 NRS 31.070 provides for the release of the levied property if the third person has filed a written claim and the person who caused the levy fails to file an undertaking upon demand by the sheriff. The undertaking indemnifies the third person against loss, liability, damages, costs and attorney’s fees sustained by reason of the wrongful taking or withholding of her property. A claim against the bond may be made by motion in the same action, thus obviating the need to file an independent action. NRS 31.070 is a valid and complete remedy to third persons whose property has been wrongfully attached. Cooper v. Liebert, 81 Nev. 341, 344, 402 P.2d 989, 991 (1965).6

*986Unfortunately, Elliott failed to pursue the comparatively simple statutory remedy for the recovery of her vehicle, a fact that Denton claims is fatal to her instant action for damages arising from the wrongful levy. Denton also claims immunity from liability for the storage-damaged car under the theory that Denton was merely acting on behalf of its client and that it never had post-attachment possession of the vehicle.

An attaching (or, as here, a levying) party is liable for damages resulting from loss of use or destruction of erroneously attached property. See All Nite Garage v. A.A.A. Towing, Inc., 85 Nev. 193, 197, 452 P.2d 902, 905 (1969); see also Peterson v. Wiesner, 62 Nev. 184, 146 P.2d 789 (1944). The attaching party’s liability is independent of any bond and exists jointly with the attaching officer. All Nite Garage, 85 Nev. at 197, 452 P.2d at 905. This is true even if the damage occurs while the property is in the sheriff’s possession. Nevada Credit Rating Bureau, 88 Nev. at 608-09, 503 P.2d at 14 (“the sheriff’s failure to protect the attached property does not benefit the . . . [tortfeasors] and insulate them from the consequences of their initial tort”).7

*987Although an attorney who, on behalf of a client, causes property to be levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution is generally not liable for resulting damages sustained by a third person, circumstances may exist that will render an attorney liable for the consequences of the levy. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of Bar v. Sinn, 23 A.2d 516, 518 (Conn. 1942); see generally 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 234 (1980).

Here, Denton disregarded readily confirmable information that the Mercedes was Elliott’s separate property and proceeded with the levy of execution under legal theories Denton thought would ultimately prevail. More importantly, Denton was ordered by the district court to return possession of the vehicle to Elliott “forthwith.” Although Denton was not in actual possession of the vehicle, it was empowered, indeed directed by lawful court order, to cause its release, as it finally did in 1988. See also NRS 31.180(2).

If Denton doubted the validity of the return order, it should have properly challenged it in court; instead, Denton chose to defy the order. I am unaware of any principle of law or equity that would enable it to do so with impunity.

Moreover, Denton’s attempt to avoid the consequences of its wrongful levy of execution by invoking the attachment statutes as an exclusive remedy should fall victim to the principle of res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action which has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Horvath v. Gladstone, 97 Nev. 594, 596, 637 P.2d 531, 533 (1981). This is particularly true when the prior proceeding is between the same parties regarding the same cause of action. See Landex, Inc. v. State ex rel. List, 94 Nev. 469, 582 P.2d 786 (1978); York v. York, 99 Nev. 491, 664 P.2d 967 (1983). Not only is the prior judgment conclusive with respect to matters actually litigated, but also as to all matters which might have been litigated and decided in the prior action. York, 99 Nev. at 493, 664 P.2d at 968. We have previously held that:

A judgment on the merits by a proper court will operate to bar every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim and every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and determined in that action in subsequent litigation between the parties or their privies involving identical causes of action.

Bissell v. College Dev. Co., 89 Nev. 558, 561, 517 P.2d 185, 187 (1973). In the context of attachment proceedings, the wrongfulness of the levy or attachment is res judicata by virtue of a *988judgment against the attaching creditor in the attachment suit. Powell v. Schultz, 118 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo.Ct.App. 1938).

In her 1984 action against Escauriaza, Denton and the sheriff, Elliott alleged wrongful attachment and sought an injunction and damages. Denton did not invoke Elliott’s statutory remedies as an affirmative defense in that case. Moreover, as previously noted, Denton eventually recognized the validity of the judgment favoring Elliott by paying for the storage fees to effectuate the release of the vehicle, and thereafter filing an action against the sheriff’s civil bureau for reimbursement.8

Denton now contends that it could not have raised the attachment statutes as a defense in the 1984 action “since the first case was for a ‘wrongful attachment,’ relating to the taking” as opposed to Elliott’s remedies after the taking. I disagree. NRS 31.070 provides a remedy to third parties aggrieved by wrongful attachment or levy of execution whose property remains in the possession of the sheriff. That was precisely the situation which existed when Elliott filed the 1984 action. Elliott’s statutory remedies could have been asserted by Denton as defenses to the 1984 action. I suggest that its failure to do so precludes Denton from raising them in the instant action.

Additionally, the district court in the 1984 action determined that Elliott’s car had been wrongfully levied upon in light of its decree enjoining its sale and ordering its return. Thus, that issue was conclusively decided in the 1984 action. Nevertheless, the district judge in the instant case apparently believed that the orders issued in the 1984 action were not entitled to a conclusive effect because, in his opinion, the orders manifested “a misapprehension of the then Court that the Defendant ESCAURIAZA had possession or control of the 1964 Mercedes.” This was error because the defendants, who were solely responsible for the wrongful levy of execution, were empowered to cause the release of the vehicle by paying the accumulated storage fees.

The propriety of the levy and the efficacy of defenses related thereto were subsumed by res judicata. The only issue left for the district court to determine in this case was the extent to which Elliott was damaged by virtue of the wrongful levy of execution and the prolonged failure to properly maintain or return the vehicle. This the court did not consider.

I began this lengthy dissent with an expression of regret over the suppression of equity. Equity delights in doing justice, and must as assuredly lament the failure to secure that objective. Equity is enlivened by fairness and smothered by its absence. For reasons specified above, I must conclude that the rule of law has *989failed to secure either justice or fairness in the instant case. The only truly innocent party, Karen Elliott, ■-'has been left with a judicial legacy not soon to be forgotten. Surely she will ever look with derision upon the premise that the civil justice system exists to right wrongs and make aggrieved parties whole.

I understand the reluctance of the majority to place the burden of loss on a respected law firm that undoubtedly sought, in good faith, to protect its client’s interests in accordance with its considered judgment on how best to achieve that end. Unfortunately, Denton’s legal theories have been rejected and the judicial resolution thereof has long since become final. Denton pried from Elliott property that was unavailable for the satisfaction of its client’s judgment.

The majority has nevertheless rendered hollow Elliott’s victory by depriving her of a meaningful remedy. Elliott had no role in the removal, storage and destruction of her valuable antique car. Although her attorneys failed to take advantage of a simple statutory remedy, Denton interposed no defense on that ground. The majority now concludes that despite the district court’s order in the 1984 case requiring the prompt return of Elliott’s car (which this court rightly or wrongly affirmed by its order dismissing appeal), and despite Denton’s refusal to timely comply with the district court’s return order, the loss Elliott has suffered must remain with her. The majority thus disregards the wrongful levy effectuated by Denton and punishes Elliott for her counsel’s failure to pursue a statutory remedy the majority now views as exclusive.9 Moreover, the majority chides Elliott for her failure to expedite the return of her car through the statutory remedy, but ignores the more serious transgression involving Denton’s disregard of a lawful and final court order that also added years of delay to this action.10

For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully dissent.