Lyons (Phillip) v. State
Lyons (Phillip) v. State
Opinion
Moreover, appellant's petition was successive because he had previously filed several post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, and it constituted an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and different from those raised in his previous petitions. 3 See NRS 34.810(2).
Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).
Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).
Relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant claimed that he had good cause because he was not appointed counsel for his previous post-conviction proceedings. We conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel was discretionary in appellant's post-conviction proceedings, see NRS 34.750(1); 1987 Nev. Stat., ch. 539, § 42, at 1230 (former NRS 177.345(1)), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or provide an explanation for why he could not raise this claim earlier. Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.
3Lyons v. State, Docket No. 24046 (Order Dismissing Appeal, July 9, 1993); Lyons v. State, Docket No. 26201 (Order Dismissing Appeal, February 10, 1998). He filed his first post-conviction petition on February 3, 1992, but did not appeal the denial of that petition.
SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A e Moreover, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the petition.
Motion to correct an illegal sentence In his motion filed on April 4, 2014, appellant claimed that the judgment of conviction failed to properly state the statute under which he was sentenced and failed to state his minimum sentence. Appellant's claims fell outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). Therefore, without considering the merits of any of the claims raised in the motion, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Hardesty
J.
Douglas
J.
cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge Phillip Jackson Lyons Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.