good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1). Further, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800(2).

Appellant argued that he had good cause because he was without the assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings.

This claim is belied by the record, as counsel was retained and filed multiple supplemental petitions on appellant's behalf. To the extent that appellant relied on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and argued that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel excused his procedural defects, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014).

Thus, the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition. Further, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State pursuant to NRS 34.800(2). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying appellant's petition as procedurally barred, and we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

' J.

Hardesty 7) Douglas Cherry cc: Hon. Stefany Miley, District Judge Jose M. Rodriguez Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 4re.94