facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). Barajas failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to any additional credit. See NRS 176.055(1) (providing that a defendant will be given credit for the amount of time spent in confinement prior to conviction unless the confinement was pursuant to the judgment of conviction for a different offense); see also McMichael v. State, 94 Nev. 184, 194, 577 P.2d 398, 404 (1978) ("Only incarceration pursuant to a charge for which sentence is ultimately imposed can be credited against that sentence."), overruled on other grounds by Meador v. State, 101 Nev. 765, 711 P.2d 852 (1985), and abrogated on other grounds by Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 40 P.3d 413 (2002). And Barajas' reliance on Johnson v. State, 120 Nev. 296, 89 P.3d 669 (2004), is misplaced because Johnson only mandates presentence incarceration credit for sentences ordered to run concurrently within a single judgment of conviction. Johnson does not mandate presentence incarceration credit where the sentences are ordered to run concurrently in separate judgments of conviction. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) I947A

&NM 'airVIBEEPT fir , cc: Second Judicial District Court Dept. 8 Law Office of Thomas L. Qualls, Ltd. Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

3 (0) 1947A •

:WMitION1151111112 I rIEREFTX • : 21k1