NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded !aches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).

Appellant first claimed that the procedural bars should not apply because he raised jurisdictional claims. Appellant's claims did not implicate the jurisdiction, personal or subject matter, of the court. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6; NRS 171.010. Therefore, the procedural bars applied to appellant.

Next, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant argued that he had good cause because he was not appointed counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings. We conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see NRS 34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Finally, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

i—lte=a-12 Hardesty

J. --12P' - Douglas 7 Cherry SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A ceiN7, cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge Arthur J. Brewer Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) I94Th e