district court to conclude that OneWest owns appellant's loan. Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 260 (indicating that, absent clear error, a district court's factual determinations will not be disturbed). Specifically, OneWest produced appellant's original promissory note with a blank endorsement, appellant's original deed of trust, and a copy of an assignment obtained from the county recorder's office. As this court has recognized, these documents are sufficient to demonstrate OneWest's ownership of appellant's loan and its compliance with the FMP statute. See Leyva, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 1280 (recognizing that possession of an endorsed-in-blank note constitutes a proper negotiation for purposes of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code and that the person in possession is thereby entitled to enforce the note);' Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 259-60 (explaining that a deed of trust assignment from MERS to another entity is effective to transfer beneficial interest in the deed of trust to that entity); Einhorn v. BAG Home Loans Servicing, LP, 128 Nev . 290 P.3d 249, 254 (2012) (recognizing that a copy of an assignment obtained from the county recorder's office is sufficient to comply with the FMP statute because such a copy is self-authenticating).

'Even if this endorsement were fabricated, as appellant suggests, OneWest still established that it was entitled to enforce appellant's note by virtue of the fact that the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. assignment assigned beneficial interest in the deed of trust and the note. See Leyva, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 1281 (explaining that, without showing a valid negotiation, a party can establish its right to enforce the note by demonstrating a valid transfer); Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 260-61 (recognizing that an assignment that assigns beneficial interest in the deed of trust and the note sufficiently demonstrates a valid transfer of the note for Article 3 purposes).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A Accordingly, ample evidence supported the district court's conclusion that OneWest owned appellant's loan. 2 Appellant's remaining argument regarding the timing of when the notice of default was recorded is outside• the scope of the FMP and is therefore inappropriate for consideration in the context of this appea1. 3 NRS 107.086(4) (2011); Leyva, 127 Nev. at ,255 P.3d at 1278-79. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

J. Hardesty

Parraguirre

C11124 , J. Cherry

2 Appellant contends that Fannie Mae, and not OneWest, owns his loan. While the printout provided in appellant's October 23, 2012, district court filing may suggest as much, this printout also states that OneWest is appellant's "mortgage company," and OneWest provided the documentation necessary to demonstrate its authority to participate in the mediation as the deed of trust beneficiary. Thus, appellant's argument in this regard does not warrant reversal of the district court's order.

3 We note, however, that NRS 107.028(4) was not enacted until after appellant's notice of default was recorded. See 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 81, § 6, at 329.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge Douglas A. Rotondi Brooks Bauer LLP Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A