IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SATICOY BAY, LLC, SERIES 6408 No. 80134 HILLSIDE BROOK, A NEVADA pt r'73 r'A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Appellant, F11 vs. OCT 15 2020 MOUNTAIN GATE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA NON- CLEW< ' PROFIT CORPORATION, BY rcilkk Res a ondent.

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.' Having considered the parties arguments and the record, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed appellant's complaint.

See Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008) (reviewing de novo a district court's NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal and recognizing that dismissal is appropriate when "it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief). In particular, appellant's claims for misrepresentation and breach of NRS 116.1113 fail because respondent had no duty to proactively disclose whether a superpriority tender had been made.2 Compare NRS 116.31162(1)(b)(3)(II) (2017) (requiring an HOA to

1Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

2A1though appellant frames the issue as whether respondent had a duty to disclose "after reasonable inquiry," appellant's complaint contains disclose if tender of the superpriority portion of the lien has been made), with NRS 116.31162 (2013)3 (not requiring any such disclosure); see Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 394, 400, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2013) (providing the elements for a negligent misrepresentation claim, one of which is "supply[ing] false information" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 (2007) (providing the elements for an intentional misrepresentation claim, one of which is making "a false representation").

Similarly, and assuming without deciding that NRS Chapter applies to NRS Chapter 116 sales, NRS 113.130 requires a seller to disclose "defect[s]," not superpriority tenders.4 NRS 113.100 defines "Defect" as "a condition that materially affects the value or use of residential property in an adverse manner." To the extent that a deed of trust could conceivably constitute a "condition," we note that the subject property technically has the same "value" regardless of whether it is encumbered by the deed of trust.5

no allegations that such an inquiry was made in this case. Relatedly, although appellant contends that it relied upon the recitals in the foreclosure deed, the recitals made no representation one way or the other whether a superpriority tender had been made.

3This was the version of the statute in place at the time of the foreclosure sale.

4We agree with respondent's arguments that applying NRS Chapter to NRS Chapter 116 sales seems nonsensical, but we also recognize appellant's competing arguments that NRS Chapter 113 does not exclude NRS Chapter 116 sales and that NRS 113.100(5)s definition of "Sellee is expansive.

5Nor are we persuaded that the Seller's Real Property Disclosure Form would require disclosure of a superpriority tender.

Finally, because respondent did not do anything unlawful, appellant's civil conspiracy claim necessarily fails. See Consol. Generator- Nev., Ine. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (providing that a civil conspiracy requires, among other things, a "concerted action, intend[ed] to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming anothee). Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

41 J. 1/41:AteAD StigliCh Silver

cc: Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge William C. Turner, Settlement Judge Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd. Leach Kern Gruchow Anderson Song/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk