Nevada Supreme Court, 2017

Garcia (Angel) v. State

Garcia (Angel) v. State
Nevada Supreme Court · Decided February 16, 2017

Garcia (Angel) v. State

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ANGEL JOEL GARCIA, No. 68967 Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, FILED Respondent. 1620 7 ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE PUTT GL

This is an appeal from an order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Jerome M. Polaha, Judge.

Appellant Angel Joel Garcia argues that his aggregate sentence, which requires him to serve a minimum of 36 years before he is eligible for parole for two counts of murder committed when he was a juvenile, violates the Eighth Amendment. 1 Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying relief.

Garcia first argues that his sentence is the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole, in violation of this court's holding in Boston, because the aggregate sentence is so long as to deny him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. However, Garcia provides no cogent argument or legal authority to support his assertion that an aggregate sentence providing for minimum parole eligibility after 36 years 'It appears that the district court determined that Garcia demonstrated good cause for his failure to raise this claim on direct appeal based on the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and State v. Boston, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 98, 363 P.3d 453 (2015), which were entered after his direct appeal.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A ce is the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 2 Thus, we conclude that Garcia has failed to demonstrate error.

See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (providing it is the appellant's burden to present relevant authority and cogent argument on appeal).

Garcia further argues that his aggregate sentence violates Miller because the district court did not consider factors relating to a juvenile offender's immaturity, impetuosity, family and home environment, and diminished culpability when sentencing him. We disagree. The factors relating to a juvenile offender's transient maturity were presented to the district court at sentencing in a report submitted by the defense. Although the district court only briefly alluded to the report at sentencing, the district court indicated that it had considered the factors and agreed with the information regarding juvenile offenders and their transient maturity. Nothing in Miller requires the district court to outline its reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Hardesty

CtAA Parraguirre

2 Notably, Garcia is ineligible for the accelerated parole consideration provided by NRS 213.12135(1)(b) (providing for parole eligibility after serving 20 years for a juvenile offender convicted of murder) because his crimes involve the deaths of two victims, see NRS 213.12135(2).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 0)) 1947A e -Mira= !a cc: Hon. Jerome M. Polaha, District Judge Stover & Jordan Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A e

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.