petitions. 2 See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(2). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).

Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).

Appellant appeared to claim that he was unable to raise the claims earlier because his counsel did not file an appeal from the second amended judgment of conviction, which was entered on October 13, 2009.

To the extent that he argued that the ineffective assistance of counsel constituted good cause, that claim itself was procedurally barred because appellant failed to raise it within a reasonable time See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252-55, 71 P.3d 503, 506-08 (2003). To the extent that he argued that the filing of the second amended judgment of conviction excused the procedural defects, he is mistaken. He filed the petition over a year after the second amended judgment of conviction was filed, and none of his claims were related to the clerical correction contained in the second amended judgment of conviction. See Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. 537, 541, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004). Therefore, the entry of the second amended judgment of conviction did not provide good cause.

2Lyons v. State, Docket No. 26436 (Order Dismissing Appeal, February 10, 1998); Lyons v. State, Docket No. 35151 (Order of Affirmance, August 7, 2001); Lyons v. State, Docket No. 50002 (Order of Affirmance, January 10, 2008); Lyons v. Nev. Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, Docket Nos. 54231, 54598 (Order of Affirmance, April 8, 2010); Lyons v. State, Docket Nos. 55760, 56523 (Order of Affirmance, March 17, 2011).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A Appellant, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), also argued that he had good cause because he was not appointed counsel in his earlier post-conviction proceedings. We conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see NRS 34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or provide an explanation for why he could not raise this claim earlier.

Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, Nev. P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.

Appellant also failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred, and we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

I Hardesty , D J.

0007/ Douglas

J.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge Phillip Jackson Lyons Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A