OPINION

On July 26, 1995, the district court convicted appellant, pursuant to a guilty plea, of one count of possession of a controlled substance, a violation of NRS 453.336. The district court sentenced appellant to serve six years in the Nevada State Prison. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

On December 29, 1995, appellant filed in the district court a proper person post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On January 8, 1996, without appointing counsel, conducting an evidentiary hearing, or receiving a response from the state, the district court dismissed appellant’s petition. The district court further determined, pursuant to NRS 209.451(l)(d)(2) and NRS 209.451(l)(d)(3), that appellant had presented frivolous claims.1 *584Accordingly, the district court recommended that the Director of the Department of Prisons order the forfeiture of up to sixty days of appellant’s good time credits, if such credits had accrued. This appeal followed.

Appellant does not challenge the district court’s determination to dismiss her habeas corpus petition. Rather, appellant claims that the district court erred in recommending the forfeiture of her good time credits. We agree.

We conclude that NRS 209.451 (1 )(d) is inapplicable to NRS chapter 34 post-conviction habeas corpus actions. The credit forfeiture provisions of NRS 209.451 (1 )(d) are expressly limited to civil cases. We have repeatedly held that a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding cannot be characterized as either civil or criminal for all purposes. See, e.g., Beets v. State, 110 Nev. 339, 341, 871 P.2d 357, 358 (1994) (citing Hill v. Warden, 96 Nev. 38, 40, 604 P.2d 807, 808 (1980)). Accordingly, had the legislature intended NRS 209.451(1 )(d) to apply to state habeas corpus actions, we believe that the legislature would have explicitly made such a provision in the statute.

A review of the legislative history of NRS 209.451 (1 )(d) supports our conclusion. This law, which was proposed as Assembly Bill 106, was designed to curb frivolous civil rights actions and other civil lawsuits filed by prisoners. See Hearing on A.B. 106 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 68th Leg. (Nev., February 15, 1995); Hearing on A.B. 106 Before the Assembly Ways and Means Comm., 68th Leg. (Nev., April 3, 1995); Hearing on A.B. 106 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 68th Leg. (Nev., May 22, 1995). The primary proponents of the law, the attorney general’s office and the Department of Prisons, both indicated that such suits were consuming scarce resources.2 See id. Accordingly, the law was proposed to deter prisoners from filing such lawsuits. The law was not designed to deter *585prisoners, who are often afforded limited legal assistance and resources, from seeking post-conviction relief pursuant to NRS chapter 34.3

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court erred in recommending the forfeiture of appellant’s good time credits. Accordingly, we remand this matter, and we direct the district court to vacate the portion of its order recommending the Director of the Department of Prisons to reduce appellant’s good time credits. We affirm the portion of the district court’s order dismissing appellant’s habeas corpus petition.