Armora (Freddy) v. State
Armora (Freddy) v. State
Opinion
as guidelines and the "[fl allure to adhere to the standards does not, in and
of itself, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"). We disagree with
Armora's contention.
"A district court may, in its discretion, grant a defendant's
[presentence] motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any substantial reason
if it is fair and just." Woods v. State, 114 Nev. 468, 475, 958 P.2d 91, 95
(1998) (internal quotations omitted). At the hearing on his motion,
Armora's former counsel testified that although he was unable to accept
collect telephone calls from inmates, he did in fact meet several times with
Armora and thoroughly discussed the plea negotiations and agreement
with him prior to the entry of his plea. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the district court determined that Armora "fail[ed] to
establish any substantial, fair, and just reason to withdraw [his] plea" or
prejudice, and that his plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. See Crawford v. State, 117 Nev. 718, 722, 30 P.3d 1123, 1125-26 (2001). We conclude that Armora failed to satisfy his burden and
prove that his plea was invalid, see Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004), and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying his motion, Johnson v. State, 123 Nev. 139, 144, 159 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2007) ("This court will not reverse a district court's determination
SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A concerning the validity of a plea absent a clear abuse of discretion.").
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2
J. Gibbons
J. Douglas
cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge Law Office of Betsy Allen Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk
2 The fast track statement does not comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it does not contain 1-inch margins on all four sides. The fast track statement and response do not comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it appears that the text is not double-spaced. Counsel for the parties are cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) I947A
HIMMEMMITZEIMBEIVI 1112§114E011 WE
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished